)]}' { "log": [ { "commit": "6931dfc9f3f81d148b7ed0ab3fd796f8b986a995", "tree": "8c7251413b1243e29dc155fd9590931b423c5e31", "parents": [ "9a936eb928c1a253c2e5d66b947688bdc55094a6" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@parisplace.org", "time": "Thu Jun 30 02:58:51 2005 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org", "time": "Thu Jun 30 08:45:09 2005 -0700" }, "message": "[PATCH] selinux_sb_copy_data() should not require a whole page\n\nCurrently selinux_sb_copy_data requires an entire page be allocated to\n*orig when the function is called. This \"requirement\" is based on the fact\nthat we call copy_page(in_save, nosec_save) and in_save \u003d orig when the\ndata is not FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA. This means that if a caller were to call\ndo_kern_mount with only about 10 bytes of options, they would get passed\nhere and then we would corrupt PAGE_SIZE - 10 bytes of memory (with all\nzeros.)\n\nCurrently it appears all in kernel FS\u0027s use one page of data so this has\nnot been a problem. An out of kernel FS did just what is described above\nand it would almost always panic shortly after they tried to mount. From\nlooking else where in the kernel it is obvious that this string of data\nmust always be null terminated. (See example in do_mount where it always\nzeros the last byte.) Thus I suggest we use strcpy in place of copy_page.\nIn this way we make sure the amount we copy is always less than or equal to\nthe amount we received and since do_mount is zeroing the last byte this\nshould be safe for all.\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@parisplace.org\u003e\nCc: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@epoch.ncsc.mil\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "9a5f04bf798254390f89445ecf0b6f4c70ddc1f8", "tree": "ed9aa17d9d980f3f013ccc84e12135c65b51757d", "parents": [ "a2ba192c96d12447472e105890a9cd1b97952747" ], "author": { "name": "Jesper Juhl", "email": "juhl-lkml@dif.dk", "time": "Sat Jun 25 14:58:51 2005 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org", "time": "Sat Jun 25 16:25:00 2005 -0700" }, "message": "[PATCH] selinux: kfree cleanup\n\nkfree(NULL) is legal.\n\nSigned-off-by: Jesper Juhl \u003cjuhl-lkml@dif.dk\u003e\nAcked-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "09ffd94fb15d85fbf9eebb8180f50264b264d6fe", "tree": "688a5b60f9718a56a5d4386ef10596e77fb65b7b", "parents": [ "6b9921976f0861e04828b3aff66696c1f3fd900d" ], "author": { "name": "Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro", "email": "lorenzo@gnu.org", "time": "Sat Jun 25 14:54:35 2005 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org", "time": "Sat Jun 25 16:24:26 2005 -0700" }, "message": "[PATCH] selinux: add executable heap check\n\nThis patch,based on sample code by Roland McGrath, adds an execheap\npermission check that controls the ability to make the heap executable so\nthat this can be prevented in almost all cases (the X server is presently\nan exception, but this will hopefully be resolved in the future) so that\neven programs with execmem permission will need to have the anonymous\nmemory mapped in order to make it executable.\n\nThe only reason that we use a permission check for such restriction (vs.\nmaking it unconditional) is that the X module loader presently needs it; it\ncould possibly be made unconditional in the future when X is changed.\n\nThe policy patch for the execheap permission is available at:\nhttp://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/policy-execheap.patch\n\nSigned-off-by: Lorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro \u003clorenzo@gnu.org\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nCc: Ingo Molnar \u003cmingo@elte.hu\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "6b9921976f0861e04828b3aff66696c1f3fd900d", "tree": "be372b9dc81e393c909c7fecf8778e8864ba3a0d", "parents": [ "2d15cab85b85a56cc886037cab43cc292923ff22" ], "author": { "name": "Lorenzo Hernandez García-Hierro", "email": "lorenzo@gnu.org", "time": "Sat Jun 25 14:54:34 2005 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org", "time": "Sat Jun 25 16:24:26 2005 -0700" }, "message": "[PATCH] selinux: add executable stack check\n\nThis patch adds an execstack permission check that controls the ability to\nmake the main process stack executable so that attempts to make the stack\nexecutable can still be prevented even if the process is allowed the\nexisting execmem permission in order to e.g. perform runtime code\ngeneration. Note that this does not yet address thread stacks. Note also\nthat unlike the execmem check, the execstack check is only applied on\nmprotect calls, not mmap calls, as the current security_file_mmap hook is\nnot passed the necessary information presently.\n\nThe original author of the code that makes the distinction of the stack\nregion, is Ingo Molnar, who wrote it within his patch for\n/proc/\u003cpid\u003e/maps markers.\n(http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l\u003dlinux-kernel\u0026m\u003d110719881508591\u0026w\u003d2)\n\nThe patches also can be found at:\nhttp://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/policy-execstack.patch\nhttp://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/kernel-execstack.patch\n\npolicy-execstack.patch is the patch that needs to be applied to the policy in\norder to support the execstack permission and exclude it\nfrom general_domain_access within macros/core_macros.te.\n\nkernel-execstack.patch adds such permission to the SELinux code within\nthe kernel and adds the proper permission check to the selinux_file_mprotect() hook.\n\nSigned-off-by: Lorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro \u003clorenzo@gnu.org\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nCc: Ingo Molnar \u003cmingo@elte.hu\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "da3caa204ca40c32dcb751ebead2a6835b83e8d1", "tree": "0bf36cf3bd9bee84cc4f93de5e99d6a0832329cb", "parents": [ "8680e22f296e75e5497edb660c59c6b4dcfbbd32" ], "author": { "name": "Gerald Schaefer", "email": "geraldsc@de.ibm.com", "time": "Tue Jun 21 17:15:18 2005 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org", "time": "Tue Jun 21 18:46:22 2005 -0700" }, "message": "[PATCH] SELinux: memory leak in selinux_sb_copy_data()\n\nThere is a memory leak during mount when SELinux is active and mount\noptions are specified.\n\nSigned-off-by: Gerald Schaefer \u003cgeraldsc@de.ibm.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@epoch.ncsc.mil\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "c04049939f88b29e235d2da217bce6e8ead44f32", "tree": "9bf3ab72b9939c529e7c96f8768bc8b7e1d768c9", "parents": [ "9ea74f0655412d0fbd12bf9adb6c14c8fe707a42" ], "author": { "name": "Steve Grubb", "email": "sgrubb@redhat.com", "time": "Fri May 13 18:17:42 2005 +0100" }, "committer": { "name": "David Woodhouse", "email": "dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org", "time": "Fri May 13 18:17:42 2005 +0100" }, "message": "AUDIT: Add message types to audit records\n\nThis patch adds more messages types to the audit subsystem so that audit \nanalysis is quicker, intuitive, and more useful.\n\nSigned-off-by: Steve Grubb \u003csgrubb@redhat.com\u003e\n---\nI forgot one type in the big patch. I need to add one for user space \noriginating SE Linux avc messages. This is used by dbus and nscd.\n\n-Steve\n---\nUpdated to 2.6.12-rc4-mm1.\n-dwmw2\n\nSigned-off-by: David Woodhouse \u003cdwmw2@infradead.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "6af963f1d6789ef20abca5696cd52a758b396e52", "tree": "20990e909fc4a79789de54cfcae7ea150329cdc5", "parents": [ "de7d5a3b6c9ff8429bf046c36b56d3192b75c3da" ], "author": { "name": "Stephen Smalley", "email": "sds@tycho.nsa.gov", "time": "Sun May 01 08:58:39 2005 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org", "time": "Sun May 01 08:58:39 2005 -0700" }, "message": "[PATCH] SELinux: cleanup ipc_has_perm\n\nThis patch removes the sclass argument from ipc_has_perm in the SELinux\nmodule, as it can be obtained from the ipc security structure. The use of\na separate argument was a legacy of the older precondition function\nhandling in SELinux and is obsolete. Please apply.\n\nSigned-off-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "0d3d077cd4f1154e63a9858e47fe3fb1ad0c03e5", "tree": "63f376b3586412af712ffac7d500516c98f7bb2c", "parents": [ "aa77d26961fa4ecb11fe4209578dcd62ad15819d" ], "author": { "name": "Herbert Xu", "email": "herbert@gondor.apana.org.au", "time": "Sun Apr 24 20:16:19 2005 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "David S. Miller", "email": "davem@davemloft.net", "time": "Sun Apr 24 20:16:19 2005 -0700" }, "message": "[SELINUX]: Fix ipv6_skip_exthdr() invocation causing OOPS.\n\nThe SELinux hooks invoke ipv6_skip_exthdr() with an incorrect\nlength final argument. However, the length argument turns out\nto be superfluous.\n\nI was just reading ipv6_skip_exthdr and it occured to me that we can\nget rid of len altogether. The only place where len is used is to\ncheck whether the skb has two bytes for ipv6_opt_hdr. This check\nis done by skb_header_pointer/skb_copy_bits anyway.\n\nNow it might appear that we\u0027ve made the code slower by deferring\nthe check to skb_copy_bits. However, this check should not trigger\nin the common case so this is OK.\n\nSigned-off-by: Herbert Xu \u003cherbert@gondor.apana.org.au\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "0c9b79429c83a404a04908be65baa9d97836bbb6", "tree": "66cdf9fc4cf40867ed8c9dc060661615941cd95f", "parents": [ "7e5c6bc0a600c49e5922591ad41ff41987f54eb4" ], "author": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@redhat.com", "time": "Sat Apr 16 15:24:13 2005 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org", "time": "Sat Apr 16 15:24:13 2005 -0700" }, "message": "[PATCH] SELinux: add support for NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT\n\nThis patch adds SELinux support for the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family, so\nthat SELinux can apply finer grained controls to it. For example, security\npolicy for hald can be locked down to the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family\nonly. Currently, this family simply defaults to the default Netlink socket\nclass.\n\nNote that some new permission definitions are added to sync with changes in\nthe core userspace policy package, which auto-generates header files.\n\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2", "tree": "0bba044c4ce775e45a88a51686b5d9f90697ea9d", "parents": [], "author": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org", "time": "Sat Apr 16 15:20:36 2005 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org", "time": "Sat Apr 16 15:20:36 2005 -0700" }, "message": "Linux-2.6.12-rc2\n\nInitial git repository build. I\u0027m not bothering with the full history,\neven though we have it. We can create a separate \"historical\" git\narchive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it\u0027s about\n3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early\ngit days unnecessarily complicated, when we don\u0027t have a lot of good\ninfrastructure for it.\n\nLet it rip!\n" } ] }