)]}'
{
  "log": [
    {
      "commit": "566be59ab86c0e030b980645a580d683a015a483",
      "tree": "c5d29c7db2f8ef93e970cb405621f59c57d01b94",
      "parents": [
        "bf6d0f5dcda17df3cc5577e203d0f8ea1c2ad6aa"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Mimi Zohar",
        "email": "zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com",
        "time": "Mon Aug 22 09:14:18 2011 -0400"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Mimi Zohar",
        "email": "zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com",
        "time": "Wed Sep 14 15:24:52 2011 -0400"
      },
      "message": "evm: permit mode bits to be updated\n\nBefore permitting \u0027security.evm\u0027 to be updated, \u0027security.evm\u0027 must\nexist and be valid.  In the case that there are no existing EVM protected\nxattrs, it is safe for posix acls to update the mode bits.\n\nTo differentiate between no \u0027security.evm\u0027 xattr and no xattrs used to\ncalculate \u0027security.evm\u0027, this patch defines INTEGRITY_NOXATTR.\n\nSigned-off-by: Mimi Zohar \u003czohar@us.ibm.com\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "6be5cc5246f807fd8ede9f5f1bb2826f2c598658",
      "tree": "00fc342eb91fb50df4e8eddfe2a7294b27df8117",
      "parents": [
        "66dbc325afcef909043c30e90930a36823fc734c"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Dmitry Kasatkin",
        "email": "dmitry.kasatkin@nokia.com",
        "time": "Wed Mar 09 14:28:20 2011 -0500"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Mimi Zohar",
        "email": "zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com",
        "time": "Mon Jul 18 12:29:41 2011 -0400"
      },
      "message": "evm: add support for different security.evm data types\n\nEVM protects a file\u0027s security extended attributes(xattrs) against integrity\nattacks. The current patchset maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the security\nxattrs, storing the value as the extended attribute \u0027security.evm\u0027. We\nanticipate other methods for protecting the security extended attributes.\nThis patch reserves the first byte of \u0027security.evm\u0027 as a place holder for\nthe type of method.\n\nChangelog v6:\n- move evm_ima_xattr_type definition to security/integrity/integrity.h\n- defined a structure for the EVM xattr called evm_ima_xattr_data\n  (based on Serge Hallyn\u0027s suggestion)\n- removed unnecessary memset\n\nSigned-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin \u003cdmitry.kasatkin@nokia.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Mimi Zohar \u003czohar@us.ibm.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserge.hallyn@canonical.com\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "66dbc325afcef909043c30e90930a36823fc734c",
      "tree": "5c8a7fe063a058f4266c6db5e48229e8c04dd00e",
      "parents": [
        "1601fbad2b14e0b8d4dbb55e749bfe31e972818a"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Mimi Zohar",
        "email": "zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com",
        "time": "Tue Mar 15 16:12:09 2011 -0400"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Mimi Zohar",
        "email": "zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com",
        "time": "Mon Jul 18 12:29:40 2011 -0400"
      },
      "message": "evm: re-release\n\nEVM protects a file\u0027s security extended attributes(xattrs) against integrity\nattacks.  This patchset provides the framework and an initial method.  The\ninitial method maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the security extended\nattributes, storing the HMAC value as the extended attribute \u0027security.evm\u0027.\nOther methods of validating the integrity of a file\u0027s metadata will be posted\nseparately (eg. EVM-digital-signatures).\n\nWhile this patchset does authenticate the security xattrs, and\ncryptographically binds them to the inode, coming extensions will bind other\ndirectory and inode metadata for more complete protection.  To help simplify\nthe review and upstreaming process, each extension will be posted separately\n(eg. IMA-appraisal, IMA-appraisal-directory).  For a general overview of the\nproposed Linux integrity subsystem, refer to Dave Safford\u0027s whitepaper:\nhttp://downloads.sf.net/project/linux-ima/linux-ima/Integrity_overview.pdf.\n\nEVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it with a\ntrusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation. The key is loaded onto the\nroot\u0027s keyring using keyctl.  Until EVM receives notification that the key has\nbeen successfully loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 \u003e \u003csecurityfs\u003e/evm), EVM can\nnot create or validate the \u0027security.evm\u0027 xattr, but returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN.\nLoading the key and signaling EVM should be done as early as possible. Normally\nthis is done in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part of the\ntrusted boot.  For more information on creating and loading existing\ntrusted/encrypted keys, refer to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt.  A\nsample dracut patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables EVM, is\navailable from http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.\n\nBased on the LSMs enabled, the set of EVM protected security xattrs is defined\nat compile.  EVM adds the following three calls to the existing security hooks:\nevm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), and evm_inode_removexattr.  To\ninitialize and update the \u0027security.evm\u0027 extended attribute, EVM defines three\ncalls: evm_inode_post_init(), evm_inode_post_setattr() and\nevm_inode_post_removexattr() hooks.  To verify the integrity of a security\nxattr, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr().\n\nChangelog v7:\n- Fixed URL in EVM ABI documentation\n\nChangelog v6: (based on Serge Hallyn\u0027s review)\n- fix URL in patch description\n- remove evm_hmac_size definition\n- use SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE (removed both MAX_DIGEST_SIZE and evm_hmac_size)\n- moved linux include before other includes\n- test for crypto_hash_setkey failure\n- fail earlier for invalid key\n- clear entire encrypted key, even on failure\n- check xattr name length before comparing xattr names\n\nChangelog:\n- locking based on i_mutex, remove evm_mutex\n- using trusted/encrypted keys for storing the EVM key used in the HMAC-sha1\n  operation.\n- replaced crypto hash with shash (Dmitry Kasatkin)\n- support for additional methods of verifying the security xattrs\n  (Dmitry Kasatkin)\n- iint not allocated for all regular files, but only for those appraised\n- Use cap_sys_admin in lieu of cap_mac_admin\n- Use __vfs_setxattr_noperm(), without permission checks, from EVM\n\nSigned-off-by: Mimi Zohar \u003czohar@us.ibm.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserge.hallyn@canonical.com\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "f381c272224f5f158f5cff64f8f3481fa0eee8b3",
      "tree": "a003dc4c6635c9d2fa90f31577ba5e7ea7bc71b1",
      "parents": [
        "9d8f13ba3f4833219e50767b022b82cd0da930eb"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Mimi Zohar",
        "email": "zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com",
        "time": "Wed Mar 09 14:13:22 2011 -0500"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Mimi Zohar",
        "email": "zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com",
        "time": "Mon Jul 18 12:29:38 2011 -0400"
      },
      "message": "integrity: move ima inode integrity data management\n\nMove the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory\nin order to share the iint among the different integrity models.\n\nChangelog:\n- don\u0027t define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE\n- rename several globally visible \u0027ima_\u0027 prefixed functions, structs,\n  locks, etc to \u0027integrity_\u0027\n- replace \u002720\u0027 with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE\n- reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles\n- remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0\n- rebased on current ima_iint.c\n- define integrity_iint_store/lock as static\n\nThere should be no other functional changes.\n\nSigned-off-by: Mimi Zohar \u003czohar@us.ibm.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserge.hallyn@ubuntu.com\u003e\n"
    }
  ]
}