)]}'
{
  "log": [
    {
      "commit": "4e54f08543d05e519e601368571cc3787fefae96",
      "tree": "0cd9d982e5bb25abcb9251d26c36ff11e7dc81a5",
      "parents": [
        "94583779e6625154e8d7fce33d097ae7d089e9de"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "David Howells",
        "email": "dhowells@redhat.com",
        "time": "Thu Jun 29 02:24:28 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Thu Jun 29 10:26:20 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] Keys: Allow in-kernel key requestor to pass auxiliary data to upcaller\n\nThe proposed NFS key type uses its own method of passing key requests to\nuserspace (upcalling) rather than invoking /sbin/request-key.  This is\nbecause the responsible userspace daemon should already be running and will\nbe contacted through rpc_pipefs.\n\nThis patch permits the NFS filesystem to pass auxiliary data to the upcall\noperation (struct key_type::request_key) so that the upcaller can use a\npre-existing communications channel more easily.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-By: Kevin Coffman \u003ckwc@citi.umich.edu\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "7e047ef5fe2d52e83020e856b1bf2556a6a2ce98",
      "tree": "97656e2c56a27be9d1da451dde627b693b8643f2",
      "parents": [
        "f116629d03655adaf7832b93b03c99391d09d4a7"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "David Howells",
        "email": "dhowells@redhat.com",
        "time": "Mon Jun 26 00:24:50 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Mon Jun 26 09:58:18 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] keys: sort out key quota system\n\nAdd the ability for key creation to overrun the user\u0027s quota in some\ncircumstances - notably when a session keyring is created and assigned to a\nprocess that didn\u0027t previously have one.\n\nThis means it\u0027s still possible to log in, should PAM require the creation of a\nnew session keyring, and fix an overburdened key quota.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "04c567d9313e4927b9835361d8ac0318ce65af6b",
      "tree": "d040ef59337342603f2cc30917493fb6a74a212a",
      "parents": [
        "d720024e94de4e8b7f10ee83c532926f3ad5d708"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "David Howells",
        "email": "dhowells@redhat.com",
        "time": "Thu Jun 22 14:47:18 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Thu Jun 22 15:05:56 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] Keys: Fix race between two instantiators of a key\n\nAdd a revocation notification method to the key type and calls it whilst\nthe key\u0027s semaphore is still write-locked after setting the revocation\nflag.\n\nThe patch then uses this to maintain a reference on the task_struct of the\nprocess that calls request_key() for as long as the authorisation key\nremains unrevoked.\n\nThis fixes a potential race between two processes both of which have\nassumed the authority to instantiate a key (one may have forked the other\nfor example).  The problem is that there\u0027s no locking around the check for\nrevocation of the auth key and the use of the task_struct it points to, nor\ndoes the auth key keep a reference on the task_struct.\n\nAccess to the \"context\" pointer in the auth key must thenceforth be done\nwith the auth key semaphore held.  The revocation method is called with the\ntarget key semaphore held write-locked and the search of the context\nprocess\u0027s keyrings is done with the auth key semaphore read-locked.\n\nThe check for the revocation state of the auth key just prior to searching\nit is done after the auth key is read-locked for the search.  This ensures\nthat the auth key can\u0027t be revoked between the check and the search.\n\nThe revocation notification method is added so that the context task_struct\ncan be released as soon as instantiation happens rather than waiting for\nthe auth key to be destroyed, thus avoiding the unnecessary pinning of the\nrequesting process.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "d720024e94de4e8b7f10ee83c532926f3ad5d708",
      "tree": "8f21613c29a26bfbeb334cb0104b8b998b09fbdc",
      "parents": [
        "f893afbe1262e27e91234506f72e17716190dd2f"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Michael LeMay",
        "email": "mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil",
        "time": "Thu Jun 22 14:47:17 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Thu Jun 22 15:05:55 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] selinux: add hooks for key subsystem\n\nIntroduce SELinux hooks to support the access key retention subsystem\nwithin the kernel.  Incorporate new flask headers from a modified version\nof the SELinux reference policy, with support for the new security class\nrepresenting retained keys.  Extend the \"key_alloc\" security hook with a\ntask parameter representing the intended ownership context for the key\nbeing allocated.  Attach security information to root\u0027s default keyrings\nwithin the SELinux initialization routine.\n\nHas passed David\u0027s testsuite.\n\nSigned-off-by: Michael LeMay \u003cmdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@sous-sol.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "b5f545c880a2a47947ba2118b2509644ab7a2969",
      "tree": "8720e02262b0ff6309ae79603f6c63965296d378",
      "parents": [
        "cab8eb594e84b434d20412fc5a3985b0bee3ab9f"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "David Howells",
        "email": "dhowells@redhat.com",
        "time": "Sun Jan 08 01:02:47 2006 -0800"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Sun Jan 08 20:13:53 2006 -0800"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys\n\nMake it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to\ninstantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4.\n\nThe patch makes the following changes:\n\n (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type\n     to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be\n     spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the\n     rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance.\n\n     The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation\n     name are passed to the method.\n\n (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key\n     to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in\n     /proc/pid/cmdline.\n\n     This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the\n     patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no\n     longer there.\n\n     A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow.\n\n (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this\n     key will retrieve the information.\n\n (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the\n     authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here\n     for the caller\u0027s set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the\n     lowest level of the session keyring.\n\n     This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to\n     switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and\n     so is usable in multithreaded programs.\n\n     The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec.\n\n (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that\n     permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated\n     key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated\n     with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread\u0027s keyrings.\n\n     This function can also clear the assumption.\n\n (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently\n     assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY).\n\n (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is\n     assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if\n     instantiation is successful.\n\n (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the\n     file of permissions functions.\n\n (9) The documentation is updated.\n\nFrom: \u003cValdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu\u003e\n\n    Build fix.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nCc: Trond Myklebust \u003ctrond.myklebust@fys.uio.no\u003e\nCc: Alexander Zangerl \u003caz@bond.edu.au\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "8d9067bda99c68e1a17d93e78cf3a5a3f67e0c35",
      "tree": "6f3c7fe665012c456b57840c290eafd4deabbeb2",
      "parents": [
        "32725ad8430b58e42c5d54757ce7871e680d05cb"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "David Howells",
        "email": "dhowells@redhat.com",
        "time": "Fri Jan 06 00:11:24 2006 -0800"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Fri Jan 06 08:33:29 2006 -0800"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] Keys: Remove key duplication\n\nRemove the key duplication stuff since there\u0027s nothing that uses it, no way\nto get at it and it\u0027s awkward to deal with for LSM purposes.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "29db9190634067c5a328ee5fcc2890251b836b4b",
      "tree": "07ec242789230824f1fa8bcbbe681fd5bf166fa8",
      "parents": [
        "2aa349f6e37ce030060c994d3aebbff4ab703565"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "David Howells",
        "email": "dhowells@redhat.com",
        "time": "Sun Oct 30 15:02:44 2005 -0800"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Sun Oct 30 17:37:23 2005 -0800"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] Keys: Add LSM hooks for key management [try #3]\n\nThe attached patch adds LSM hooks for key management facilities. The notable\nchanges are:\n\n (1) The key struct now supports a security pointer for the use of security\n     modules. This will permit key labelling and restrictions on which\n     programs may access a key.\n\n (2) Security modules get a chance to note (or abort) the allocation of a key.\n\n (3) The key permission checking can now be enhanced by the security modules;\n     the permissions check consults LSM if all other checks bear out.\n\n (4) The key permissions checking functions now return an error code rather\n     than a boolean value.\n\n (5) An extra permission has been added to govern the modification of\n     attributes (UID, GID, permissions).\n\nNote that there isn\u0027t an LSM hook specifically for each keyctl() operation,\nbut rather the permissions hook allows control of individual operations based\non the permission request bits.\n\nKey management access control through LSM is enabled by automatically if both\nCONFIG_KEYS and CONFIG_SECURITY are enabled.\n\nThis should be applied on top of the patch ensubjected:\n\n\t[PATCH] Keys: Possessor permissions should be additive\n\nSigned-Off-By: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "664cceb0093b755739e56572b836a99104ee8a75",
      "tree": "dbaa3ab802803879f29532db4d8a91a54294cf88",
      "parents": [
        "5134fc15b643dc36eb9aa77e4318b886844a9ac5"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "David Howells",
        "email": "dhowells@redhat.com",
        "time": "Wed Sep 28 17:03:15 2005 +0100"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Wed Sep 28 09:10:47 2005 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] Keys: Add possessor permissions to keys [try #3]\n\nThe attached patch adds extra permission grants to keys for the possessor of a\nkey in addition to the owner, group and other permissions bits. This makes\nSUID binaries easier to support without going as far as labelling keys and key\ntargets using the LSM facilities.\n\nThis patch adds a second \"pointer type\" to key structures (struct key_ref *)\nthat can have the bottom bit of the address set to indicate the possession of\na key. This is propagated through searches from the keyring to the discovered\nkey. It has been made a separate type so that the compiler can spot attempts\nto dereference a potentially incorrect pointer.\n\nThe \"possession\" attribute can\u0027t be attached to a key structure directly as\nit\u0027s not an intrinsic property of a key.\n\nPointers to keys have been replaced with struct key_ref *\u0027s wherever\npossession information needs to be passed through.\n\nThis does assume that the bottom bit of the pointer will always be zero on\nreturn from kmem_cache_alloc().\n\nThe key reference type has been made into a typedef so that at least it can be\nlocated in the sources, even though it\u0027s basically a pointer to an undefined\ntype. I\u0027ve also renamed the accessor functions to be more useful, and all\nreference variables should now end in \"_ref\".\n\nSigned-Off-By: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "3e30148c3d524a9c1c63ca28261bc24c457eb07a",
      "tree": "a2fcc46cc11fe871ad976c07476d934a07313576",
      "parents": [
        "8589b4e00e352f983259140f25a262d973be6bc5"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "David Howells",
        "email": "dhowells@redhat.com",
        "time": "Thu Jun 23 22:00:56 2005 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org",
        "time": "Fri Jun 24 00:05:19 2005 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key\n\nThe attached patch makes the following changes:\n\n (1) There\u0027s a new special key type called \".request_key_auth\".\n\n     This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and\n     another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be\n     created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.\n\n     Authorisation keys hold two references:\n\n     (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being\n     \t constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,\n     \t rendering it of no further use.\n\n     (b) The \"authorising process\". This is either:\n\n     \t (i) the process that called request_key(), or:\n\n     \t (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an\n     \t      authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising\n     \t      process referred to by that authorisation key will also be\n     \t      referred to by the new authorisation key.\n\n\t This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests\n\t will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with\n\t the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.\n\n (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to\n     /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.\n\n (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if\n     it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the\n     calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process\n     specified therein and it will use the specified process\u0027s credentials\n     (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process\u0027s\n     credentials.\n\n     This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging\n     to the authorising process.\n\n (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn\u0027t have\n     direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the\n     keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the\n     calling process\u0027s session keyring, and is searchable using the\n     credentials of the authorising process.\n\n     This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging\n     to the authorising process.\n\n (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or\n     KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather\n     than the process doing the instantiation.\n\n (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which\n     request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is\n     done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*\n     constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.\n\n (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another\n     process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits\n     a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.\n\nSigned-Off-By: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot \u003cbenoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "7888e7ff4ee579442128d7d12a9c9dbf2cf7de6a",
      "tree": "abe428ecb966e1dae07fce17f38e3e0c0ab4f134",
      "parents": [
        "76d8aeabfeb1c42641a81c44280177b9a08670d8"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "David Howells",
        "email": "dhowells@redhat.com",
        "time": "Thu Jun 23 22:00:51 2005 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org",
        "time": "Fri Jun 24 00:05:18 2005 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] Keys: Pass session keyring to call_usermodehelper()\n\nThe attached patch makes it possible to pass a session keyring through to the\nprocess spawned by call_usermodehelper().  This allows patch 3/3 to pass an\nauthorisation key through to /sbin/request-key, thus permitting better access\ncontrols when doing just-in-time key creation.\n\nSigned-Off-By: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "76d8aeabfeb1c42641a81c44280177b9a08670d8",
      "tree": "0a584439bb44e440717aa77a1398ba9eea24a137",
      "parents": [
        "7286aa9b9ab35f20b1ff16d867f4535701df99b5"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "David Howells",
        "email": "dhowells@redhat.com",
        "time": "Thu Jun 23 22:00:49 2005 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org",
        "time": "Fri Jun 24 00:05:18 2005 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] keys: Discard key spinlock and use RCU for key payload\n\nThe attached patch changes the key implementation in a number of ways:\n\n (1) It removes the spinlock from the key structure.\n\n (2) The key flags are now accessed using atomic bitops instead of\n     write-locking the key spinlock and using C bitwise operators.\n\n     The three instantiation flags are dealt with with the construction\n     semaphore held during the request_key/instantiate/negate sequence, thus\n     rendering the spinlock superfluous.\n\n     The key flags are also now bit numbers not bit masks.\n\n (3) The key payload is now accessed using RCU. This permits the recursive\n     keyring search algorithm to be simplified greatly since no locks need be\n     taken other than the usual RCU preemption disablement. Searching now does\n     not require any locks or semaphores to be held; merely that the starting\n     keyring be pinned.\n\n (4) The keyring payload now includes an RCU head so that it can be disposed\n     of by call_rcu(). This requires that the payload be copied on unlink to\n     prevent introducing races in copy-down vs search-up.\n\n (5) The user key payload is now a structure with the data following it. It\n     includes an RCU head like the keyring payload and for the same reason. It\n     also contains a data length because the data length in the key may be\n     changed on another CPU whilst an RCU protected read is in progress on the\n     payload. This would then see the supposed RCU payload and the on-key data\n     length getting out of sync.\n\n     I\u0027m tempted to drop the key\u0027s datalen entirely, except that it\u0027s used in\n     conjunction with quota management and so is a little tricky to get rid\n     of.\n\n (6) Update the keys documentation.\n\nSigned-Off-By: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
      "tree": "0bba044c4ce775e45a88a51686b5d9f90697ea9d",
      "parents": [],
      "author": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org",
        "time": "Sat Apr 16 15:20:36 2005 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org",
        "time": "Sat Apr 16 15:20:36 2005 -0700"
      },
      "message": "Linux-2.6.12-rc2\n\nInitial git repository build. I\u0027m not bothering with the full history,\neven though we have it. We can create a separate \"historical\" git\narchive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it\u0027s about\n3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early\ngit days unnecessarily complicated, when we don\u0027t have a lot of good\ninfrastructure for it.\n\nLet it rip!\n"
    }
  ]
}