)]}'
{
  "log": [
    {
      "commit": "b53767719b6cd8789392ea3e7e2eb7b8906898f0",
      "tree": "a0279dc93c79b94d3865b0f19f6b7b353e20608c",
      "parents": [
        "57c521ce6125e15e99e56c902cb8da96bee7b36d"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Serge E. Hallyn",
        "email": "serue@us.ibm.com",
        "time": "Tue Oct 16 23:31:36 2007 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org",
        "time": "Wed Oct 17 08:43:07 2007 -0700"
      },
      "message": "Implement file posix capabilities\n\nImplement file posix capabilities.  This allows programs to be given a\nsubset of root\u0027s powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use\nsetuid and giving the binary all of root\u0027s powers.\n\nThis version works with Kaigai Kohei\u0027s userspace tools, found at\nhttp://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php.  For more information on how to use this\npatch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at\nhttp://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.\n\nChangelog:\n\tNov 27:\n\tIncorporate fixes from Andrew Morton\n\t(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and\n\tsecurity-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)\n\tFix Kconfig dependency.\n\tFix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.\n\n\tNov 13:\n\tIntegrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from\n\tcapability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.\n\n\tNov 13:\n\tFix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey\n\tDobriyan.\n\n\tNov 09:\n\tAddress warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security\n\twhen file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean\n\tup the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper\n\tfunction.\n\n\tNov 08:\n\tFor pointers to required userspace tools and how to use\n\tthem, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.\n\n\tNov 07:\n\tFix the calculation of the highest bit checked in\n\tcheck_cap_sanity().\n\n\tNov 07:\n\tAllow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since\n\tcapabilities are the default.\n\tHook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.\n\tMove capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce\n\taudit messages.\n\n\tNov 05:\n\tAdd secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and\n\ttask_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file\n\tcap support can be stacked.\n\n\tSep 05:\n\tAs Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place\n\tfor capability code.\n\n\tSep 01:\n\tDefine task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and\n\ttask_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which\n\tthey called a program with some fscaps.\n\n\tOne remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we\n\tok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a\n\tcpuset?\n\n\tIt is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn\u0027t\n\tallow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check.  But since\n\tit uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where\n\tCAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,\n\tfixing it might be tough.\n\n\t     task_setscheduler\n\t\t note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task.  Are we ok with\n\t\t     CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?\n\t     task_setioprio\n\t     task_setnice\n\t\t sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another\n\t\t process.  Need same checks as setrlimit\n\n\tAug 21:\n\tUpdated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that\n\teuid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process\n\tmight still have elevated caps.\n\n\tAug 15:\n\tHandle endianness of xattrs.\n\tEnforce capability version match between kernel and disk.\n\tEnforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are\n\tset, else return -EPERM.\n\tWith this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering\n\tdoing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than\n\td_instantiate.\n\n\tAug 10:\n\tAlways call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than\n\tcaching it at d_instantiate.\n\n[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]\n[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]\nSigned-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nCc: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nCc: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nCc: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@sous-sol.org\u003e\nCc: Andrew Morgan \u003cmorgan@kernel.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morgan \u003cmorgan@kernel.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Adrian Bunk \u003cbunk@kernel.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "20510f2f4e2dabb0ff6c13901807627ec9452f98",
      "tree": "d64b9eeb90d577f7f9688a215c4c6c3c2405188a",
      "parents": [
        "5c3b447457789374cdb7b03afe2540d48c649a36"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Tue Oct 16 23:31:32 2007 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org",
        "time": "Wed Oct 17 08:43:07 2007 -0700"
      },
      "message": "security: Convert LSM into a static interface\n\nConvert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security\nmodule is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the\noverall security architecture.\n\nNeedlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API\nabuse.\n\nParameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified\nat boot.\n\nThe SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed.\n\nIn a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM.  The modular interface\nis thus unecessary and broken infrastructure.  It is used only by out-of-tree\nmodules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and\ndangerous, e.g.  silently re-vectoring SELinux.\n\n[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups]\n[akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix]\n[randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc]\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@sous-sol.org\u003e\nCc: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nCc: \"Serge E. Hallyn\" \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Arjan van de Ven \u003carjan@infradead.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Randy Dunlap \u003crandy.dunlap@oracle.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "3bc1fa8ae18f281b40903cce94baba10c3cf9d88",
      "tree": "9097244b28cbf4eba16368803272af0fc70224d5",
      "parents": [
        "cd1c6a48ac16b360746f9f111895931d332c35dd"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Chris Wright",
        "email": "chrisw@sous-sol.org",
        "time": "Fri Sep 29 01:59:49 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Fri Sep 29 09:18:10 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] LSM: remove BSD secure level security module\n\nThis code has suffered from broken core design and lack of developer\nattention.  Broken security modules are too dangerous to leave around.  It\nis time to remove this one.\n\nSigned-off-by: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@sous-sol.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Michael Halcrow \u003cmhalcrow@us.ibm.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nCc: Davi Arnaut \u003cdavi.arnaut@gmail.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman \u003cgregkh@suse.de\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Alan Cox \u003calan@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "06ec7be557a1259611d6093a00463c42650dc71a",
      "tree": "b83cdbc8405e0a174939d36e4fe40fb8adb51071",
      "parents": [
        "e51f6d343789a4f0a2a7587ad7ec7746969d5c1c"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Michael LeMay",
        "email": "mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil",
        "time": "Mon Jun 26 00:24:56 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Mon Jun 26 09:58:18 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] keys: restrict contents of /proc/keys to Viewable keys\n\nRestrict /proc/keys such that only those keys to which the current task is\ngranted View permission are presented.\n\nThe documentation is also updated to reflect these changes.\n\nSigned-off-by: Michael LeMay \u003cmdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "df71837d5024e2524cd51c93621e558aa7dd9f3f",
      "tree": "58938f1d46f3c6713b63e5a785e82fdbb10121a1",
      "parents": [
        "88026842b0a760145aa71d69e74fbc9ec118ca44"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Trent Jaeger",
        "email": "tjaeger@cse.psu.edu",
        "time": "Tue Dec 13 23:12:27 2005 -0800"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "David S. Miller",
        "email": "davem@sunset.davemloft.net",
        "time": "Tue Jan 03 13:10:24 2006 -0800"
      },
      "message": "[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction.\n\nThis patch series implements per packet access control via the\nextension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in\nthe XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security\nassociations to label packets.  Extensions to the SELinux LSM are\nincluded that leverage the patch for this purpose.\n\nThis patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem,\npfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a\nsocket to use only authorized security associations (or no security\nassociation) to send/receive network packets.\n\nPatch purpose:\n\nThe patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on\nthe strongly authenticated IPSec security association.  Such access\ncontrols augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP\naddress.  The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be\nspoofed.  By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote\nhosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism.\nThis enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application\nif the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to\nenforce the access control policy.\n\nPatch design approach:\n\nThe overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by\nuser-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a\nsecurity context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM\nsubsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via\nsecurity associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those\npolicies.\n\nA presentation available at\nwww.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf\nfrom the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach.\n\nPatch implementation details:\n\nOn output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or\nxfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of\nthe socket and the same security context is required for resultant\nsecurity association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in\nipsec-tools).  This is enforced in xfrm_state_find.\n\nOn input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket\n(at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must\nalso match the security association being used.\n\nThe patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec.\nThe existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as\nbefore.\n\nAlso, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is\nminimal.  The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the\ncombination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec\nprocessing proceeds as in the original case.\n\nTesting:\n\nThe pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools.  ipsec-tools have\nbeen modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version\n0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security\nassociations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation\nusing the security contexts via racoon.\n\nThe xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set\nsecurity contexts.  These programs are also available from me, and\ncontain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing\nthis interface.  Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel\nbehavior.\n\nSigned-off-by: Trent Jaeger \u003ctjaeger@cse.psu.edu\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Herbert Xu \u003cherbert@gondor.apana.org.au\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "2c40579bdc2a94977fcff2521d5b53a97c33e77a",
      "tree": "04da3ba2070d46115e93ddbb148e035666862d84",
      "parents": [
        "5a73c308754e27829c94544e010f133019cbd432"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Adrian Bunk",
        "email": "bunk@stusta.de",
        "time": "Mon Aug 22 18:20:50 2005 +0200"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Chris Wright",
        "email": "chrisw@osdl.org",
        "time": "Mon Aug 22 14:10:22 2005 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] SECURITY must depend on SYSFS\n\nCONFIG_SECURITY\u003dy and CONFIG_SYSFS\u003dn results in the following compile\nerror:\n\n\u003c--  snip  --\u003e\n\n...\n  LD      vmlinux\nsecurity/built-in.o: In function `securityfs_init\u0027:\ninode.c:(.init.text+0x1c2): undefined reference to `kernel_subsys\u0027\nmake: *** [vmlinux] Error 1\n\n\u003c--  snip  --\u003e\n\nSigned-off-by: Adrian Bunk \u003cbunk@stusta.de\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
      "tree": "0bba044c4ce775e45a88a51686b5d9f90697ea9d",
      "parents": [],
      "author": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org",
        "time": "Sat Apr 16 15:20:36 2005 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org",
        "time": "Sat Apr 16 15:20:36 2005 -0700"
      },
      "message": "Linux-2.6.12-rc2\n\nInitial git repository build. I\u0027m not bothering with the full history,\neven though we have it. We can create a separate \"historical\" git\narchive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it\u0027s about\n3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early\ngit days unnecessarily complicated, when we don\u0027t have a lot of good\ninfrastructure for it.\n\nLet it rip!\n"
    }
  ]
}