)]}'
{
  "log": [
    {
      "commit": "7420ed23a4f77480b5b7b3245e5da30dd24b7575",
      "tree": "016f5bb996c5eae66754b10243c5be6226d773f2",
      "parents": [
        "96cb8e3313c7a12e026c1ed510522ae6f6023875"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Venkat Yekkirala",
        "email": "vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com",
        "time": "Fri Aug 04 23:17:57 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "David S. Miller",
        "email": "davem@sunset.davemloft.net",
        "time": "Fri Sep 22 14:53:36 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[NetLabel]: SELinux support\n\nAdd NetLabel support to the SELinux LSM and modify the\nsocket_post_create() LSM hook to return an error code.  The most\nsignificant part of this patch is the addition of NetLabel hooks into\nthe following SELinux LSM hooks:\n\n * selinux_file_permission()\n * selinux_socket_sendmsg()\n * selinux_socket_post_create()\n * selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb()\n * selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream()\n * selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram()\n * selinux_sock_graft()\n * selinux_inet_conn_request()\n\nThe basic reasoning behind this patch is that outgoing packets are\n\"NetLabel\u0027d\" by labeling their socket and the NetLabel security\nattributes are checked via the additional hook in\nselinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb().  NetLabel itself is only a labeling\nmechanism, similar to filesystem extended attributes, it is up to the\nSELinux enforcement mechanism to perform the actual access checks.\n\nIn addition to the changes outlined above this patch also includes\nsome changes to the extended bitmap (ebitmap) and multi-level security\n(mls) code to import and export SELinux TE/MLS attributes into and out\nof NetLabel.\n\nSigned-off-by: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "4237c75c0a35535d7f9f2bfeeb4b4df1e068a0bf",
      "tree": "02adcb6fe6c346a8b99cf161ba5233ed1e572727",
      "parents": [
        "cb969f072b6d67770b559617f14e767f47e77ece"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Venkat Yekkirala",
        "email": "vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com",
        "time": "Mon Jul 24 23:32:50 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "David S. Miller",
        "email": "davem@sunset.davemloft.net",
        "time": "Fri Sep 22 14:53:29 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[MLSXFRM]: Auto-labeling of child sockets\n\nThis automatically labels the TCP, Unix stream, and dccp child sockets\nas well as openreqs to be at the same MLS level as the peer. This will\nresult in the selection of appropriately labeled IPSec Security\nAssociations.\n\nThis also uses the sock\u0027s sid (as opposed to the isec sid) in SELinux\nenforcement of secmark in rcv_skb and postroute_last hooks.\n\nSigned-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala \u003cvyekkirala@TrustedCS.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "cb969f072b6d67770b559617f14e767f47e77ece",
      "tree": "4112eb0182e8b3e28b42aebaa40ca25454fc6b76",
      "parents": [
        "beb8d13bed80f8388f1a9a107d07ddd342e627e8"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Venkat Yekkirala",
        "email": "vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com",
        "time": "Mon Jul 24 23:32:20 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "David S. Miller",
        "email": "davem@sunset.davemloft.net",
        "time": "Fri Sep 22 14:53:28 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[MLSXFRM]: Default labeling of socket specific IPSec policies\n\nThis defaults the label of socket-specific IPSec policies to be the\nsame as the socket they are set on.\n\nSigned-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala \u003cvyekkirala@TrustedCS.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "beb8d13bed80f8388f1a9a107d07ddd342e627e8",
      "tree": "19d5763b9b3b8ff3969997565e5ec0edd6e4bd33",
      "parents": [
        "4e2ba18eae7f370c7c3ed96eaca747cc9b39f917"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Venkat Yekkirala",
        "email": "vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com",
        "time": "Fri Aug 04 23:12:42 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "David S. Miller",
        "email": "davem@sunset.davemloft.net",
        "time": "Fri Sep 22 14:53:27 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[MLSXFRM]: Add flow labeling\n\nThis labels the flows that could utilize IPSec xfrms at the points the\nflows are defined so that IPSec policy and SAs at the right label can\nbe used.\n\nThe following protos are currently not handled, but they should\ncontinue to be able to use single-labeled IPSec like they currently\ndo.\n\nipmr\nip_gre\nipip\nigmp\nsit\nsctp\nip6_tunnel (IPv6 over IPv6 tunnel device)\ndecnet\n\nSigned-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala \u003cvyekkirala@TrustedCS.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "e0d1caa7b0d5f02e4f34aa09c695d04251310c6c",
      "tree": "bf023c17abf6813f2694ebf5fafff82edd6a1023",
      "parents": [
        "b6340fcd761acf9249b3acbc95c4dc555d9beb07"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Venkat Yekkirala",
        "email": "vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com",
        "time": "Mon Jul 24 23:29:07 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "David S. Miller",
        "email": "davem@sunset.davemloft.net",
        "time": "Fri Sep 22 14:53:24 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[MLSXFRM]: Flow based matching of xfrm policy and state\n\nThis implements a seemless mechanism for xfrm policy selection and\nstate matching based on the flow sid. This also includes the necessary\nSELinux enforcement pieces.\n\nSigned-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala \u003cvyekkirala@TrustedCS.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "892c141e62982272b9c738b5520ad0e5e1ad7b42",
      "tree": "c8e0c9b3e55106d2cb085a5047b9d02dbbb28653",
      "parents": [
        "08554d6b33e60aa8ee40bbef94505941c0eefef2"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Venkat Yekkirala",
        "email": "vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com",
        "time": "Fri Aug 04 23:08:56 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "David S. Miller",
        "email": "davem@sunset.davemloft.net",
        "time": "Fri Sep 22 14:53:22 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[MLSXFRM]: Add security sid to sock\n\nThis adds security for IP sockets at the sock level. Security at the\nsock level is needed to enforce the SELinux security policy for\nsecurity associations even when a sock is orphaned (such as in the TCP\nLAST_ACK state).\n\nThis will also be used to enforce SELinux controls over data arriving\nat or leaving a child socket while it\u0027s still waiting to be accepted.\n\nSigned-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala \u003cvyekkirala@TrustedCS.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "95ce568812822931991a24147987c5c75c0ac5b0",
      "tree": "ff9b281375a7e4ad9383999dc1810d9a21124021",
      "parents": [
        "e6eb307d48c81d688804f8b39a0a3ddde3cd3458"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "David S. Miller",
        "email": "davem@sunset.davemloft.net",
        "time": "Wed Aug 02 14:37:06 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "David S. Miller",
        "email": "davem@sunset.davemloft.net",
        "time": "Wed Aug 02 14:37:06 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[SECURITY]: Fix build with CONFIG_SECURITY disabled.\n\ninclude/linux/security.h: In function ‘security_release_secctx’:\ninclude/linux/security.h:2757: warning: ‘return’ with a value, in function returning void\n\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "dc49c1f94e3469d94b952e8f5160dd4ccd791d79",
      "tree": "e47b1974c262a03dbabf0a148325d9089817e78e",
      "parents": [
        "2b7e24b66d31d677d76b49918e711eb360c978b6"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Catherine Zhang",
        "email": "cxzhang@watson.ibm.com",
        "time": "Wed Aug 02 14:12:06 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "David S. Miller",
        "email": "davem@davemloft.net",
        "time": "Wed Aug 02 14:12:06 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[AF_UNIX]: Kernel memory leak fix for af_unix datagram getpeersec patch\n\nFrom: Catherine Zhang \u003ccxzhang@watson.ibm.com\u003e\n\nThis patch implements a cleaner fix for the memory leak problem of the\noriginal unix datagram getpeersec patch.  Instead of creating a\nsecurity context each time a unix datagram is sent, we only create the\nsecurity context when the receiver requests it.\n\nThis new design requires modification of the current\nunix_getsecpeer_dgram LSM hook and addition of two new hooks, namely,\nsecid_to_secctx and release_secctx.  The former retrieves the security\ncontext and the latter releases it.  A hook is required for releasing\nthe security context because it is up to the security module to decide\nhow that\u0027s done.  In the case of Selinux, it\u0027s a simple kfree\noperation.\n\nAcked-by:  Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "a1836a42daf5ddfe9a891973734bd9a7d62eb504",
      "tree": "e8819aec40aff3fa0eecd2ef9d92df8213bce58b",
      "parents": [
        "7a01955f99b65622a00ba5c8b39202ddc6fa65f8"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "David Quigley",
        "email": "dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov",
        "time": "Fri Jun 30 01:55:49 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Fri Jun 30 11:25:37 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] SELinux: Add security hook definition for getioprio and insert hooks\n\nAdd a new security hook definition for the sys_ioprio_get operation.  At\npresent, the SELinux hook function implementation for this hook is\nidentical to the getscheduler implementation but a separate hook is\nintroduced to allow this check to be specialized in the future if\nnecessary.\n\nThis patch also creates a helper function get_task_ioprio which handles the\naccess check in addition to retrieving the ioprio value for the task.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Quigley \u003cdpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nAcked-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nCc: Jens Axboe \u003caxboe@suse.de\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "f9008e4c5c525941967b67777945aa6266ab6326",
      "tree": "a0c9436485b80d548ef74d5f1aec0f6d0309af6e",
      "parents": [
        "ed11d9eb2228acc483c819ab353e3c41bcb158fa"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "David Quigley",
        "email": "dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov",
        "time": "Fri Jun 30 01:55:46 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Fri Jun 30 11:25:36 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] SELinux: extend task_kill hook to handle signals sent by AIO completion\n\nThis patch extends the security_task_kill hook to handle signals sent by AIO\ncompletion.  In this case, the secid of the task responsible for the signal\nneeds to be obtained and saved earlier, so a security_task_getsecid() hook is\nadded, and then this saved value is passed subsequently to the extended\ntask_kill hook for use in checking.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Quigley \u003cdpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nCc: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nCc: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@sous-sol.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "c7bdb545d23026b18be53289fd866d1ac07f5f8c",
      "tree": "6d9a218871d88f7579dd53f14692df2529b6e712",
      "parents": [
        "576a30eb6453439b3c37ba24455ac7090c247b5a"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Darrel Goeddel",
        "email": "dgoeddel@trustedcs.com",
        "time": "Tue Jun 27 13:26:11 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "David S. Miller",
        "email": "davem@sunset.davemloft.net",
        "time": "Thu Jun 29 16:57:55 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[NETLINK]: Encapsulate eff_cap usage within security framework.\n\nThis patch encapsulates the usage of eff_cap (in netlink_skb_params) within\nthe security framework by extending security_netlink_recv to include a required\ncapability parameter and converting all direct usage of eff_caps outside\nof the lsm modules to use the interface.  It also updates the SELinux\nimplementation of the security_netlink_send and security_netlink_recv\nhooks to take advantage of the sid in the netlink_skb_params struct.\nThis also enables SELinux to perform auditing of netlink capability checks.\nPlease apply, for 2.6.18 if possible.\n\nSigned-off-by: Darrel Goeddel \u003cdgoeddel@trustedcs.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nAcked-by:  James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "7e047ef5fe2d52e83020e856b1bf2556a6a2ce98",
      "tree": "97656e2c56a27be9d1da451dde627b693b8643f2",
      "parents": [
        "f116629d03655adaf7832b93b03c99391d09d4a7"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "David Howells",
        "email": "dhowells@redhat.com",
        "time": "Mon Jun 26 00:24:50 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Mon Jun 26 09:58:18 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] keys: sort out key quota system\n\nAdd the ability for key creation to overrun the user\u0027s quota in some\ncircumstances - notably when a session keyring is created and assigned to a\nprocess that didn\u0027t previously have one.\n\nThis means it\u0027s still possible to log in, should PAM require the creation of a\nnew session keyring, and fix an overburdened key quota.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "35601547baf92d984b6e59cf3583649da04baea5",
      "tree": "a392501e6e004ed33789dbf3f7a9fe43295439e1",
      "parents": [
        "22fb52dd736a62e24c44c50739007496265dc38c"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "David Quigley",
        "email": "dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov",
        "time": "Fri Jun 23 02:04:01 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Fri Jun 23 07:42:54 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] SELinux: add task_movememory hook\n\nThis patch adds new security hook, task_movememory, to be called when memory\nowened by a task is to be moved (e.g.  when migrating pages to a this hook is\nidentical to the setscheduler implementation, but a separate hook introduced\nto allow this check to be specialized in the future if necessary.\n\nSince the last posting, the hook has been renamed following feedback from\nChristoph Lameter.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Quigley \u003cdpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nAcked-by:  Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nCc: Christoph Lameter \u003cclameter@sgi.com\u003e\nCc: Andi Kleen \u003cak@muc.de\u003e\nAcked-by: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@sous-sol.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "03e68060636e05989ea94bcb671ab633948f328c",
      "tree": "aee5e7b55f31998536dd3a4f54f38caeee6105d6",
      "parents": [
        "9216dfad4fc97ab639ef0885efc713f3d7a20d5b"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Fri Jun 23 02:03:58 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Fri Jun 23 07:42:53 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] lsm: add task_setioprio hook\n\nImplement an LSM hook for setting a task\u0027s IO priority, similar to the hook\nfor setting a tasks\u0027s nice value.\n\nA previous version of this LSM hook was included in an older version of\nmultiadm by Jan Engelhardt, although I don\u0027t recall it being submitted\nupstream.\n\nAlso included is the corresponding SELinux hook, which re-uses the setsched\npermission in the proccess class.\n\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nAcked-by:  Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nCc: Jan Engelhardt \u003cjengelh@linux01.gwdg.de\u003e\nCc: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@sous-sol.org\u003e\nCc: Jens Axboe \u003caxboe@suse.de\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "726c334223180e3c0197cc980a432681370d4baf",
      "tree": "8327b354bb3dc959a6606051ae6f8d4d035e38a2",
      "parents": [
        "454e2398be9b9fa30433fccc548db34d19aa9958"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "David Howells",
        "email": "dhowells@redhat.com",
        "time": "Fri Jun 23 02:02:58 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Fri Jun 23 07:42:45 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] VFS: Permit filesystem to perform statfs with a known root dentry\n\nGive the statfs superblock operation a dentry pointer rather than a superblock\npointer.\n\nThis complements the get_sb() patch.  That reduced the significance of\nsb-\u003es_root, allowing NFS to place a fake root there.  However, NFS does\nrequire a dentry to use as a target for the statfs operation.  This permits\nthe root in the vfsmount to be used instead.\n\nlinux/mount.h has been added where necessary to make allyesconfig build\nsuccessfully.\n\nInterest has also been expressed for use with the FUSE and XFS filesystems.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Al Viro \u003cviro@zeniv.linux.org.uk\u003e\nCc: Nathan Scott \u003cnathans@sgi.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "d720024e94de4e8b7f10ee83c532926f3ad5d708",
      "tree": "8f21613c29a26bfbeb334cb0104b8b998b09fbdc",
      "parents": [
        "f893afbe1262e27e91234506f72e17716190dd2f"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Michael LeMay",
        "email": "mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil",
        "time": "Thu Jun 22 14:47:17 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Thu Jun 22 15:05:55 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] selinux: add hooks for key subsystem\n\nIntroduce SELinux hooks to support the access key retention subsystem\nwithin the kernel.  Incorporate new flask headers from a modified version\nof the SELinux reference policy, with support for the new security class\nrepresenting retained keys.  Extend the \"key_alloc\" security hook with a\ntask parameter representing the intended ownership context for the key\nbeing allocated.  Attach security information to root\u0027s default keyrings\nwithin the SELinux initialization routine.\n\nHas passed David\u0027s testsuite.\n\nSigned-off-by: Michael LeMay \u003cmdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@sous-sol.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "6f68dc37759b1d6ff3b4d4a9d097605a09f8f043",
      "tree": "7d0be960b8c0ec5b947637a0650f1c639002103a",
      "parents": [
        "9dadaa19cb11a8db38072a92a3f95deab7a797fb"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "David S. Miller",
        "email": "davem@sunset.davemloft.net",
        "time": "Thu Jun 08 23:58:52 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "David S. Miller",
        "email": "davem@sunset.davemloft.net",
        "time": "Sat Jun 17 21:29:49 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[NET]: Fix warnings after LSM-IPSEC changes.\n\nAssignment used as truth value in xfrm_del_sa()\nand xfrm_get_policy().\n\nWrong argument type declared for security_xfrm_state_delete()\nwhen SELINUX is disabled.\n\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "c8c05a8eec6f1258f6d5cb71a44ee5dc1e989b63",
      "tree": "b4a04dd9e2b940cb5b2911fb67fbe49c5f8b3fbf",
      "parents": [
        "cec6f7f39c3db7d9f6091bf2f8fc8d520f372719"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Catherine Zhang",
        "email": "cxzhang@watson.ibm.com",
        "time": "Thu Jun 08 23:39:49 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "David S. Miller",
        "email": "davem@sunset.davemloft.net",
        "time": "Sat Jun 17 21:29:45 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[LSM-IPsec]: SELinux Authorize\n\nThis patch contains a fix for the previous patch that adds security\ncontexts to IPsec policies and security associations.  In the previous\npatch, no authorization (besides the check for write permissions to\nSAD and SPD) is required to delete IPsec policies and security\nassocations with security contexts.  Thus a user authorized to change\nSAD and SPD can bypass the IPsec policy authorization by simply\ndeleteing policies with security contexts.  To fix this security hole,\nan additional authorization check is added for removing security\npolicies and security associations with security contexts.\n\nNote that if no security context is supplied on add or present on\npolicy to be deleted, the SELinux module allows the change\nunconditionally.  The hook is called on deletion when no context is\npresent, which we may want to change.  At present, I left it up to the\nmodule.\n\nLSM changes:\n\nThe patch adds two new LSM hooks: xfrm_policy_delete and\nxfrm_state_delete.  The new hooks are necessary to authorize deletion\nof IPsec policies that have security contexts.  The existing hooks\nxfrm_policy_free and xfrm_state_free lack the context to do the\nauthorization, so I decided to split authorization of deletion and\nmemory management of security data, as is typical in the LSM\ninterface.\n\nUse:\n\nThe new delete hooks are checked when xfrm_policy or xfrm_state are\ndeleted by either the xfrm_user interface (xfrm_get_policy,\nxfrm_del_sa) or the pfkey interface (pfkey_spddelete, pfkey_delete).\n\nSELinux changes:\n\nThe new policy_delete and state_delete functions are added.\n\nSigned-off-by: Catherine Zhang \u003ccxzhang@watson.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Trent Jaeger \u003ctjaeger@cse.psu.edu\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "9c7aa6aa74fa8a5cda36e54cbbe4fffe0214497d",
      "tree": "1e1489ed5080ea4aff6206bfa904f549de8e56ca",
      "parents": [
        "1b50eed9cac0e8e5e4d3a522d8aa267f7f8f8acb"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Steve Grubb",
        "email": "sgrubb@redhat.com",
        "time": "Fri Mar 31 15:22:49 2006 -0500"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Al Viro",
        "email": "viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk",
        "time": "Mon May 01 06:09:56 2006 -0400"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] change lspp ipc auditing\n\nHi,\n\nThe patch below converts IPC auditing to collect sid\u0027s and convert to context\nstring only if it needs to output an audit record. This patch depends on the\ninode audit change patch already being applied.\n\nSigned-off-by: Steve Grubb \u003csgrubb@redhat.com\u003e\n\nSigned-off-by: Al Viro \u003cviro@zeniv.linux.org.uk\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "1b9a3917366028cc451a98dd22e3bcd537d4e5c1",
      "tree": "d911058720e0a9aeeaf9f407ccdc6fbf4047f47d",
      "parents": [
        "3661f00e2097676847deb01add1a0918044bd816",
        "71e1c784b24a026a490b3de01541fc5ee14ebc09"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Sat Mar 25 09:24:53 2006 -0800"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Sat Mar 25 09:24:53 2006 -0800"
      },
      "message": "Merge branch \u0027audit.b3\u0027 of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current\n\n* \u0027audit.b3\u0027 of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current: (22 commits)\n  [PATCH] fix audit_init failure path\n  [PATCH] EXPORT_SYMBOL patch for audit_log, audit_log_start, audit_log_end and audit_format\n  [PATCH] sem2mutex: audit_netlink_sem\n  [PATCH] simplify audit_free() locking\n  [PATCH] Fix audit operators\n  [PATCH] promiscuous mode\n  [PATCH] Add tty to syscall audit records\n  [PATCH] add/remove rule update\n  [PATCH] audit string fields interface + consumer\n  [PATCH] SE Linux audit events\n  [PATCH] Minor cosmetic cleanups to the code moved into auditfilter.c\n  [PATCH] Fix audit record filtering with !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL\n  [PATCH] Fix IA64 success/failure indication in syscall auditing.\n  [PATCH] Miscellaneous bug and warning fixes\n  [PATCH] Capture selinux subject/object context information.\n  [PATCH] Exclude messages by message type\n  [PATCH] Collect more inode information during syscall processing.\n  [PATCH] Pass dentry, not just name, in fsnotify creation hooks.\n  [PATCH] Define new range of userspace messages.\n  [PATCH] Filter rule comparators\n  ...\n\nFixed trivial conflict in security/selinux/hooks.c\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "12b5989be10011387a9da5dee82e5c0d6f9d02e7",
      "tree": "74da71d407bf26bf97c639bb2b473de233a736ac",
      "parents": [
        "77d47582c2345e071df02afaf9191641009287c4"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Chris Wright",
        "email": "chrisw@sous-sol.org",
        "time": "Sat Mar 25 03:07:41 2006 -0800"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Sat Mar 25 08:22:56 2006 -0800"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] refactor capable() to one implementation, add __capable() helper\n\nMove capable() to kernel/capability.c and eliminate duplicate\nimplementations.  Add __capable() function which can be used to check for\ncapabiilty of any process.\n\nSigned-off-by: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@sous-sol.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "2c7946a7bf45ae86736ab3b43d0085e43947945c",
      "tree": "b956f301033ebaefe8d2701b257edfd947f537f3",
      "parents": [
        "be33690d8fcf40377f16193c463681170eb6b295"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Catherine Zhang",
        "email": "cxzhang@watson.ibm.com",
        "time": "Mon Mar 20 22:41:23 2006 -0800"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "David S. Miller",
        "email": "davem@davemloft.net",
        "time": "Mon Mar 20 22:41:23 2006 -0800"
      },
      "message": "[SECURITY]: TCP/UDP getpeersec\n\nThis patch implements an application of the LSM-IPSec networking\ncontrols whereby an application can determine the label of the\nsecurity association its TCP or UDP sockets are currently connected to\nvia getsockopt and the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.\n\nPatch purpose:\n\nThis patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the\nsecurity context of an IPSec security association a particular TCP or\nUDP socket is using.  The application can then use this security\ncontext to determine the security context for processing on behalf of\nthe peer at the other end of this connection.  In the case of UDP, the\nsecurity context is for each individual packet.  An example\napplication is the inetd daemon, which could be modified to start\ndaemons running at security contexts dependent on the remote client.\n\nPatch design approach:\n\n- Design for TCP\nThe patch enables the SELinux LSM to set the peer security context for\na socket based on the security context of the IPSec security\nassociation.  The application may retrieve this context using\ngetsockopt.  When called, the kernel determines if the socket is a\nconnected (TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket and, if so, uses the dst_entry\ncache on the socket to retrieve the security associations.  If a\nsecurity association has a security context, the context string is\nreturned, as for UNIX domain sockets.\n\n- Design for UDP\nUnlike TCP, UDP is connectionless.  This requires a somewhat different\nAPI to retrieve the peer security context.  With TCP, the peer\nsecurity context stays the same throughout the connection, thus it can\nbe retrieved at any time between when the connection is established\nand when it is torn down.  With UDP, each read/write can have\ndifferent peer and thus the security context might change every time.\nAs a result the security context retrieval must be done TOGETHER with\nthe packet retrieval.\n\nThe solution is to build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for\nretrieving user credentials.  Linux offers the API for obtaining user\ncredentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages\nthat are bundled together with a normal message).\n\nPatch implementation details:\n\n- Implementation for TCP\nThe security context can be retrieved by applications using getsockopt\nwith the existing SO_PEERSEC flag.  As an example (ignoring error\nchecking):\n\ngetsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERSEC, optbuf, \u0026optlen);\nprintf(\"Socket peer context is: %s\\n\", optbuf);\n\nThe SELinux function, selinux_socket_getpeersec, is extended to check\nfor labeled security associations for connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED \u003d\u003d\nsk-\u003esk_state) TCP sockets only.  If so, the socket has a dst_cache of\nstruct dst_entry values that may refer to security associations.  If\nthese have security associations with security contexts, the security\ncontext is returned.\n\ngetsockopt returns a buffer that contains a security context string or\nthe buffer is unmodified.\n\n- Implementation for UDP\nTo retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to\nthe kernel such desire by setting the IP_PASSSEC option via\ngetsockopt.  Then the application retrieves the security context using\nthe auxiliary data mechanism.\n\nAn example server application for UDP should look like this:\n\ntoggle \u003d 1;\ntoggle_len \u003d sizeof(toggle);\n\nsetsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_PASSSEC, \u0026toggle, \u0026toggle_len);\nrecvmsg(sockfd, \u0026msg_hdr, 0);\nif (msg_hdr.msg_controllen \u003e sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) {\n    cmsg_hdr \u003d CMSG_FIRSTHDR(\u0026msg_hdr);\n    if (cmsg_hdr-\u003ecmsg_len \u003c\u003d CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) \u0026\u0026\n        cmsg_hdr-\u003ecmsg_level \u003d\u003d SOL_IP \u0026\u0026\n        cmsg_hdr-\u003ecmsg_type \u003d\u003d SCM_SECURITY) {\n        memcpy(\u0026scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext));\n    }\n}\n\nip_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option IP_PASSSEC to allow\na server socket to receive security context of the peer.  A new\nancillary message type SCM_SECURITY.\n\nWhen the packet is received we get the security context from the\nsec_path pointer which is contained in the sk_buff, and copy it to the\nancillary message space.  An additional LSM hook,\nselinux_socket_getpeersec_udp, is defined to retrieve the security\ncontext from the SELinux space.  The existing function,\nselinux_socket_getpeersec does not suit our purpose, because the\nsecurity context is copied directly to user space, rather than to\nkernel space.\n\nTesting:\n\nWe have tested the patch by setting up TCP and UDP connections between\napplications on two machines using the IPSec policies that result in\nlabeled security associations being built.  For TCP, we can then\nextract the peer security context using getsockopt on either end.  For\nUDP, the receiving end can retrieve the security context using the\nauxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.\n\nSigned-off-by: Catherine Zhang \u003ccxzhang@watson.ibm.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Herbert Xu \u003cherbert@gondor.apana.org.au\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "7306a0b9b3e2056a616c84841288ca2431a05627",
      "tree": "d3f61ef43c7079790d6b8ef9bf307689a7d9ea16",
      "parents": [
        "8c8570fb8feef2bc166bee75a85748b25cda22d9"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Dustin Kirkland",
        "email": "dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com",
        "time": "Wed Nov 16 15:53:13 2005 +0000"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Al Viro",
        "email": "viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk",
        "time": "Mon Mar 20 14:08:54 2006 -0500"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] Miscellaneous bug and warning fixes\n\nThis patch fixes a couple of bugs revealed in new features recently\nadded to -mm1:\n* fixes warnings due to inconsistent use of const struct inode *inode\n* fixes bug that prevent a kernel from booting with audit on, and SELinux off\n  due to a missing function in security/dummy.c\n* fixes a bug that throws spurious audit_panic() messages due to a missing\n  return just before an error_path label\n* some reasonable house cleaning in audit_ipc_context(),\n  audit_inode_context(), and audit_log_task_context()\n\nSigned-off-by: Dustin Kirkland \u003cdustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David Woodhouse \u003cdwmw2@infradead.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "8c8570fb8feef2bc166bee75a85748b25cda22d9",
      "tree": "ed783d405ea9d5f3d3ccc57fb56c7b7cb2cdfb82",
      "parents": [
        "c8edc80c8b8c397c53f4f659a05b9ea6208029bf"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Dustin Kirkland",
        "email": "dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com",
        "time": "Thu Nov 03 17:15:16 2005 +0000"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Al Viro",
        "email": "viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk",
        "time": "Mon Mar 20 14:08:54 2006 -0500"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] Capture selinux subject/object context information.\n\nThis patch extends existing audit records with subject/object context\ninformation. Audit records associated with filesystem inodes, ipc, and\ntasks now contain SELinux label information in the field \"subj\" if the\nitem is performing the action, or in \"obj\" if the item is the receiver\nof an action.\n\nThese labels are collected via hooks in SELinux and appended to the\nappropriate record in the audit code.\n\nThis additional information is required for Common Criteria Labeled\nSecurity Protection Profile (LSPP).\n\n[AV: fixed kmalloc flags use]\n[folded leak fixes]\n[folded cleanup from akpm (kfree(NULL)]\n[folded audit_inode_context() leak fix]\n[folded akpm\u0027s fix for audit_ipc_perm() definition in case of !CONFIG_AUDIT]\n\nSigned-off-by: Dustin Kirkland \u003cdustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David Woodhouse \u003cdwmw2@infradead.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Al Viro \u003cviro@zeniv.linux.org.uk\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "53ea68ecea11bcbb3451c2758ce181bd97b569a9",
      "tree": "4e754db2a21db5b90a1650f2993d0b76c00cbd53",
      "parents": [
        "89a2fa5f2139be35e214bcf86a8291d6a1da75f2"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Stephen Smalley",
        "email": "sds@epoch.ncsc.mil",
        "time": "Fri Feb 03 08:21:12 2006 -0500"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Fri Feb 03 18:31:33 2006 -0800"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] SELinux: fix size-128 slab leak\n\nRemove private inode tests from security_inode_alloc and security_inode_free,\nas we otherwise end up leaking inode security structures for private inodes.\n\nSigned-off-by:  Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by:  Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "ed5a92700d3ce2646cb7763792a5f7ad1bade7e8",
      "tree": "83f0bb909c11e29c90fd3433284911ba7d76567e",
      "parents": [
        "7ee26aa04d4dbd5e006b2f184d6028c71384681f"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Randy Dunlap",
        "email": "rdunlap@xenotime.net",
        "time": "Wed Feb 01 03:05:00 2006 -0800"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Wed Feb 01 08:53:11 2006 -0800"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] tpm_bios: needs more securityfs_ functions\n\ntpm_bios.c needs securityfs_xyz() functions.\n\nDoes include/linux/security.h need stubs for these, or should\nchar/tpm/Makefile just be modified to say:\n\nifdef CONFIG_ACPI\nifdef CONFIG_SECURITY\n\tobj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) +\u003d tpm_bios.o\nendif\nendif\n\ndrivers/char/tpm/tpm_bios.c:494: warning: implicit declaration of function \u0027securityfs_create_dir\u0027\ndrivers/char/tpm/tpm_bios.c:494: warning: assignment makes pointer from integer without a cast\ndrivers/char/tpm/tpm_bios.c:499: warning: implicit declaration of function \u0027securityfs_create_file\u0027\ndrivers/char/tpm/tpm_bios.c:501: warning: assignment makes pointer from integer without a cast\ndrivers/char/tpm/tpm_bios.c:508: warning: assignment makes pointer from integer without a cast\ndrivers/char/tpm/tpm_bios.c:523: warning: implicit declaration of function \u0027securityfs_remove\u0027\n*** Warning: \"securityfs_create_file\" [drivers/char/tpm/tpm_bios.ko] undefined!\n*** Warning: \"securityfs_create_dir\" [drivers/char/tpm/tpm_bios.ko] undefined!\n*** Warning: \"securityfs_remove\" [drivers/char/tpm/tpm_bios.ko] undefined!\n\nThere are also some gcc and sparse warnings that could be fixed.\n(see http://www.xenotime.net/linux/doc/build-tpm.out)\n\nSigned-off-by: Randy Dunlap \u003crdunlap@xenotime.net\u003e\nCc: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nCc: Greg KH \u003cgreg@kroah.com\u003e\nCc: Kylene Jo Hall \u003ckjhall@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "df71837d5024e2524cd51c93621e558aa7dd9f3f",
      "tree": "58938f1d46f3c6713b63e5a785e82fdbb10121a1",
      "parents": [
        "88026842b0a760145aa71d69e74fbc9ec118ca44"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Trent Jaeger",
        "email": "tjaeger@cse.psu.edu",
        "time": "Tue Dec 13 23:12:27 2005 -0800"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "David S. Miller",
        "email": "davem@sunset.davemloft.net",
        "time": "Tue Jan 03 13:10:24 2006 -0800"
      },
      "message": "[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction.\n\nThis patch series implements per packet access control via the\nextension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in\nthe XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security\nassociations to label packets.  Extensions to the SELinux LSM are\nincluded that leverage the patch for this purpose.\n\nThis patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem,\npfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a\nsocket to use only authorized security associations (or no security\nassociation) to send/receive network packets.\n\nPatch purpose:\n\nThe patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on\nthe strongly authenticated IPSec security association.  Such access\ncontrols augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP\naddress.  The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be\nspoofed.  By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote\nhosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism.\nThis enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application\nif the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to\nenforce the access control policy.\n\nPatch design approach:\n\nThe overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by\nuser-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a\nsecurity context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM\nsubsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via\nsecurity associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those\npolicies.\n\nA presentation available at\nwww.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf\nfrom the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach.\n\nPatch implementation details:\n\nOn output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or\nxfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of\nthe socket and the same security context is required for resultant\nsecurity association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in\nipsec-tools).  This is enforced in xfrm_state_find.\n\nOn input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket\n(at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must\nalso match the security association being used.\n\nThe patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec.\nThe existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as\nbefore.\n\nAlso, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is\nminimal.  The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the\ncombination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec\nprocessing proceeds as in the original case.\n\nTesting:\n\nThe pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools.  ipsec-tools have\nbeen modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version\n0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security\nassociations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation\nusing the security contexts via racoon.\n\nThe xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set\nsecurity contexts.  These programs are also available from me, and\ncontain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing\nthis interface.  Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel\nbehavior.\n\nSigned-off-by: Trent Jaeger \u003ctjaeger@cse.psu.edu\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Herbert Xu \u003cherbert@gondor.apana.org.au\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "29db9190634067c5a328ee5fcc2890251b836b4b",
      "tree": "07ec242789230824f1fa8bcbbe681fd5bf166fa8",
      "parents": [
        "2aa349f6e37ce030060c994d3aebbff4ab703565"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "David Howells",
        "email": "dhowells@redhat.com",
        "time": "Sun Oct 30 15:02:44 2005 -0800"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Sun Oct 30 17:37:23 2005 -0800"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] Keys: Add LSM hooks for key management [try #3]\n\nThe attached patch adds LSM hooks for key management facilities. The notable\nchanges are:\n\n (1) The key struct now supports a security pointer for the use of security\n     modules. This will permit key labelling and restrictions on which\n     programs may access a key.\n\n (2) Security modules get a chance to note (or abort) the allocation of a key.\n\n (3) The key permission checking can now be enhanced by the security modules;\n     the permissions check consults LSM if all other checks bear out.\n\n (4) The key permissions checking functions now return an error code rather\n     than a boolean value.\n\n (5) An extra permission has been added to govern the modification of\n     attributes (UID, GID, permissions).\n\nNote that there isn\u0027t an LSM hook specifically for each keyctl() operation,\nbut rather the permissions hook allows control of individual operations based\non the permission request bits.\n\nKey management access control through LSM is enabled by automatically if both\nCONFIG_KEYS and CONFIG_SECURITY are enabled.\n\nThis should be applied on top of the patch ensubjected:\n\n\t[PATCH] Keys: Possessor permissions should be additive\n\nSigned-Off-By: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "d381d8a9a08cac9824096213069159be17fd2e2f",
      "tree": "0c19722b8f67c29b7c08c6ab8776a9c146395d03",
      "parents": [
        "89d155ef62e5e0c10e4b37aaa5056f0beafe10e6"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Sun Oct 30 14:59:22 2005 -0800"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Sun Oct 30 17:37:11 2005 -0800"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] SELinux: canonicalize getxattr()\n\nThis patch allows SELinux to canonicalize the value returned from\ngetxattr() via the security_inode_getsecurity() hook, which is called after\nthe fs level getxattr() function.\n\nThe purpose of this is to allow the in-core security context for an inode\nto override the on-disk value.  This could happen in cases such as\nupgrading a system to a different labeling form (e.g.  standard SELinux to\nMLS) without needing to do a full relabel of the filesystem.\n\nIn such cases, we want getxattr() to return the canonical security context\nthat the kernel is using rather than what is stored on disk.\n\nThe implementation hooks into the inode_getsecurity(), adding another\nparameter to indicate the result of the preceding fs-level getxattr() call,\nso that SELinux knows whether to compare a value obtained from disk with\nthe kernel value.\n\nWe also now allow getxattr() to work for mountpoint labeled filesystems\n(i.e.  mount with option context\u003dfoo_t), as we are able to return the\nkernel value to the user.\n\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "7d877f3bda870ab5f001bd92528654471d5966b3",
      "tree": "1c05b62abead153956c4ca250ffb1891887e77c9",
      "parents": [
        "fd4f2df24bc23e6b8fc069765b425c7dacf52347"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Al Viro",
        "email": "viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk",
        "time": "Fri Oct 21 03:20:43 2005 -0400"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Fri Oct 28 08:16:47 2005 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] gfp_t: net/*\n\nSigned-off-by: Al Viro \u003cviro@zeniv.linux.org.uk\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "dd0fc66fb33cd610bc1a5db8a5e232d34879b4d7",
      "tree": "51f96a9db96293b352e358f66032e1f4ff79fafb",
      "parents": [
        "3b0e77bd144203a507eb191f7117d2c5004ea1de"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Al Viro",
        "email": "viro@ftp.linux.org.uk",
        "time": "Fri Oct 07 07:46:04 2005 +0100"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Sat Oct 08 15:00:57 2005 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] gfp flags annotations - part 1\n\n - added typedef unsigned int __nocast gfp_t;\n\n - replaced __nocast uses for gfp flags with gfp_t - it gives exactly\n   the same warnings as far as sparse is concerned, doesn\u0027t change\n   generated code (from gcc point of view we replaced unsigned int with\n   typedef) and documents what\u0027s going on far better.\n\nSigned-off-by: Al Viro \u003cviro@zeniv.linux.org.uk\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "ddbf9ef385bfbef897210733abfb73cb9b94ecec",
      "tree": "64a9e965a71eef13e813a3327f8d74aa7168ee19",
      "parents": [
        "5d54e69c68c05b162a56f9914cae72afd7e6f40a",
        "2c40579bdc2a94977fcff2521d5b53a97c33e77a"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Tue Sep 13 09:48:54 2005 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Tue Sep 13 09:48:54 2005 -0700"
      },
      "message": "Merge master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/chrisw/lsm-2.6 \n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "e31e14ec356f36b131576be5bc31d8fef7e95483",
      "tree": "5597419cf186904d77c4b4ecf117287bcc1db986",
      "parents": [
        "a74574aafea3a63add3251047601611111f44562"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Stephen Smalley",
        "email": "sds@tycho.nsa.gov",
        "time": "Fri Sep 09 13:01:45 2005 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Fri Sep 09 13:57:28 2005 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] remove the inode_post_link and inode_post_rename LSM hooks\n\nThis patch removes the inode_post_link and inode_post_rename LSM hooks as\nthey are unused (and likely useless).\n\nSigned-off-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "a74574aafea3a63add3251047601611111f44562",
      "tree": "a8f4a809589513c666c6f5518cbe84f50ee5523e",
      "parents": [
        "570bc1c2e5ccdb408081e77507a385dc7ebed7fa"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Stephen Smalley",
        "email": "sds@tycho.nsa.gov",
        "time": "Fri Sep 09 13:01:44 2005 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Fri Sep 09 13:57:28 2005 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] Remove security_inode_post_create/mkdir/symlink/mknod hooks\n\nThis patch removes the inode_post_create/mkdir/mknod/symlink LSM hooks as\nthey are obsoleted by the new inode_init_security hook that enables atomic\ninode security labeling.\n\nIf anyone sees any reason to retain these hooks, please speak now.  Also,\nis anyone using the post_rename/link hooks; if not, those could also be\nremoved.\n\nSigned-off-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "5e41ff9e0650f327a6c819841fa412da95d57319",
      "tree": "a525df8bda34c2aa52f30326f94cd15109bb58b3",
      "parents": [
        "f5ee56cc184e0944ebc9ff1691985219959596f6"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Stephen Smalley",
        "email": "sds@tycho.nsa.gov",
        "time": "Fri Sep 09 13:01:35 2005 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Fri Sep 09 13:57:27 2005 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] security: enable atomic inode security labeling\n\nThe following patch set enables atomic security labeling of newly created\ninodes by altering the fs code to invoke a new LSM hook to obtain the security\nattribute to apply to a newly created inode and to set up the incore inode\nsecurity state during the inode creation transaction.  This parallels the\nexisting processing for setting ACLs on newly created inodes.  Otherwise, it\nis possible for new inodes to be accessed by another thread via the dcache\nprior to complete security setup (presently handled by the\npost_create/mkdir/...  LSM hooks in the VFS) and a newly created inode may be\nleft unlabeled on the disk in the event of a crash.  SELinux presently works\naround the issue by ensuring that the incore inode security label is\ninitialized to a special SID that is inaccessible to unprivileged processes\n(in accordance with policy), thereby preventing inappropriate access but\npotentially causing false denials on legitimate accesses.  A simple test\nprogram demonstrates such false denials on SELinux, and the patch solves the\nproblem.  Similar such false denials have been encountered in real\napplications.\n\nThis patch defines a new inode_init_security LSM hook to obtain the security\nattribute to apply to a newly created inode and to set up the incore inode\nsecurity state for it, and adds a corresponding hook function implementation\nto SELinux.\n\nSigned-off-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "20380731bc2897f2952ae055420972ded4cd786e",
      "tree": "abd31e5ebfadcf4f9024634eec8b11855029e512",
      "parents": [
        "9deff7f2365958c5c5aa8cb5a0dd651c4dd83f8f"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo",
        "email": "acme@mandriva.com",
        "time": "Tue Aug 16 02:18:02 2005 -0300"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "David S. Miller",
        "email": "davem@sunset.davemloft.net",
        "time": "Mon Aug 29 16:01:32 2005 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[NET]: Fix sparse warnings\n\nOf this type, mostly:\n\nCHECK   net/ipv6/netfilter.c\nnet/ipv6/netfilter.c:96:12: warning: symbol \u0027ipv6_netfilter_init\u0027 was not declared. Should it be static?\nnet/ipv6/netfilter.c:101:6: warning: symbol \u0027ipv6_netfilter_fini\u0027 was not declared. Should it be static?\n\nSigned-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo \u003cacme@mandriva.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "b67dbf9d4c1987c370fd18fdc4cf9d8aaea604c2",
      "tree": "76c8bf2d44a9e8b3fb8df8dedf950bbb78d340ae",
      "parents": [
        "043d051615aa5da09a7e44f1edbb69798458e067"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Greg KH",
        "email": "greg@kroah.com",
        "time": "Thu Jul 07 14:37:53 2005 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Chris Wright",
        "email": "chrisw@osdl.org",
        "time": "Fri Jul 08 18:48:41 2005 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] add securityfs for all LSMs to use\n\nHere\u0027s a small patch against 2.6.13-rc2 that adds securityfs, a virtual\nfs that all LSMs can use instead of creating their own.  The fs should\nbe mounted at /sys/kernel/security, and the fs creates that mount point.\nThis will make the LSB people happy that we aren\u0027t creating a new\n/my_lsm_fs directory in the root for every different LSM.\n\nIt has changed a bit since the last version, thanks to comments from\nMike Waychison.\n\nSigned-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman \u003cgregkh@suse.de\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
      "tree": "0bba044c4ce775e45a88a51686b5d9f90697ea9d",
      "parents": [],
      "author": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org",
        "time": "Sat Apr 16 15:20:36 2005 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org",
        "time": "Sat Apr 16 15:20:36 2005 -0700"
      },
      "message": "Linux-2.6.12-rc2\n\nInitial git repository build. I\u0027m not bothering with the full history,\neven though we have it. We can create a separate \"historical\" git\narchive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it\u0027s about\n3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early\ngit days unnecessarily complicated, when we don\u0027t have a lot of good\ninfrastructure for it.\n\nLet it rip!\n"
    }
  ]
}