)]}'
{
  "commit": "d7992f42c61d5dc6d164f7dddd05284485204ada",
  "tree": "02e6d942f6859ad9cd0e8d7c2cd56bf84bc2f54a",
  "parents": [
    "54b6a1bd5364aca95cd6ffae00f2b64c6511122c"
  ],
  "author": {
    "name": "Neil Horman",
    "email": "nhorman@redhat.com",
    "time": "Wed Jan 28 15:20:51 2009 +1100"
  },
  "committer": {
    "name": "Herbert Xu",
    "email": "herbert@gondor.apana.org.au",
    "time": "Wed Feb 18 16:48:06 2009 +0800"
  },
  "message": "crypto: ansi_cprng - Force reset on allocation\n\nPseudo RNGs provide predictable outputs based on input parateters {key, V, DT},\nthe idea behind them is that only the user should know what the inputs are.\nWhile its nice to have default known values for testing purposes, it seems\ndangerous to allow the use of those default values without some sort of safety\nmeasure in place, lest an attacker easily guess the output of the cprng.  This\npatch forces the NEED_RESET flag on when allocating a cprng context, so that any\nuser is forced to reseed it before use.  The defaults can still be used for\ntesting, but this will prevent their inadvertent use, and be more secure.\n   \nSigned-off-by: Neil Horman \u003cnhorman@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Herbert Xu \u003cherbert@gondor.apana.org.au\u003e\n",
  "tree_diff": [
    {
      "type": "modify",
      "old_id": "0fac8ffc2fb7ef5dc6d39cca05d0292b584bb472",
      "old_mode": 33188,
      "old_path": "crypto/ansi_cprng.c",
      "new_id": "74478061ac0cb9a606b4c8823db63f563bf99263",
      "new_mode": 33188,
      "new_path": "crypto/ansi_cprng.c"
    }
  ]
}