knfsd: nfsd4: secinfo handling without secinfo= option
We could return some sort of error in the case where someone asks for secinfo
on an export without the secinfo= option set--that'd be no worse than what
we've been doing. But it's not really correct. So, hack up an approximate
secinfo response in that case--it may not be complete, but it'll tell the
client at least one acceptable security flavor.
Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
index 864498f..b3d55c6 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
#include <linux/nfs4.h>
#include <linux/nfs4_acl.h>
#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth_gss.h>
#define NFSDDBG_FACILITY NFSDDBG_XDR
@@ -2454,15 +2455,38 @@
{
int i = 0;
struct svc_export *exp = secinfo->si_exp;
+ u32 nflavs;
+ struct exp_flavor_info *flavs;
+ struct exp_flavor_info def_flavs[2];
ENCODE_HEAD;
if (nfserr)
goto out;
+ if (exp->ex_nflavors) {
+ flavs = exp->ex_flavors;
+ nflavs = exp->ex_nflavors;
+ } else { /* Handling of some defaults in absence of real secinfo: */
+ flavs = def_flavs;
+ if (exp->ex_client->flavour->flavour == RPC_AUTH_UNIX) {
+ nflavs = 2;
+ flavs[0].pseudoflavor = RPC_AUTH_UNIX;
+ flavs[1].pseudoflavor = RPC_AUTH_NULL;
+ } else if (exp->ex_client->flavour->flavour == RPC_AUTH_GSS) {
+ nflavs = 1;
+ flavs[0].pseudoflavor
+ = svcauth_gss_flavor(exp->ex_client);
+ } else {
+ nflavs = 1;
+ flavs[0].pseudoflavor
+ = exp->ex_client->flavour->flavour;
+ }
+ }
+
RESERVE_SPACE(4);
- WRITE32(exp->ex_nflavors);
+ WRITE32(nflavs);
ADJUST_ARGS();
- for (i = 0; i < exp->ex_nflavors; i++) {
- u32 flav = exp->ex_flavors[i].pseudoflavor;
+ for (i = 0; i < nflavs; i++) {
+ u32 flav = flavs[i].pseudoflavor;
struct gss_api_mech *gm = gss_mech_get_by_pseudoflavor(flav);
if (gm) {