)]}'
{
  "log": [
    {
      "commit": "c09edd6eba683741bb8aa8e388a2bfaf1c1a28f9",
      "tree": "af9052388c6244b7bece50b23dae454482ecc501",
      "parents": [
        "f4480240f700587c15507b7815e75989b16825b2"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Roland McGrath",
        "email": "roland@redhat.com",
        "time": "Tue Jul 17 04:03:48 2007 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org",
        "time": "Tue Jul 17 10:23:03 2007 -0700"
      },
      "message": "avoid OPEN_MAX in SCM_MAX_FD\n\nThe OPEN_MAX constant is an arbitrary number with no useful relation to\nanything.  Nothing should be using it.  SCM_MAX_FD is just an arbitrary\nconstant and it should be clear that its value is chosen in net/scm.h\nand not actually derived from anything else meaningful in the system.\n\nSigned-off-by: Roland McGrath \u003croland@redhat.com\u003e\nCc: \"David S. Miller\" \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "dc49c1f94e3469d94b952e8f5160dd4ccd791d79",
      "tree": "e47b1974c262a03dbabf0a148325d9089817e78e",
      "parents": [
        "2b7e24b66d31d677d76b49918e711eb360c978b6"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Catherine Zhang",
        "email": "cxzhang@watson.ibm.com",
        "time": "Wed Aug 02 14:12:06 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "David S. Miller",
        "email": "davem@davemloft.net",
        "time": "Wed Aug 02 14:12:06 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[AF_UNIX]: Kernel memory leak fix for af_unix datagram getpeersec patch\n\nFrom: Catherine Zhang \u003ccxzhang@watson.ibm.com\u003e\n\nThis patch implements a cleaner fix for the memory leak problem of the\noriginal unix datagram getpeersec patch.  Instead of creating a\nsecurity context each time a unix datagram is sent, we only create the\nsecurity context when the receiver requests it.\n\nThis new design requires modification of the current\nunix_getsecpeer_dgram LSM hook and addition of two new hooks, namely,\nsecid_to_secctx and release_secctx.  The former retrieves the security\ncontext and the latter releases it.  A hook is required for releasing\nthe security context because it is up to the security module to decide\nhow that\u0027s done.  In the case of Selinux, it\u0027s a simple kfree\noperation.\n\nAcked-by:  Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "877ce7c1b3afd69a9b1caeb1b9964c992641f52a",
      "tree": "740c6c0d4a2858af53c09c4635cadf06833536c1",
      "parents": [
        "d6b4991ad5d1a9840e12db507be1a6593def01fe"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Catherine Zhang",
        "email": "cxzhang@watson.ibm.com",
        "time": "Thu Jun 29 12:27:47 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "David S. Miller",
        "email": "davem@sunset.davemloft.net",
        "time": "Thu Jun 29 16:58:06 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[AF_UNIX]: Datagram getpeersec\n\nThis patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the\nlabel of its peer\u0027s Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of\nrecvmsg.\n\nPatch purpose:\n\nThis patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the\nsecurity context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket.  The application\ncan then use this security context to determine the security context for\nprocessing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet.\n\nPatch design and implementation:\n\nThe design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET\nsockets.  Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for\nretrieving user credentials.  Linux offers the API for obtaining user\ncredentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages\nthat are bundled together with a normal message).  To retrieve the security\ncontext, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by\nsetting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt.  Then the application\nretrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism.\n\nAn example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this:\n\ntoggle \u003d 1;\ntoggle_len \u003d sizeof(toggle);\n\nsetsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, \u0026toggle, \u0026toggle_len);\nrecvmsg(sockfd, \u0026msg_hdr, 0);\nif (msg_hdr.msg_controllen \u003e sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) {\n    cmsg_hdr \u003d CMSG_FIRSTHDR(\u0026msg_hdr);\n    if (cmsg_hdr-\u003ecmsg_len \u003c\u003d CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) \u0026\u0026\n        cmsg_hdr-\u003ecmsg_level \u003d\u003d SOL_SOCKET \u0026\u0026\n        cmsg_hdr-\u003ecmsg_type \u003d\u003d SCM_SECURITY) {\n        memcpy(\u0026scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext));\n    }\n}\n\nsock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow\na server socket to receive security context of the peer.\n\nTesting:\n\nWe have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server\napplications.  We verified that the server can retrieve the security context\nusing the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.\n\nSigned-off-by: Catherine Zhang \u003ccxzhang@watson.ibm.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Acked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "1d541ddd74802cfa0eb8a3864668851f6cd79bdf",
      "tree": "3db70aede59a2743124b077ed1dd2ebe3629b506",
      "parents": [
        "e9df7d7f584666533b1bdfcf5c60a43d64689198"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Benjamin LaHaise",
        "email": "benjamin.c.lahaise@intel.com",
        "time": "Mon Mar 20 21:31:51 2006 -0800"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "David S. Miller",
        "email": "davem@davemloft.net",
        "time": "Mon Mar 20 21:31:51 2006 -0800"
      },
      "message": "[AF_UNIX]: scm: better initialization\n\nInstead of doing a memset then initialization of the fields of the scm\nstructure, just initialize all the members explicitly.  Prevent reloading\nof current on x86 and x86-64 by storing the value in a local variable for\nsubsequent dereferences.  This is worth a ~7KB/s increase in af_unix\nbandwidth.  Note that we avoid the issues surrounding potentially\nuninitialized members of the ucred structure by constructing a struct\nucred instead of assigning the members individually, which forces the\ncompiler to zero any padding.\n\n[ I modified the patch not to use the aggregate assignment since\n  gcc-3.4.x and earlier cannot optimize that properly at all even\n  though gcc-4.0.x and later can -DaveM ]\n\nSigned-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise \u003cbenjamin.c.lahaise@intel.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
      "tree": "0bba044c4ce775e45a88a51686b5d9f90697ea9d",
      "parents": [],
      "author": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org",
        "time": "Sat Apr 16 15:20:36 2005 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org",
        "time": "Sat Apr 16 15:20:36 2005 -0700"
      },
      "message": "Linux-2.6.12-rc2\n\nInitial git repository build. I\u0027m not bothering with the full history,\neven though we have it. We can create a separate \"historical\" git\narchive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it\u0027s about\n3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early\ngit days unnecessarily complicated, when we don\u0027t have a lot of good\ninfrastructure for it.\n\nLet it rip!\n"
    }
  ]
}