)]}'
{
  "log": [
    {
      "commit": "7bf570dc8dcf76df2a9f583bef2da96d4289ed0d",
      "tree": "b60a62585dfe511d9216cdd4a207fd07df1b2f99",
      "parents": [
        "7663c1e2792a9662b23dec6e19bfcd3d55360b8f"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "David Howells",
        "email": "dhowells@redhat.com",
        "time": "Tue Apr 29 20:52:51 2008 +0100"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org",
        "time": "Tue Apr 29 13:22:56 2008 -0700"
      },
      "message": "Security: Make secctx_to_secid() take const secdata\n\nMake secctx_to_secid() take constant secdata.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "70a5bb72b55e82fbfbf1e22cae6975fac58a1e2d",
      "tree": "8e6dcaf5630388d81b23845f293789f2d6a3596b",
      "parents": [
        "4a38e122e2cc6294779021ff4ccc784a3997059e"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "David Howells",
        "email": "dhowells@redhat.com",
        "time": "Tue Apr 29 01:01:26 2008 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org",
        "time": "Tue Apr 29 08:06:16 2008 -0700"
      },
      "message": "keys: add keyctl function to get a security label\n\nAdd a keyctl() function to get the security label of a key.\n\nThe following is added to Documentation/keys.txt:\n\n (*) Get the LSM security context attached to a key.\n\n\tlong keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY, key_serial_t key, char *buffer,\n\t\t    size_t buflen)\n\n     This function returns a string that represents the LSM security context\n     attached to a key in the buffer provided.\n\n     Unless there\u0027s an error, it always returns the amount of data it could\n     produce, even if that\u0027s too big for the buffer, but it won\u0027t copy more\n     than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy\n     will take place.\n\n     A NUL character is included at the end of the string if the buffer is\n     sufficiently big.  This is included in the returned count.  If no LSM is\n     in force then an empty string will be returned.\n\n     A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be\n     successful.\n\n[akpm@linux-foundation.org: declare keyctl_get_security()]\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nCc: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\nCc: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@sous-sol.org\u003e\nCc: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nCc: Kevin Coffman \u003ckwc@citi.umich.edu\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "8f0cfa52a1d4ffacd8e7de906d19662f5da58d58",
      "tree": "2aa82e3682e75330d9b5d601855e3af3c57c03d8",
      "parents": [
        "7ec02ef1596bb3c829a7e8b65ebf13b87faf1819"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "David Howells",
        "email": "dhowells@redhat.com",
        "time": "Tue Apr 29 00:59:41 2008 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org",
        "time": "Tue Apr 29 08:06:06 2008 -0700"
      },
      "message": "xattr: add missing consts to function arguments\n\nAdd missing consts to xattr function arguments.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nCc: Andreas Gruenbacher \u003cagruen@suse.de\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "3898b1b4ebff8dcfbcf1807e0661585e06c9a91c",
      "tree": "69a338864dfe654f68064a599c5d0da460df34ac",
      "parents": [
        "4016a1390d07f15b267eecb20e76a48fd5c524ef"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Andrew G. Morgan",
        "email": "morgan@kernel.org",
        "time": "Mon Apr 28 02:13:40 2008 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org",
        "time": "Mon Apr 28 08:58:26 2008 -0700"
      },
      "message": "capabilities: implement per-process securebits\n\nFilesystem capability support makes it possible to do away with (set)uid-0\nbased privilege and use capabilities instead.  That is, with filesystem\nsupport for capabilities but without this present patch, it is (conceptually)\npossible to manage a system with capabilities alone and never need to obtain\nprivilege via (set)uid-0.\n\nOf course, conceptually isn\u0027t quite the same as currently possible since few\nuser applications, certainly not enough to run a viable system, are currently\nprepared to leverage capabilities to exercise privilege.  Further, many\napplications exist that may never get upgraded in this way, and the kernel\nwill continue to want to support their setuid-0 base privilege needs.\n\nWhere pure-capability applications evolve and replace setuid-0 binaries, it is\ndesirable that there be a mechanisms by which they can contain their\nprivilege.  In addition to leveraging the per-process bounding and inheritable\nsets, this should include suppressing the privilege of the uid-0 superuser\nfrom the process\u0027 tree of children.\n\nThe feature added by this patch can be leveraged to suppress the privilege\nassociated with (set)uid-0.  This suppression requires CAP_SETPCAP to\ninitiate, and only immediately affects the \u0027current\u0027 process (it is inherited\nthrough fork()/exec()).  This reimplementation differs significantly from the\nhistorical support for securebits which was system-wide, unwieldy and which\nhas ultimately withered to a dead relic in the source of the modern kernel.\n\nWith this patch applied a process, that is capable(CAP_SETPCAP), can now drop\nall legacy privilege (through uid\u003d0) for itself and all subsequently\nfork()\u0027d/exec()\u0027d children with:\n\n  prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 0x2f);\n\nThis patch represents a no-op unless CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is\nenabled at configure time.\n\n[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix uninitialised var warning]\n[serue@us.ibm.com: capabilities: use cap_task_prctl when !CONFIG_SECURITY]\nSigned-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan \u003cmorgan@kernel.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nReviewed-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nCc: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nCc: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "b5266eb4c8d1a2887a19aaec8144ee4ad1b054c3",
      "tree": "37105d0640169ad758d20847cf3effe77381f50f",
      "parents": [
        "1a60a280778ff90270fc7390d9ec102f713a5a29"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Al Viro",
        "email": "viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk",
        "time": "Sat Mar 22 17:48:24 2008 -0400"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Al Viro",
        "email": "viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk",
        "time": "Mon Apr 21 23:13:23 2008 -0400"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] switch a bunch of LSM hooks from nameidata to path\n\nNamely, ones from namespace.c\n\nSigned-off-by: Al Viro \u003cviro@zeniv.linux.org.uk\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "3925e6fc1f774048404fdd910b0345b06c699eb4",
      "tree": "c9a58417d9492f39f7fe81d4721d674c34dd8be2",
      "parents": [
        "334d094504c2fe1c44211ecb49146ae6bca8c321",
        "7cea51be4e91edad05bd834f3235b45c57783f0d"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org",
        "time": "Fri Apr 18 18:18:30 2008 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org",
        "time": "Fri Apr 18 18:18:30 2008 -0700"
      },
      "message": "Merge branch \u0027for-linus\u0027 of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6\n\n* \u0027for-linus\u0027 of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6:\n  security: fix up documentation for security_module_enable\n  Security: Introduce security\u003d boot parameter\n  Audit: Final renamings and cleanup\n  SELinux: use new audit hooks, remove redundant exports\n  Audit: internally use the new LSM audit hooks\n  LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks\n  SELinux: remove redundant exports\n  Netlink: Use generic LSM hook\n  Audit: use new LSM hooks instead of SELinux exports\n  SELinux: setup new inode/ipc getsecid hooks\n  LSM: Introduce inode_getsecid and ipc_getsecid hooks\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "334d094504c2fe1c44211ecb49146ae6bca8c321",
      "tree": "d3c0f68e4b9f8e3d2ccc39e7dfe5de0534a5fad9",
      "parents": [
        "d1a4be630fb068f251d64b62919f143c49ca8057",
        "d1643d24c61b725bef399cc1cf2944b4c9c23177"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org",
        "time": "Fri Apr 18 18:02:35 2008 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org",
        "time": "Fri Apr 18 18:02:35 2008 -0700"
      },
      "message": "Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6.26\n\n* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6.26: (1090 commits)\n  [NET]: Fix and allocate less memory for -\u003epriv\u0027less netdevices\n  [IPV6]: Fix dangling references on error in fib6_add().\n  [NETLABEL]: Fix NULL deref in netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen() if ifindex not found\n  [PKT_SCHED]: Fix datalen check in tcf_simp_init().\n  [INET]: Uninline the __inet_inherit_port call.\n  [INET]: Drop the inet_inherit_port() call.\n  SCTP: Initialize partial_bytes_acked to 0, when all of the data is acked.\n  [netdrvr] forcedeth: internal simplifications; changelog removal\n  phylib: factor out get_phy_id from within get_phy_device\n  PHY: add BCM5464 support to broadcom PHY driver\n  cxgb3: Fix __must_check warning with dev_dbg.\n  tc35815: Statistics cleanup\n  natsemi: fix MMIO for PPC 44x platforms\n  [TIPC]: Cleanup of TIPC reference table code\n  [TIPC]: Optimized initialization of TIPC reference table\n  [TIPC]: Remove inlining of reference table locking routines\n  e1000: convert uint16_t style integers to u16\n  ixgb: convert uint16_t style integers to u16\n  sb1000.c: make const arrays static\n  sb1000.c: stop inlining largish static functions\n  ...\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "7cea51be4e91edad05bd834f3235b45c57783f0d",
      "tree": "55843bf8ab3afc3e33a99e86391668d48355d614",
      "parents": [
        "076c54c5bcaed2081c0cba94a6f77c4d470236ad"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Fri Mar 07 12:23:49 2008 +1100"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Sat Apr 19 10:00:59 2008 +1000"
      },
      "message": "security: fix up documentation for security_module_enable\n\nsecurity_module_enable() can only be called during kernel init.\n\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "076c54c5bcaed2081c0cba94a6f77c4d470236ad",
      "tree": "5e8f05cab20a49922618bb3af697a6b46e610eee",
      "parents": [
        "04305e4aff8b0533dc05f9f6f1a34d0796bd985f"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Ahmed S. Darwish",
        "email": "darwish.07@gmail.com",
        "time": "Thu Mar 06 18:09:10 2008 +0200"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Sat Apr 19 10:00:51 2008 +1000"
      },
      "message": "Security: Introduce security\u003d boot parameter\n\nAdd the security\u003d boot parameter. This is done to avoid LSM\nregistration clashes in case of more than one bult-in module.\n\nUser can choose a security module to enable at boot. If no\nsecurity\u003d boot parameter is specified, only the first LSM\nasking for registration will be loaded. An invalid security\nmodule name will be treated as if no module has been chosen.\n\nLSM modules must check now if they are allowed to register\nby calling security_module_enable(ops) first. Modify SELinux\nand SMACK to do so.\n\nDo not let SMACK register smackfs if it was not chosen on\nboot. Smackfs assumes that smack hooks are registered and\nthe initial task security setup (swapper-\u003esecurity) is done.\n\nSigned-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish \u003cdarwish.07@gmail.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "03d37d25e0f91b28c4b6d002be6221f1af4b19d8",
      "tree": "de56538f7b6e7623d7cee2b0fcdc8f9764957252",
      "parents": [
        "6b89a74be0fbbc6cc639d5cf7dcf8e6ee0f120a7"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Ahmed S. Darwish",
        "email": "darwish.07@gmail.com",
        "time": "Sat Mar 01 22:00:05 2008 +0200"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Sat Apr 19 09:52:36 2008 +1000"
      },
      "message": "LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks\n\nIntroduce a generic Audit interface for security modules\nby adding the following new LSM hooks:\n\naudit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule)\naudit_rule_known(krule)\naudit_rule_match(secid, field, op, rule, actx)\naudit_rule_free(rule)\n\nThose hooks are only available if CONFIG_AUDIT is enabled.\n\nSigned-off-by: Casey Schaufler \u003ccasey@schaufler-ca.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish \u003cdarwish.07@gmail.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nReviewed-by: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "8a076191f373abaeb4aa5f6755d22e49db98940f",
      "tree": "1311a11332abb0828999a7347a07509a68dffb5f",
      "parents": [
        "d1a4be630fb068f251d64b62919f143c49ca8057"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Ahmed S. Darwish",
        "email": "darwish.07@gmail.com",
        "time": "Sat Mar 01 21:51:09 2008 +0200"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Sat Apr 19 09:52:32 2008 +1000"
      },
      "message": "LSM: Introduce inode_getsecid and ipc_getsecid hooks\n\nIntroduce inode_getsecid(inode, secid) and ipc_getsecid(ipcp, secid)\nLSM hooks. These hooks will be used instead of similar exported\nSELinux interfaces.\n\nLet {inode,ipc,task}_getsecid hooks set the secid to 0 by default\nif CONFIG_SECURITY is not defined or if the hook is set to\nNULL (dummy). This is done to notify the caller that no valid\nsecid exists.\n\nSigned-off-by: Casey Schaufler \u003ccasey@schaufler-ca.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish \u003cdarwish.07@gmail.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nReviewed-by: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "dd6f953adb5c4deb9cd7b6a5054e7d5eafe4ed71",
      "tree": "0ed459ca8da43b7e0486c8f0a840845a731920bf",
      "parents": [
        "b0c636b99997c8594da6a46e166ce4fcf6956fda"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Harvey Harrison",
        "email": "harvey.harrison@gmail.com",
        "time": "Thu Mar 06 10:03:59 2008 +1100"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Fri Apr 18 20:26:07 2008 +1000"
      },
      "message": "security: replace remaining __FUNCTION__ occurrences\n\n__FUNCTION__ is gcc-specific, use __func__\n\nSigned-off-by: Harvey Harrison \u003charvey.harrison@gmail.com\u003e\nCc: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nCc: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "03e1ad7b5d871d4189b1da3125c2f12d1b5f7d0b",
      "tree": "1e7f291ac6bd0c1f3a95e8252c32fcce7ff47ea7",
      "parents": [
        "00447872a643787411c2c0cb1df6169dda8b0c47"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Paul Moore",
        "email": "paul.moore@hp.com",
        "time": "Sat Apr 12 19:07:52 2008 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "David S. Miller",
        "email": "davem@davemloft.net",
        "time": "Sat Apr 12 19:07:52 2008 -0700"
      },
      "message": "LSM: Make the Labeled IPsec hooks more stack friendly\n\nThe xfrm_get_policy() and xfrm_add_pol_expire() put some rather large structs\non the stack to work around the LSM API.  This patch attempts to fix that\nproblem by changing the LSM API to require only the relevant \"security\"\npointers instead of the entire SPD entry; we do this for all of the\nsecurity_xfrm_policy*() functions to keep things consistent.\n\nSigned-off-by: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "e0007529893c1c064be90bd21422ca0da4a0198e",
      "tree": "c2334ba940e682183a18d18972cf95bd3a3da46a",
      "parents": [
        "29e8c3c304b62f31b799565c9ee85d42bd163f80"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Eric Paris",
        "email": "eparis@redhat.com",
        "time": "Wed Mar 05 10:31:54 2008 -0500"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Thu Mar 06 08:40:53 2008 +1100"
      },
      "message": "LSM/SELinux: Interfaces to allow FS to control mount options\n\nIntroduce new LSM interfaces to allow an FS to deal with their own mount\noptions.  This includes a new string parsing function exported from the\nLSM that an FS can use to get a security data blob and a new security\ndata blob.  This is particularly useful for an FS which uses binary\nmount data, like NFS, which does not pass strings into the vfs to be\nhandled by the loaded LSM.  Also fix a BUG() in both SELinux and SMACK\nwhen dealing with binary mount data.  If the binary mount data is less\nthan one page the copy_page() in security_sb_copy_data() can cause an\nillegal page fault and boom.  Remove all NFSisms from the SELinux code\nsince they were broken by past NFS changes.\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nAcked-by: Casey Schaufler \u003ccasey@schaufler-ca.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "a5ecbcb8c13ea8a822d243bf782d0dc9525b4f84",
      "tree": "902df830bf581642a49bbb1e4f4de5b9f80eeaa1",
      "parents": [
        "551e4fb2465b87de9d4aa1669b27d624435443bb"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Eric Paris",
        "email": "eparis@redhat.com",
        "time": "Thu Jan 31 15:11:22 2008 -0500"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@localhost.localdomain",
        "time": "Wed Feb 06 21:39:46 2008 +0800"
      },
      "message": "security: allow Kconfig to set default mmap_min_addr protection\n\nSince it was decided that low memory protection from userspace couldn\u0027t\nbe turned on by default add a Kconfig option to allow users/distros to\nset a default at compile time.  This value is still tunable after boot\nin /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr\n\nDiscussion:\nhttp://www.mail-archive.com/linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org/msg02543.html\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "42492594043d621a7910ff5877c3eb9202870b45",
      "tree": "9188d112c019a189606847dc1d90ccc63c1bacf2",
      "parents": [
        "3729145821e3088a0c3c4183037fde356204bf97"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "David P. Quigley",
        "email": "dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov",
        "time": "Mon Feb 04 22:29:39 2008 -0800"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org",
        "time": "Tue Feb 05 09:44:20 2008 -0800"
      },
      "message": "VFS/Security: Rework inode_getsecurity and callers to return resulting buffer\n\nThis patch modifies the interface to inode_getsecurity to have the function\nreturn a buffer containing the security blob and its length via parameters\ninstead of relying on the calling function to give it an appropriately sized\nbuffer.\n\nSecurity blobs obtained with this function should be freed using the\nrelease_secctx LSM hook.  This alleviates the problem of the caller having to\nguess a length and preallocate a buffer for this function allowing it to be\nused elsewhere for Labeled NFS.\n\nThe patch also removed the unused err parameter.  The conversion is similar to\nthe one performed by Al Viro for the security_getprocattr hook.\n\nSigned-off-by: David P. Quigley \u003cdpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nCc: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nCc: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@sous-sol.org\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nCc: Casey Schaufler \u003ccasey@schaufler-ca.com\u003e\nCc: Al Viro \u003cviro@zeniv.linux.org.uk\u003e\nCc: Christoph Hellwig \u003chch@lst.de\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "63cb34492351078479b2d4bae6a881806a396286",
      "tree": "d33ab15eda40c5195c4a723d9e49591a9b4950f9",
      "parents": [
        "c43e259cc756ece387faae849af0058b56d78466"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "David Howells",
        "email": "dhowells@redhat.com",
        "time": "Tue Jan 15 23:47:35 2008 +0000"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Fri Jan 25 11:29:53 2008 +1100"
      },
      "message": "security: add a secctx_to_secid() hook\n\nAdd a secctx_to_secid() LSM hook to go along with the existing\nsecid_to_secctx() LSM hook.  This patch also includes the SELinux\nimplementation for this hook.\n\nSigned-off-by: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "bced95283e9434611cbad8f2ff903cd396eaea72",
      "tree": "5d56afc7a5f239ebc53a1800a508f16b8d8701b0",
      "parents": [
        "42d7896ebc5f7268b1fe6bbd20f2282e20ae7895"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "H. Peter Anvin",
        "email": "hpa@zytor.com",
        "time": "Sat Dec 29 16:20:25 2007 -0800"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Fri Jan 25 11:29:50 2008 +1100"
      },
      "message": "security: remove security_sb_post_mountroot hook\n\nThe security_sb_post_mountroot() hook is long-since obsolete, and is\nfundamentally broken: it is never invoked if someone uses initramfs.\nThis is particularly damaging, because the existence of this hook has\nbeen used as motivation for not using initramfs.\n\nStephen Smalley confirmed on 2007-07-19 that this hook was originally\nused by SELinux but can now be safely removed:\n\n     http://marc.info/?l\u003dlinux-kernel\u0026m\u003d118485683612916\u0026w\u003d2\n\nCc: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nCc: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nCc: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@parisplace.org\u003e\nCc: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@sous-sol.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: H. Peter Anvin \u003chpa@zytor.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "c9180a57a9ab2d5525faf8815a332364ee9e89b7",
      "tree": "c677ec33735f3529d478a2b71fcc732d4fe59adf",
      "parents": [
        "19c5fc198c369bb00f3ed9716ef40648865d8d94"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Eric Paris",
        "email": "eparis@redhat.com",
        "time": "Fri Nov 30 13:00:35 2007 -0500"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Fri Jan 25 11:29:46 2008 +1100"
      },
      "message": "Security: add get, set, and cloning of superblock security information\n\nAdds security_get_sb_mnt_opts, security_set_sb_mnt_opts, and\nsecurity_clont_sb_mnt_opts to the LSM and to SELinux.  This will allow\nfilesystems to directly own and control all of their mount options if they\nso choose.  This interface deals only with option identifiers and strings so\nit should generic enough for any LSM which may come in the future.\n\nFilesystems which pass text mount data around in the kernel (almost all of\nthem) need not currently make use of this interface when dealing with\nSELinux since it will still parse those strings as it always has.  I assume\nfuture LSM\u0027s would do the same.  NFS is the primary FS which does not use\ntext mount data and thus must make use of this interface.\n\nAn LSM would need to implement these functions only if they had mount time\noptions, such as selinux has context\u003d or fscontext\u003d.  If the LSM has no\nmount time options they could simply not implement and let the dummy ops\ntake care of things.\n\nAn LSM other than SELinux would need to define new option numbers in\nsecurity.h and any FS which decides to own there own security options would\nneed to be patched to use this new interface for every possible LSM.  This\nis because it was stated to me very clearly that LSM\u0027s should not attempt to\nunderstand FS mount data and the burdon to understand security should be in\nthe FS which owns the options.\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Stephen D. Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "cbfee34520666862f8ff539e580c48958fbb7706",
      "tree": "ded5cafce333e908a0fbeda1f7c55eaf7c1fbaaa",
      "parents": [
        "b53767719b6cd8789392ea3e7e2eb7b8906898f0"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Adrian Bunk",
        "email": "bunk@kernel.org",
        "time": "Tue Oct 16 23:31:38 2007 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org",
        "time": "Wed Oct 17 08:43:07 2007 -0700"
      },
      "message": "security/ cleanups\n\nThis patch contains the following cleanups that are now possible:\n- remove the unused security_operations-\u003einode_xattr_getsuffix\n- remove the no longer used security_operations-\u003eunregister_security\n- remove some no longer required exit code\n- remove a bunch of no longer used exports\n\nSigned-off-by: Adrian Bunk \u003cbunk@kernel.org\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nCc: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@sous-sol.org\u003e\nCc: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nCc: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "b53767719b6cd8789392ea3e7e2eb7b8906898f0",
      "tree": "a0279dc93c79b94d3865b0f19f6b7b353e20608c",
      "parents": [
        "57c521ce6125e15e99e56c902cb8da96bee7b36d"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Serge E. Hallyn",
        "email": "serue@us.ibm.com",
        "time": "Tue Oct 16 23:31:36 2007 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org",
        "time": "Wed Oct 17 08:43:07 2007 -0700"
      },
      "message": "Implement file posix capabilities\n\nImplement file posix capabilities.  This allows programs to be given a\nsubset of root\u0027s powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use\nsetuid and giving the binary all of root\u0027s powers.\n\nThis version works with Kaigai Kohei\u0027s userspace tools, found at\nhttp://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php.  For more information on how to use this\npatch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at\nhttp://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.\n\nChangelog:\n\tNov 27:\n\tIncorporate fixes from Andrew Morton\n\t(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and\n\tsecurity-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)\n\tFix Kconfig dependency.\n\tFix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.\n\n\tNov 13:\n\tIntegrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from\n\tcapability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.\n\n\tNov 13:\n\tFix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey\n\tDobriyan.\n\n\tNov 09:\n\tAddress warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security\n\twhen file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean\n\tup the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper\n\tfunction.\n\n\tNov 08:\n\tFor pointers to required userspace tools and how to use\n\tthem, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.\n\n\tNov 07:\n\tFix the calculation of the highest bit checked in\n\tcheck_cap_sanity().\n\n\tNov 07:\n\tAllow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since\n\tcapabilities are the default.\n\tHook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.\n\tMove capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce\n\taudit messages.\n\n\tNov 05:\n\tAdd secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and\n\ttask_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file\n\tcap support can be stacked.\n\n\tSep 05:\n\tAs Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place\n\tfor capability code.\n\n\tSep 01:\n\tDefine task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and\n\ttask_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which\n\tthey called a program with some fscaps.\n\n\tOne remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we\n\tok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a\n\tcpuset?\n\n\tIt is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn\u0027t\n\tallow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check.  But since\n\tit uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where\n\tCAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,\n\tfixing it might be tough.\n\n\t     task_setscheduler\n\t\t note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task.  Are we ok with\n\t\t     CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?\n\t     task_setioprio\n\t     task_setnice\n\t\t sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another\n\t\t process.  Need same checks as setrlimit\n\n\tAug 21:\n\tUpdated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that\n\teuid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process\n\tmight still have elevated caps.\n\n\tAug 15:\n\tHandle endianness of xattrs.\n\tEnforce capability version match between kernel and disk.\n\tEnforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are\n\tset, else return -EPERM.\n\tWith this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering\n\tdoing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than\n\td_instantiate.\n\n\tAug 10:\n\tAlways call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than\n\tcaching it at d_instantiate.\n\n[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]\n[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]\nSigned-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nCc: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nCc: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nCc: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@sous-sol.org\u003e\nCc: Andrew Morgan \u003cmorgan@kernel.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morgan \u003cmorgan@kernel.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Adrian Bunk \u003cbunk@kernel.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "20510f2f4e2dabb0ff6c13901807627ec9452f98",
      "tree": "d64b9eeb90d577f7f9688a215c4c6c3c2405188a",
      "parents": [
        "5c3b447457789374cdb7b03afe2540d48c649a36"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Tue Oct 16 23:31:32 2007 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org",
        "time": "Wed Oct 17 08:43:07 2007 -0700"
      },
      "message": "security: Convert LSM into a static interface\n\nConvert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security\nmodule is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the\noverall security architecture.\n\nNeedlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API\nabuse.\n\nParameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified\nat boot.\n\nThe SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed.\n\nIn a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM.  The modular interface\nis thus unecessary and broken infrastructure.  It is used only by out-of-tree\nmodules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and\ndangerous, e.g.  silently re-vectoring SELinux.\n\n[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups]\n[akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix]\n[randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc]\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@sous-sol.org\u003e\nCc: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nCc: \"Serge E. Hallyn\" \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Arjan van de Ven \u003carjan@infradead.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Randy Dunlap \u003crandy.dunlap@oracle.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "d4cf291526a74cc33d33700a35b74395eec812fd",
      "tree": "321018f7ef60b7cf2df7104f5361901d021edfdb",
      "parents": [
        "9faf65fb6ee2b4e08325ba2d69e5ccf0c46453d0"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Adrian Bunk",
        "email": "bunk@stusta.de",
        "time": "Sun Jul 01 22:23:53 2007 +0200"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Wed Jul 11 22:52:33 2007 -0400"
      },
      "message": "security: unexport mmap_min_addr\n\nRemove unneeded export.\n\nSigned-off-by: Adrian Bunk \u003cbunk@stusta.de\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "ed0321895182ffb6ecf210e066d87911b270d587",
      "tree": "832bb54666f73b06e55322df40f915c5e9ef64d7",
      "parents": [
        "13bddc2e9d591e31bf20020dc19ea6ca85de420e"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Eric Paris",
        "email": "eparis@redhat.com",
        "time": "Thu Jun 28 15:55:21 2007 -0400"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Wed Jul 11 22:52:29 2007 -0400"
      },
      "message": "security: Protection for exploiting null dereference using mmap\n\nAdd a new security check on mmap operations to see if the user is attempting\nto mmap to low area of the address space.  The amount of space protected is\nindicated by the new proc tunable /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr and defaults to\n0, preserving existing behavior.\n\nThis patch uses a new SELinux security class \"memprotect.\"  Policy already\ncontains a number of allow rules like a_t self:process * (unconfined_t being\none of them) which mean that putting this check in the process class (its\nbest current fit) would make it useless as all user processes, which we also\nwant to protect against, would be allowed. By taking the memprotect name of\nthe new class it will also make it possible for us to move some of the other\nmemory protect permissions out of \u0027process\u0027 and into the new class next time\nwe bump the policy version number (which I also think is a good future idea)\n\nAcked-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nAcked-by: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@sous-sol.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "cd354f1ae75e6466a7e31b727faede57a1f89ca5",
      "tree": "09a2da1672465fefbc7fe06ff4e6084f1dd14c6b",
      "parents": [
        "3fc605a2aa38899c12180ca311f1eeb61a6d867e"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Tim Schmielau",
        "email": "tim@physik3.uni-rostock.de",
        "time": "Wed Feb 14 00:33:14 2007 -0800"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org",
        "time": "Wed Feb 14 08:09:54 2007 -0800"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] remove many unneeded #includes of sched.h\n\nAfter Al Viro (finally) succeeded in removing the sched.h #include in module.h\nrecently, it makes sense again to remove other superfluous sched.h includes.\nThere are quite a lot of files which include it but don\u0027t actually need\nanything defined in there.  Presumably these includes were once needed for\nmacros that used to live in sched.h, but moved to other header files in the\ncourse of cleaning it up.\n\nTo ease the pain, this time I did not fiddle with any header files and only\nremoved #includes from .c-files, which tend to cause less trouble.\n\nCompile tested against 2.6.20-rc2 and 2.6.20-rc2-mm2 (with offsets) on alpha,\narm, i386, ia64, mips, powerpc, and x86_64 with allnoconfig, defconfig,\nallmodconfig, and allyesconfig as well as a few randconfigs on x86_64 and all\nconfigs in arch/arm/configs on arm.  I also checked that no new warnings were\nintroduced by the patch (actually, some warnings are removed that were emitted\nby unnecessarily included header files).\n\nSigned-off-by: Tim Schmielau \u003ctim@physik3.uni-rostock.de\u003e\nAcked-by: Russell King \u003crmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "6ab3d5624e172c553004ecc862bfeac16d9d68b7",
      "tree": "6d98881fe91fd9583c109208d5c27131b93fa248",
      "parents": [
        "e02169b682bc448ccdc819dc8639ed34a23cedd8"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Jörn Engel",
        "email": "joern@wohnheim.fh-wedel.de",
        "time": "Fri Jun 30 19:25:36 2006 +0200"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Adrian Bunk",
        "email": "bunk@stusta.de",
        "time": "Fri Jun 30 19:25:36 2006 +0200"
      },
      "message": "Remove obsolete #include \u003clinux/config.h\u003e\n\nSigned-off-by: Jörn Engel \u003cjoern@wohnheim.fh-wedel.de\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Adrian Bunk \u003cbunk@stusta.de\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "12b5989be10011387a9da5dee82e5c0d6f9d02e7",
      "tree": "74da71d407bf26bf97c639bb2b473de233a736ac",
      "parents": [
        "77d47582c2345e071df02afaf9191641009287c4"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Chris Wright",
        "email": "chrisw@sous-sol.org",
        "time": "Sat Mar 25 03:07:41 2006 -0800"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Sat Mar 25 08:22:56 2006 -0800"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] refactor capable() to one implementation, add __capable() helper\n\nMove capable() to kernel/capability.c and eliminate duplicate\nimplementations.  Add __capable() function which can be used to check for\ncapabiilty of any process.\n\nSigned-off-by: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@sous-sol.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "c59ede7b78db329949d9cdcd7064e22d357560ef",
      "tree": "f9dc9d464fdad5bfd464d983e77c1af031389dda",
      "parents": [
        "e16885c5ad624a6efe1b1bf764e075d75f65a788"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Randy.Dunlap",
        "email": "rdunlap@xenotime.net",
        "time": "Wed Jan 11 12:17:46 2006 -0800"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Wed Jan 11 18:42:13 2006 -0800"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] move capable() to capability.h\n\n- Move capable() from sched.h to capability.h;\n\n- Use \u003clinux/capability.h\u003e where capable() is used\n\t(in include/, block/, ipc/, kernel/, a few drivers/,\n\tmm/, security/, \u0026 sound/;\n\tmany more drivers/ to go)\n\nSigned-off-by: Randy Dunlap \u003crdunlap@xenotime.net\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
      "tree": "0bba044c4ce775e45a88a51686b5d9f90697ea9d",
      "parents": [],
      "author": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org",
        "time": "Sat Apr 16 15:20:36 2005 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org",
        "time": "Sat Apr 16 15:20:36 2005 -0700"
      },
      "message": "Linux-2.6.12-rc2\n\nInitial git repository build. I\u0027m not bothering with the full history,\neven though we have it. We can create a separate \"historical\" git\narchive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it\u0027s about\n3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early\ngit days unnecessarily complicated, when we don\u0027t have a lot of good\ninfrastructure for it.\n\nLet it rip!\n"
    }
  ]
}