)]}' { "log": [ { "commit": "09ffd94fb15d85fbf9eebb8180f50264b264d6fe", "tree": "688a5b60f9718a56a5d4386ef10596e77fb65b7b", "parents": [ "6b9921976f0861e04828b3aff66696c1f3fd900d" ], "author": { "name": "Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro", "email": "lorenzo@gnu.org", "time": "Sat Jun 25 14:54:35 2005 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org", "time": "Sat Jun 25 16:24:26 2005 -0700" }, "message": "[PATCH] selinux: add executable heap check\n\nThis patch,based on sample code by Roland McGrath, adds an execheap\npermission check that controls the ability to make the heap executable so\nthat this can be prevented in almost all cases (the X server is presently\nan exception, but this will hopefully be resolved in the future) so that\neven programs with execmem permission will need to have the anonymous\nmemory mapped in order to make it executable.\n\nThe only reason that we use a permission check for such restriction (vs.\nmaking it unconditional) is that the X module loader presently needs it; it\ncould possibly be made unconditional in the future when X is changed.\n\nThe policy patch for the execheap permission is available at:\nhttp://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/policy-execheap.patch\n\nSigned-off-by: Lorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro \u003clorenzo@gnu.org\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nCc: Ingo Molnar \u003cmingo@elte.hu\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "6b9921976f0861e04828b3aff66696c1f3fd900d", "tree": "be372b9dc81e393c909c7fecf8778e8864ba3a0d", "parents": [ "2d15cab85b85a56cc886037cab43cc292923ff22" ], "author": { "name": "Lorenzo Hernandez García-Hierro", "email": "lorenzo@gnu.org", "time": "Sat Jun 25 14:54:34 2005 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org", "time": "Sat Jun 25 16:24:26 2005 -0700" }, "message": "[PATCH] selinux: add executable stack check\n\nThis patch adds an execstack permission check that controls the ability to\nmake the main process stack executable so that attempts to make the stack\nexecutable can still be prevented even if the process is allowed the\nexisting execmem permission in order to e.g. perform runtime code\ngeneration. Note that this does not yet address thread stacks. Note also\nthat unlike the execmem check, the execstack check is only applied on\nmprotect calls, not mmap calls, as the current security_file_mmap hook is\nnot passed the necessary information presently.\n\nThe original author of the code that makes the distinction of the stack\nregion, is Ingo Molnar, who wrote it within his patch for\n/proc/\u003cpid\u003e/maps markers.\n(http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l\u003dlinux-kernel\u0026m\u003d110719881508591\u0026w\u003d2)\n\nThe patches also can be found at:\nhttp://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/policy-execstack.patch\nhttp://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/kernel-execstack.patch\n\npolicy-execstack.patch is the patch that needs to be applied to the policy in\norder to support the execstack permission and exclude it\nfrom general_domain_access within macros/core_macros.te.\n\nkernel-execstack.patch adds such permission to the SELinux code within\nthe kernel and adds the proper permission check to the selinux_file_mprotect() hook.\n\nSigned-off-by: Lorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro \u003clorenzo@gnu.org\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nCc: Ingo Molnar \u003cmingo@elte.hu\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "b207a290ea7dc83dba02e40b81cc8a29415a9c60", "tree": "fe76d1c494977ba95ab576e9207dc13c4a66a04a", "parents": [ "6af963f1d6789ef20abca5696cd52a758b396e52" ], "author": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@redhat.com", "time": "Sun May 01 08:58:40 2005 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org", "time": "Sun May 01 08:58:40 2005 -0700" }, "message": "[PATCH] SELinux: add finer grained permissions to Netlink audit processing\n\nThis patch provides finer grained permissions for the audit family of\nNetlink sockets under SELinux.\n\n1. We need a way to differentiate between privileged and unprivileged\n reads of kernel data maintained by the audit subsystem. The AUDIT_GET\n operation is unprivileged: it returns the current status of the audit\n subsystem (e.g. whether it\u0027s enabled etc.). The AUDIT_LIST operation\n however returns a list of the current audit ruleset, which is considered\n privileged by the audit folk. To deal with this, a new SELinux\n permission has been implemented and applied to the operation:\n nlmsg_readpriv, which can be allocated to appropriately privileged\n domains. Unprivileged domains would only be allocated nlmsg_read.\n\n2. There is a requirement for certain domains to generate audit events\n from userspace. These events need to be collected by the kernel,\n collated and transmitted sequentially back to the audit daemon. An\n example is user level login, an auditable event under CAPP, where\n login-related domains generate AUDIT_USER messages via PAM which are\n relayed back to auditd via the kernel. To prevent handing out\n nlmsg_write permissions to such domains, a new permission has been\n added, nlmsg_relay, which is intended for this type of purpose: data is\n passed via the kernel back to userspace but no privileged information is\n written to the kernel.\n\nAlso, AUDIT_LOGIN messages are now valid only for kernel-\u003euser messaging,\nso this value has been removed from the SELinux nlmsgtab (which is only\nused to check user-\u003ekernel messages).\n\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "0c9b79429c83a404a04908be65baa9d97836bbb6", "tree": "66cdf9fc4cf40867ed8c9dc060661615941cd95f", "parents": [ "7e5c6bc0a600c49e5922591ad41ff41987f54eb4" ], "author": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@redhat.com", "time": "Sat Apr 16 15:24:13 2005 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org", "time": "Sat Apr 16 15:24:13 2005 -0700" }, "message": "[PATCH] SELinux: add support for NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT\n\nThis patch adds SELinux support for the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family, so\nthat SELinux can apply finer grained controls to it. For example, security\npolicy for hald can be locked down to the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family\nonly. Currently, this family simply defaults to the default Netlink socket\nclass.\n\nNote that some new permission definitions are added to sync with changes in\nthe core userspace policy package, which auto-generates header files.\n\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2", "tree": "0bba044c4ce775e45a88a51686b5d9f90697ea9d", "parents": [], "author": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org", "time": "Sat Apr 16 15:20:36 2005 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org", "time": "Sat Apr 16 15:20:36 2005 -0700" }, "message": "Linux-2.6.12-rc2\n\nInitial git repository build. I\u0027m not bothering with the full history,\neven though we have it. We can create a separate \"historical\" git\narchive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it\u0027s about\n3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early\ngit days unnecessarily complicated, when we don\u0027t have a lot of good\ninfrastructure for it.\n\nLet it rip!\n" } ] }