)]}'
{
  "log": [
    {
      "commit": "5806896019ceaa0a1e808182afb4bba33c948ad6",
      "tree": "d0fe25384a3c87048b5eec639a11e57c9629d854",
      "parents": [
        "4aab1e896a0a9d57420ff2867caa5a369123d8cb"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Paul Gortmaker",
        "email": "paul.gortmaker@windriver.com",
        "time": "Mon Mar 14 19:32:21 2011 -0400"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Tue Mar 22 09:35:12 2011 +1100"
      },
      "message": "security: select correct default LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR on ARM.\n\nThe default for this is universally set to 64k, but the help says:\n\n   For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space\n   a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.\n   On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.\n\nThe text is right, in that we are seeing selinux-enabled ARM targets\nthat fail to launch /sbin/init because selinux blocks a memory map.\nSo select the right value if we know we are building ARM.\n\nSigned-off-by: Paul Gortmaker \u003cpaul.gortmaker@windriver.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "7e70cb4978507cf31d76b90e4cfb4c28cad87f0c",
      "tree": "c5df493eef8d30dcb40d647b0528970eb4a391c6",
      "parents": [
        "d00a1c72f7f4661212299e6cb132dfa58030bcdb"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Mimi Zohar",
        "email": "zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com",
        "time": "Tue Nov 23 18:55:35 2010 -0500"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Mon Nov 29 08:55:29 2010 +1100"
      },
      "message": "keys: add new key-type encrypted\n\nDefine a new kernel key-type called \u0027encrypted\u0027. Encrypted keys are kernel\ngenerated random numbers, which are encrypted/decrypted with a \u0027trusted\u0027\nsymmetric key. Encrypted keys are created/encrypted/decrypted in the kernel.\nUserspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs.\n\nChangelog:\n- bug fix: replaced master-key rcu based locking with semaphore\n  (reported by David Howells)\n- Removed memset of crypto_shash_digest() digest output\n- Replaced verification of \u0027key-type:key-desc\u0027 using strcspn(), with\n  one based on string constants.\n- Moved documentation to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt\n- Replace hash with shash (based on comments by David Howells)\n- Make lengths/counts size_t where possible (based on comments by David Howells)\n  Could not convert most lengths, as crypto expects \u0027unsigned int\u0027\n  (size_t: on 32 bit is defined as unsigned int, but on 64 bit is unsigned long)\n- Add \u0027const\u0027 where possible (based on comments by David Howells)\n- allocate derived_buf dynamically to support arbitrary length master key\n  (fixed by Roberto Sassu)\n- wait until late_initcall for crypto libraries to be registered\n- cleanup security/Kconfig\n- Add missing \u0027update\u0027 keyword (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)\n- Free epayload on failure to create key (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)\n- Increase the data size limit (requested by Roberto Sassu)\n- Crypto return codes are always 0 on success and negative on failure,\n  remove unnecessary tests.\n- Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc()\n\nSigned-off-by: Mimi Zohar \u003czohar@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David Safford \u003csafford@watson.ibm.com\u003e\nReviewed-by: Roberto Sassu \u003croberto.sassu@polito.it\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "d00a1c72f7f4661212299e6cb132dfa58030bcdb",
      "tree": "2c873e461f42bbf3aea03b7b2e59cea8f941d841",
      "parents": [
        "c749ba912e87ccebd674ae24b97462176c63732e"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Mimi Zohar",
        "email": "zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com",
        "time": "Tue Nov 23 17:50:34 2010 -0500"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Mon Nov 29 08:55:25 2010 +1100"
      },
      "message": "keys: add new trusted key-type\n\nDefine a new kernel key-type called \u0027trusted\u0027.  Trusted keys are random\nnumber symmetric keys, generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM.  The TPM\nonly unseals the keys, if the boot PCRs and other criteria match.\nUserspace can only ever see encrypted blobs.\n\nBased on suggestions by Jason Gunthorpe, several new options have been\nadded to support additional usages.\n\nThe new options are:\nmigratable\u003d  designates that the key may/may not ever be updated\n             (resealed under a new key, new pcrinfo or new auth.)\n\npcrlock\u003dn    extends the designated PCR \u0027n\u0027 with a random value,\n             so that a key sealed to that PCR may not be unsealed\n             again until after a reboot.\n\nkeyhandle\u003d   specifies the sealing/unsealing key handle.\n\nkeyauth\u003d     specifies the sealing/unsealing key auth.\n\nblobauth\u003d    specifies the sealed data auth.\n\nImplementation of a kernel reserved locality for trusted keys will be\ninvestigated for a possible future extension.\n\nChangelog:\n- Updated and added examples to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt\n- Moved generic TPM constants to include/linux/tpm_command.h\n  (David Howell\u0027s suggestion.)\n- trusted_defined.c: replaced kzalloc with kmalloc, added pcrlock failure\n  error handling, added const qualifiers where appropriate.\n- moved to late_initcall\n- updated from hash to shash (suggestion by David Howells)\n- reduced worst stack usage (tpm_seal) from 530 to 312 bytes\n- moved documentation to Documentation directory (suggestion by David Howells)\n- all the other code cleanups suggested by David Howells\n- Add pcrlock CAP_SYS_ADMIN dependency (based on comment by Jason Gunthorpe)\n- New options: migratable, pcrlock, keyhandle, keyauth, blobauth (based on\n  discussions with Jason Gunthorpe)\n- Free payload on failure to create key(reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)\n- Updated Kconfig and other descriptions (based on Serge Hallyn\u0027s suggestion)\n- Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc() (reported by Serge Hallyn)\n\nSigned-off-by: David Safford \u003csafford@watson.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Mimi Zohar \u003czohar@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "eaf06b241b091357e72b76863ba16e89610d31bd",
      "tree": "83bc8667309050b3538630707513574c14c51f37",
      "parents": [
        "203f40a5a030ed4048cd40e3bd9ab5df6c5df589"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Dan Rosenberg",
        "email": "drosenberg@vsecurity.com",
        "time": "Thu Nov 11 14:05:18 2010 -0800"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org",
        "time": "Fri Nov 12 07:55:32 2010 -0800"
      },
      "message": "Restrict unprivileged access to kernel syslog\n\nThe kernel syslog contains debugging information that is often useful\nduring exploitation of other vulnerabilities, such as kernel heap\naddresses.  Rather than futilely attempt to sanitize hundreds (or\nthousands) of printk statements and simultaneously cripple useful\ndebugging functionality, it is far simpler to create an option that\nprevents unprivileged users from reading the syslog.\n\nThis patch, loosely based on grsecurity\u0027s GRKERNSEC_DMESG, creates the\ndmesg_restrict sysctl.  When set to \"0\", the default, no restrictions are\nenforced.  When set to \"1\", only users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can read the\nkernel syslog via dmesg(8) or other mechanisms.\n\n[akpm@linux-foundation.org: explain the config option in kernel.txt]\nSigned-off-by: Dan Rosenberg \u003cdrosenberg@vsecurity.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Ingo Molnar \u003cmingo@elte.hu\u003e\nAcked-by: Eugene Teo \u003ceugeneteo@kernel.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Kees Cook \u003ckees.cook@canonical.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "f9ad1af53d5232a89a1ff1827102843999975dfa",
      "tree": "2d7f4c35208b74995651fa6eb47031a37f928503",
      "parents": [
        "c1c124e91e7c6d5a600c98f6fb5b443c403a14f4"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "John Johansen",
        "email": "john.johansen@canonical.com",
        "time": "Thu Jul 29 14:48:08 2010 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Mon Aug 02 15:38:34 2010 +1000"
      },
      "message": "AppArmor: Enable configuring and building of the AppArmor security module\n\nKconfig and Makefiles to enable configuration and building of AppArmor.\n\nSigned-off-by: John Johansen \u003cjohn.johansen@canonical.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "b3a222e52e4d4be77cc4520a57af1a4a0d8222d1",
      "tree": "1c3d5df529a404636b996ef39c991c9b8813aa12",
      "parents": [
        "0bce95279909aa4cc401a2e3140b4295ca22e72a"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Serge E. Hallyn",
        "email": "serue@us.ibm.com",
        "time": "Mon Nov 23 16:21:30 2009 -0600"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Tue Nov 24 15:06:47 2009 +1100"
      },
      "message": "remove CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES compile option\n\nAs far as I know, all distros currently ship kernels with default\nCONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES\u003dy.  Since having the option on\nleaves a \u0027no_file_caps\u0027 option to boot without file capabilities,\nthe main reason to keep the option is that turning it off saves\nyou (on my s390x partition) 5k.  In particular, vmlinux sizes\ncame to:\n\nwithout patch fscaps\u003dn:\t\t \t53598392\nwithout patch fscaps\u003dy:\t\t \t53603406\nwith this patch applied:\t\t53603342\n\nwith the security-next tree.\n\nAgainst this we must weigh the fact that there is no simple way for\nuserspace to figure out whether file capabilities are supported,\nwhile things like per-process securebits, capability bounding\nsets, and adding bits to pI if CAP_SETPCAP is in pE are not supported\nwith SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES\u003dn, leaving a bit of a problem for\napplications wanting to know whether they can use them and/or why\nsomething failed.\n\nIt also adds another subtly different set of semantics which we must\nmaintain at the risk of severe security regressions.\n\nSo this patch removes the SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES compile\noption.  It drops the kernel size by about 50k over the stock\nSECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES\u003dy kernel, by removing the\ncap_limit_ptraced_target() function.\n\nChangelog:\n\tNov 20: remove cap_limit_ptraced_target() as it\u0027s logic\n\t\twas ifndef\u0027ed.\n\nSigned-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Andrew G. Morgan\" \u003cmorgan@kernel.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "6e65f92ff0d6f18580737321718d09035085a3fb",
      "tree": "2edfad79128d1b48e0b4ad49abdfbfcf2a1a2a48",
      "parents": [
        "0e1a6ef2dea88101b056b6d9984f3325c5efced3"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "John Johansen",
        "email": "john.johansen@canonical.com",
        "time": "Thu Nov 05 17:03:20 2009 -0800"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Mon Nov 09 08:40:07 2009 +1100"
      },
      "message": "Config option to set a default LSM\n\nThe LSM currently requires setting a kernel parameter at boot to select\na specific LSM.  This adds a config option that allows specifying a default\nLSM that is used unless overridden with the security\u003d kernel parameter.\nIf the the config option is not set the current behavior of first LSM\nto register is used.\n\nSigned-off-by: John Johansen \u003cjohn.johansen@canonical.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "3e1c2515acf70448cad1ae3ab835ca80be043d33",
      "tree": "46034a30e83ba406479d9753acdbb0fd76180b2b",
      "parents": [
        "b7f3008ad1d795935551e4dd810b0255a7bfa3c9"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Tue Oct 20 13:48:33 2009 +0900"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Tue Oct 20 14:26:16 2009 +0900"
      },
      "message": "security: remove root_plug\n\n    Remove the root_plug example LSM code.  It\u0027s unmaintained and\n    increasingly broken in various ways.\n\n    Made at the 2009 Kernel Summit in Tokyo!\n\n    Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman \u003cgregkh@suse.de\u003e\n    Signed-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "936e894a976dd3b0f07f1f6f43c17b77b7e6146d",
      "tree": "5ed5c1f6735dcd26550594df23c8f7fe2aa21a15",
      "parents": [
        "69575d388603365f2afbf4166df93152df59b165",
        "326ba5010a5429a5a528b268b36a5900d4ab0eba"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Ingo Molnar",
        "email": "mingo@elte.hu",
        "time": "Wed Sep 02 08:17:56 2009 +0200"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Ingo Molnar",
        "email": "mingo@elte.hu",
        "time": "Wed Sep 02 08:17:56 2009 +0200"
      },
      "message": "Merge commit \u0027v2.6.31-rc8\u0027 into x86/txt\n\nConflicts:\n\tarch/x86/kernel/reboot.c\n\tsecurity/Kconfig\n\nMerge reason: resolve the conflicts, bump up from rc3 to rc8.\n\nSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar \u003cmingo@elte.hu\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "69575d388603365f2afbf4166df93152df59b165",
      "tree": "ca3d66668c8ec47befc0adbfa62cf135229bda59",
      "parents": [
        "62a3207b8cf3de35368cdc3822b30b82d59eea95"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Shane Wang",
        "email": "shane.wang@intel.com",
        "time": "Tue Sep 01 18:25:07 2009 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "H. Peter Anvin",
        "email": "hpa@zytor.com",
        "time": "Tue Sep 01 18:25:07 2009 -0700"
      },
      "message": "x86, intel_txt: clean up the impact on generic code, unbreak non-x86\n\nMove tboot.h from asm to linux to fix the build errors of intel_txt\npatch on non-X86 platforms. Remove the tboot code from generic code\ninit/main.c and kernel/cpu.c.\n\nSigned-off-by: Shane Wang \u003cshane.wang@intel.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: H. Peter Anvin \u003chpa@zytor.com\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "024e6cb408307de41cbfcb1e5a170d9af60ab2a9",
      "tree": "a292ba561abe291f906cde4907e5956b0a5a5f5a",
      "parents": [
        "a58578e47f004017cf47803ad372490806630e58"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Andreas Schwab",
        "email": "schwab@linux-m68k.org",
        "time": "Tue Aug 18 22:14:29 2009 +0200"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Wed Aug 19 08:42:56 2009 +1000"
      },
      "message": "security: Fix prompt for LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR\n\nFix prompt for LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR.\n\n(Verbs are cool!)\n\nSigned-off-by: Andreas Schwab \u003cschwab@linux-m68k.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "a58578e47f004017cf47803ad372490806630e58",
      "tree": "f815076f1956aa50d0eea5d0323eaae9c27b3424",
      "parents": [
        "df4ecf1524c7793de3121b2d4e5fc6bcc0da3bfb"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Dave Jones",
        "email": "davej@redhat.com",
        "time": "Tue Aug 18 13:47:37 2009 -0400"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Wed Aug 19 08:38:29 2009 +1000"
      },
      "message": "security: Make LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR default match its help text.\n\nCommit 788084aba2ab7348257597496befcbccabdc98a3 added the LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR\noption, whose help text states \"For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots\nof address space a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.\"\nWhich implies that it\u0027s default setting was typoed.\n\nSigned-off-by: Dave Jones \u003cdavej@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "788084aba2ab7348257597496befcbccabdc98a3",
      "tree": "2da42d746d67b16ef705229a1b5a3528ec19c725",
      "parents": [
        "8cf948e744e0218af604c32edecde10006dc8e9e"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Eric Paris",
        "email": "eparis@redhat.com",
        "time": "Fri Jul 31 12:54:11 2009 -0400"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Mon Aug 17 15:09:11 2009 +1000"
      },
      "message": "Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addr\n\nCurrently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory\nis determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable.  This patch causes SELinux to\nignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how\nmuch space the LSM should protect.\n\nThe tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux\npermissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by\nCONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR.\n\nThis allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason\nbeing they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux\ncontrols preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to\nmap some area of low memory.\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "3c556e4198926b284ff5ff6756111a64e1e98cb0",
      "tree": "0f9c37081267980305e279ce7f3f53dfbeb6a5c6",
      "parents": [
        "58c41d28259c246dbc11358d85d332dc20ccd57b"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo",
        "email": "acme@redhat.com",
        "time": "Wed Aug 12 12:00:40 2009 -0300"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "H. Peter Anvin",
        "email": "hpa@zytor.com",
        "time": "Fri Aug 14 16:43:15 2009 -0700"
      },
      "message": "x86, intel_txt: Fix typos in Kconfig help\n\nSigned-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo \u003cacme@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: H. Peter Anvin \u003chpa@zytor.com\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "3162534069597e34dd0ac9eb711be8dc23835ae7",
      "tree": "a8cddd3899917784ebac2cdf6c75d2c8b50d04af",
      "parents": [
        "aea1f7964ae6cba5eb419a958956deb9016b3341"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Joseph Cihula",
        "email": "joseph.cihula@intel.com",
        "time": "Tue Jun 30 19:30:59 2009 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "H. Peter Anvin",
        "email": "hpa@zytor.com",
        "time": "Tue Jul 21 11:49:06 2009 -0700"
      },
      "message": "x86, intel_txt: Intel TXT boot support\n\nThis patch adds kernel configuration and boot support for Intel Trusted\nExecution Technology (Intel TXT).\n\nIntel\u0027s technology for safer computing, Intel Trusted Execution\nTechnology (Intel TXT), defines platform-level enhancements that\nprovide the building blocks for creating trusted platforms.\n\nIntel TXT was formerly known by the code name LaGrande Technology (LT).\n\nIntel TXT in Brief:\no  Provides dynamic root of trust for measurement (DRTM)\no  Data protection in case of improper shutdown\no  Measurement and verification of launched environment\n\nIntel TXT is part of the vPro(TM) brand and is also available some\nnon-vPro systems.  It is currently available on desktop systems based on\nthe Q35, X38, Q45, and Q43 Express chipsets (e.g. Dell Optiplex 755, HP\ndc7800, etc.) and mobile systems based on the GM45, PM45, and GS45\nExpress chipsets.\n\nFor more information, see http://www.intel.com/technology/security/.\nThis site also has a link to the Intel TXT MLE Developers Manual, which\nhas been updated for the new released platforms.\n\nA much more complete description of how these patches support TXT, how to\nconfigure a system for it, etc. is in the Documentation/intel_txt.txt file\nin this patch.\n\nThis patch provides the TXT support routines for complete functionality,\ndocumentation for TXT support and for the changes to the boot_params structure,\nand boot detection of a TXT launch.  Attempts to shutdown (reboot, Sx) the system\nwill result in platform resets; subsequent patches will support these shutdown modes\nproperly.\n\n Documentation/intel_txt.txt      |  210 +++++++++++++++++++++\n Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt  |    1\n arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h |    3\n arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h    |    3\n arch/x86/include/asm/tboot.h     |  197 ++++++++++++++++++++\n arch/x86/kernel/Makefile         |    1\n arch/x86/kernel/setup.c          |    4\n arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c          |  379 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++\n security/Kconfig                 |   30 +++\n 9 files changed, 827 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\nSigned-off-by: Joseph Cihula \u003cjoseph.cihula@intel.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Shane Wang \u003cshane.wang@intel.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Gang Wei \u003cgang.wei@intel.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: H. Peter Anvin \u003chpa@zytor.com\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "e0a94c2a63f2644826069044649669b5e7ca75d3",
      "tree": "debf8a9af6ac23dadd116dc1cd1f9dcefe9629c6",
      "parents": [
        "7d2948b1248109dbc7f4aaf9867c54b1912d494c"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Christoph Lameter",
        "email": "cl@linux-foundation.org",
        "time": "Wed Jun 03 16:04:31 2009 -0400"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Thu Jun 04 12:07:48 2009 +1000"
      },
      "message": "security: use mmap_min_addr indepedently of security models\n\nThis patch removes the dependency of mmap_min_addr on CONFIG_SECURITY.\nIt also sets a default mmap_min_addr of 4096.\n\nmmapping of addresses below 4096 will only be possible for processes\nwith CAP_SYS_RAWIO.\n\nSigned-off-by: Christoph Lameter \u003ccl@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nLooks-ok-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "00d7d6f840ddc947237307e022de5e75ded4105f",
      "tree": "53669494101f93becdd401be2e70073bc7c6fe0b",
      "parents": [
        "f7433243770c77979c396b4c7449a10e9b3521db"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Kentaro Takeda",
        "email": "takedakn@nttdata.co.jp",
        "time": "Thu Feb 05 17:18:17 2009 +0900"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Thu Feb 12 15:19:00 2009 +1100"
      },
      "message": "Kconfig and Makefile\n\nTOMOYO uses LSM hooks for pathname based access control and securityfs support.\n\nSigned-off-by: Kentaro Takeda \u003ctakedakn@nttdata.co.jp\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Tetsuo Handa \u003cpenguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "cb5629b10d64a8006622ce3a52bc887d91057d69",
      "tree": "7c06d8f30783115e3384721046258ce615b129c5",
      "parents": [
        "8920d5ad6ba74ae8ab020e90cc4d976980e68701",
        "f01d1d546abb2f4028b5299092f529eefb01253a"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Fri Feb 06 11:01:45 2009 +1100"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Fri Feb 06 11:01:45 2009 +1100"
      },
      "message": "Merge branch \u0027master\u0027 into next\n\nConflicts:\n\tfs/namei.c\n\nManually merged per:\n\ndiff --cc fs/namei.c\nindex 734f2b5,bbc15c2..0000000\n--- a/fs/namei.c\n+++ b/fs/namei.c\n@@@ -860,9 -848,8 +849,10 @@@ static int __link_path_walk(const char\n  \t\tnd-\u003eflags |\u003d LOOKUP_CONTINUE;\n  \t\terr \u003d exec_permission_lite(inode);\n  \t\tif (err \u003d\u003d -EAGAIN)\n- \t\t\terr \u003d vfs_permission(nd, MAY_EXEC);\n+ \t\t\terr \u003d inode_permission(nd-\u003epath.dentry-\u003ed_inode,\n+ \t\t\t\t\t       MAY_EXEC);\n +\t\tif (!err)\n +\t\t\terr \u003d ima_path_check(\u0026nd-\u003epath, MAY_EXEC);\n   \t\tif (err)\n  \t\t\tbreak;\n\n@@@ -1525,14 -1506,9 +1509,14 @@@ int may_open(struct path *path, int acc\n  \t\tflag \u0026\u003d ~O_TRUNC;\n  \t}\n\n- \terror \u003d vfs_permission(nd, acc_mode);\n+ \terror \u003d inode_permission(inode, acc_mode);\n  \tif (error)\n  \t\treturn error;\n +\n- \terror \u003d ima_path_check(\u0026nd-\u003epath,\n++\terror \u003d ima_path_check(path,\n +\t\t\t       acc_mode \u0026 (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC));\n +\tif (error)\n +\t\treturn error;\n  \t/*\n  \t * An append-only file must be opened in append mode for writing.\n  \t */\n\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "3323eec921efd815178a23107ab63588c605c0b2",
      "tree": "bc9e9714ac4881ebc515c1bd155674c52c356d6a",
      "parents": [
        "6146f0d5e47ca4047ffded0fb79b6c25359b386c"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Mimi Zohar",
        "email": "zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com",
        "time": "Wed Feb 04 09:06:58 2009 -0500"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Fri Feb 06 09:05:30 2009 +1100"
      },
      "message": "integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider\n\nIMA provides hardware (TPM) based measurement and attestation for\nfile measurements. As the Trusted Computing (TPM) model requires,\nIMA measures all files before they are accessed in any way (on the\nintegrity_bprm_check, integrity_path_check and integrity_file_mmap\nhooks), and commits the measurements to the TPM. Once added to the\nTPM, measurements can not be removed.\n\nIn addition, IMA maintains a list of these file measurements, which\ncan be used to validate the aggregate value stored in the TPM.  The\nTPM can sign these measurements, and thus the system can prove, to\nitself and to a third party, the system\u0027s integrity in a way that\ncannot be circumvented by malicious or compromised software.\n\n- alloc ima_template_entry before calling ima_store_template()\n- log ima_add_boot_aggregate() failure\n- removed unused IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN\n- replaced hard coded string length with #define name\n\nSigned-off-by: Mimi Zohar \u003czohar@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "be6d3e56a6b9b3a4ee44a0685e39e595073c6f0d",
      "tree": "3a770f4cc676efeba443b28caa1ad195eeff49bc",
      "parents": [
        "6a94cb73064c952255336cc57731904174b2c58f"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Kentaro Takeda",
        "email": "takedakn@nttdata.co.jp",
        "time": "Wed Dec 17 13:24:15 2008 +0900"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Al Viro",
        "email": "viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk",
        "time": "Wed Dec 31 18:07:37 2008 -0500"
      },
      "message": "introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.\n\nAdd new LSM hooks for path-based checks.  Call them on directory-modifying\noperations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved.\n\nSigned-off-by: Kentaro Takeda \u003ctakedakn@nttdata.co.jp\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Tetsuo Handa \u003cpenguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Toshiharu Harada \u003charadats@nttdata.co.jp\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Al Viro \u003cviro@zeniv.linux.org.uk\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "da31894ed7b654e2e1741e7ac4ef6c15be0dd14b",
      "tree": "7247357082b105a4aab13a2fb7dad73886f1a9e5",
      "parents": [
        "86d688984deefa3ae5a802880c11f2b408b5d6cf"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Eric Paris",
        "email": "eparis@redhat.com",
        "time": "Fri Aug 22 11:35:57 2008 -0400"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Thu Aug 28 10:47:42 2008 +1000"
      },
      "message": "securityfs: do not depend on CONFIG_SECURITY\n\nAdd a new Kconfig option SECURITYFS which will build securityfs support\nbut does not require CONFIG_SECURITY.  The only current user of\nsecurityfs does not depend on CONFIG_SECURITY and there is no reason the\nfull LSM needs to be built to build this fs.\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "84aaa7ab4c40b66d6dd9aa393901551ad50ec640",
      "tree": "6b16125299477335c808e7ee548bd778fc9fd5df",
      "parents": [
        "ab763c7112ce0e2559c73f921617c81dc7287ca6"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Andrew G. Morgan",
        "email": "morgan@kernel.org",
        "time": "Wed Jul 23 21:28:25 2008 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org",
        "time": "Thu Jul 24 10:47:22 2008 -0700"
      },
      "message": "security: filesystem capabilities no longer experimental\n\nFilesystem capabilities have come of age.  Remove the experimental tag for\nconfiguring filesystem capabilities.\n\nSigned-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan \u003cmorgan@kernel.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "93cbace7a058bce7f99319ef6ceff4b78cf45051",
      "tree": "01a9f6c054dc2cca186a563a84345c4635ab304e",
      "parents": [
        "5915eb53861c5776cfec33ca4fcc1fd20d66dd27"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Miklos Szeredi",
        "email": "miklos@szeredi.hu",
        "time": "Thu Jul 10 11:10:09 2008 +0200"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Mon Jul 14 15:03:41 2008 +1000"
      },
      "message": "security: remove dummy module fix\n\nFix small oversight in \"security: remove dummy module\":\nCONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES doesn\u0027t depend on CONFIG_SECURITY\n\nSigned-off-by: Miklos Szeredi \u003cmszeredi@suse.cz\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "5915eb53861c5776cfec33ca4fcc1fd20d66dd27",
      "tree": "d4895b96dfdc227a3abe2f13c093b6f53ac3aef8",
      "parents": [
        "b478a9f9889c81e88077d1495daadee64c0af541"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Miklos Szeredi",
        "email": "mszeredi@suse.cz",
        "time": "Thu Jul 03 20:56:05 2008 +0200"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Mon Jul 14 15:03:04 2008 +1000"
      },
      "message": "security: remove dummy module\n\nRemove the dummy module and make the \"capability\" module the default.\n\nCompile and boot tested.\n\nSigned-off-by: Miklos Szeredi \u003cmszeredi@suse.cz\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "5f46ce14bd432cf52bf91079270af164ca48f821",
      "tree": "ae8129b0ba3743b67ba69af83c7c8aa6950e4f15",
      "parents": [
        "27cc2a6e572e1a86a08a02918517558f175f6974"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "maximilian attems",
        "email": "max@stro.at",
        "time": "Wed Apr 16 19:36:36 2008 +0200"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Fri Apr 18 20:26:18 2008 +1000"
      },
      "message": "security: enhance DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR description\n\nGot burned by setting the proposed default of 65536\nacross all Debian archs.\n\nThus proposing to be more specific on which archs you may\nset this. Also propose a value for arm and friends that\ndoesn\u0027t break sshd.\n\nReword to mention working archs ia64 and ppc64 too.\n\nSigned-off-by: maximilian attems \u003cmax@stro.at\u003e\nCc: Martin Michlmayr \u003ctbm@cyrius.com\u003e\nCc: Gordon Farquharson \u003cgordonfarquharson@gmail.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "a5ecbcb8c13ea8a822d243bf782d0dc9525b4f84",
      "tree": "902df830bf581642a49bbb1e4f4de5b9f80eeaa1",
      "parents": [
        "551e4fb2465b87de9d4aa1669b27d624435443bb"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Eric Paris",
        "email": "eparis@redhat.com",
        "time": "Thu Jan 31 15:11:22 2008 -0500"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@localhost.localdomain",
        "time": "Wed Feb 06 21:39:46 2008 +0800"
      },
      "message": "security: allow Kconfig to set default mmap_min_addr protection\n\nSince it was decided that low memory protection from userspace couldn\u0027t\nbe turned on by default add a Kconfig option to allow users/distros to\nset a default at compile time.  This value is still tunable after boot\nin /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr\n\nDiscussion:\nhttp://www.mail-archive.com/linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org/msg02543.html\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "e114e473771c848c3cfec05f0123e70f1cdbdc99",
      "tree": "933b840f3ccac6860da56291c742094f9b5a20cb",
      "parents": [
        "eda61d32e8ad1d9102872f9a0abf3344bf9c5e67"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Casey Schaufler",
        "email": "casey@schaufler-ca.com",
        "time": "Mon Feb 04 22:29:50 2008 -0800"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org",
        "time": "Tue Feb 05 09:44:20 2008 -0800"
      },
      "message": "Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel\n\nSmack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel.\n\nSmack implements mandatory access control (MAC) using labels\nattached to tasks and data containers, including files, SVIPC,\nand other tasks. Smack is a kernel based scheme that requires\nan absolute minimum of application support and a very small\namount of configuration data.\n\nSmack uses extended attributes and\nprovides a set of general mount options, borrowing technics used\nelsewhere. Smack uses netlabel for CIPSO labeling. Smack provides\na pseudo-filesystem smackfs that is used for manipulation of\nsystem Smack attributes.\n\nThe patch, patches for ls and sshd, a README, a startup script,\nand x86 binaries for ls and sshd are also available on\n\n    http://www.schaufler-ca.com\n\nDevelopment has been done using Fedora Core 7 in a virtual machine\nenvironment and on an old Sony laptop.\n\nSmack provides mandatory access controls based on the label attached\nto a task and the label attached to the object it is attempting to\naccess. Smack labels are deliberately short (1-23 characters) text\nstrings. Single character labels using special characters are reserved\nfor system use. The only operation applied to Smack labels is equality\ncomparison. No wildcards or expressions, regular or otherwise, are\nused. Smack labels are composed of printable characters and may not\ninclude \"/\".\n\nA file always gets the Smack label of the task that created it.\n\nSmack defines and uses these labels:\n\n    \"*\" - pronounced \"star\"\n    \"_\" - pronounced \"floor\"\n    \"^\" - pronounced \"hat\"\n    \"?\" - pronounced \"huh\"\n\nThe access rules enforced by Smack are, in order:\n\n1. Any access requested by a task labeled \"*\" is denied.\n2. A read or execute access requested by a task labeled \"^\"\n   is permitted.\n3. A read or execute access requested on an object labeled \"_\"\n   is permitted.\n4. Any access requested on an object labeled \"*\" is permitted.\n5. Any access requested by a task on an object with the same\n   label is permitted.\n6. Any access requested that is explicitly defined in the loaded\n   rule set is permitted.\n7. Any other access is denied.\n\nRules may be explicitly defined by writing subject,object,access\ntriples to /smack/load.\n\nSmack rule sets can be easily defined that describe Bell\u0026LaPadula\nsensitivity, Biba integrity, and a variety of interesting\nconfigurations. Smack rule sets can be modified on the fly to\naccommodate changes in the operating environment or even the time\nof day.\n\nSome practical use cases:\n\nHierarchical levels. The less common of the two usual uses\nfor MLS systems is to define hierarchical levels, often\nunclassified, confidential, secret, and so on. To set up smack\nto support this, these rules could be defined:\n\n   C        Unclass rx\n   S        C       rx\n   S        Unclass rx\n   TS       S       rx\n   TS       C       rx\n   TS       Unclass rx\n\nA TS process can read S, C, and Unclass data, but cannot write it.\nAn S process can read C and Unclass. Note that specifying that\nTS can read S and S can read C does not imply TS can read C, it\nhas to be explicitly stated.\n\nNon-hierarchical categories. This is the more common of the\nusual uses for an MLS system. Since the default rule is that a\nsubject cannot access an object with a different label no\naccess rules are required to implement compartmentalization.\n\nA case that the Bell \u0026 LaPadula policy does not allow is demonstrated\nwith this Smack access rule:\n\nA case that Bell\u0026LaPadula does not allow that Smack does:\n\n    ESPN    ABC   r\n    ABC     ESPN  r\n\nOn my portable video device I have two applications, one that\nshows ABC programming and the other ESPN programming. ESPN wants\nto show me sport stories that show up as news, and ABC will\nonly provide minimal information about a sports story if ESPN\nis covering it. Each side can look at the other\u0027s info, neither\ncan change the other. Neither can see what FOX is up to, which\nis just as well all things considered.\n\nAnother case that I especially like:\n\n    SatData Guard   w\n    Guard   Publish w\n\nA program running with the Guard label opens a UDP socket and\naccepts messages sent by a program running with a SatData label.\nThe Guard program inspects the message to ensure it is wholesome\nand if it is sends it to a program running with the Publish label.\nThis program then puts the information passed in an appropriate\nplace. Note that the Guard program cannot write to a Publish\nfile system object because file system semanitic require read as\nwell as write.\n\nThe four cases (categories, levels, mutual read, guardbox) here\nare all quite real, and problems I\u0027ve been asked to solve over\nthe years. The first two are easy to do with traditonal MLS systems\nwhile the last two you can\u0027t without invoking privilege, at least\nfor a while.\n\nSigned-off-by: Casey Schaufler \u003ccasey@schaufler-ca.com\u003e\nCc: Joshua Brindle \u003cmethod@manicmethod.com\u003e\nCc: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\nCc: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nCc: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@sous-sol.org\u003e\nCc: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nCc: \"Ahmed S. Darwish\" \u003cdarwish.07@gmail.com\u003e\nCc: Andrew G. Morgan \u003cmorgan@kernel.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "f71ea9ddf0ff110f3fcbb89a46686bfba264014c",
      "tree": "db6843db55d5e1036248fc41782a891882b2cb54",
      "parents": [
        "374ea019cacfa8b69ae49eea993b74cb5968970b"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "sergeh@us.ibm.com",
        "email": "sergeh@us.ibm.com",
        "time": "Tue Jan 29 05:04:43 2008 -0800"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Wed Jan 30 08:18:21 2008 +1100"
      },
      "message": "security: compile capabilities by default\n\nCapabilities have long been the default when CONFIG_SECURITY\u003dn,\nand its help text suggests turning it on when CONFIG_SECURITY\u003dy.\nBut it is set to default n.\n\nDefault it to y instead.\n\nSigned-off-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Matt LaPlante \u003ckernel1@cyberdogtech.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "b53767719b6cd8789392ea3e7e2eb7b8906898f0",
      "tree": "a0279dc93c79b94d3865b0f19f6b7b353e20608c",
      "parents": [
        "57c521ce6125e15e99e56c902cb8da96bee7b36d"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Serge E. Hallyn",
        "email": "serue@us.ibm.com",
        "time": "Tue Oct 16 23:31:36 2007 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org",
        "time": "Wed Oct 17 08:43:07 2007 -0700"
      },
      "message": "Implement file posix capabilities\n\nImplement file posix capabilities.  This allows programs to be given a\nsubset of root\u0027s powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use\nsetuid and giving the binary all of root\u0027s powers.\n\nThis version works with Kaigai Kohei\u0027s userspace tools, found at\nhttp://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php.  For more information on how to use this\npatch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at\nhttp://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.\n\nChangelog:\n\tNov 27:\n\tIncorporate fixes from Andrew Morton\n\t(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and\n\tsecurity-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)\n\tFix Kconfig dependency.\n\tFix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.\n\n\tNov 13:\n\tIntegrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from\n\tcapability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.\n\n\tNov 13:\n\tFix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey\n\tDobriyan.\n\n\tNov 09:\n\tAddress warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security\n\twhen file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean\n\tup the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper\n\tfunction.\n\n\tNov 08:\n\tFor pointers to required userspace tools and how to use\n\tthem, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.\n\n\tNov 07:\n\tFix the calculation of the highest bit checked in\n\tcheck_cap_sanity().\n\n\tNov 07:\n\tAllow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since\n\tcapabilities are the default.\n\tHook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.\n\tMove capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce\n\taudit messages.\n\n\tNov 05:\n\tAdd secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and\n\ttask_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file\n\tcap support can be stacked.\n\n\tSep 05:\n\tAs Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place\n\tfor capability code.\n\n\tSep 01:\n\tDefine task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and\n\ttask_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which\n\tthey called a program with some fscaps.\n\n\tOne remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we\n\tok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a\n\tcpuset?\n\n\tIt is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn\u0027t\n\tallow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check.  But since\n\tit uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where\n\tCAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,\n\tfixing it might be tough.\n\n\t     task_setscheduler\n\t\t note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task.  Are we ok with\n\t\t     CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?\n\t     task_setioprio\n\t     task_setnice\n\t\t sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another\n\t\t process.  Need same checks as setrlimit\n\n\tAug 21:\n\tUpdated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that\n\teuid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process\n\tmight still have elevated caps.\n\n\tAug 15:\n\tHandle endianness of xattrs.\n\tEnforce capability version match between kernel and disk.\n\tEnforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are\n\tset, else return -EPERM.\n\tWith this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering\n\tdoing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than\n\td_instantiate.\n\n\tAug 10:\n\tAlways call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than\n\tcaching it at d_instantiate.\n\n[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]\n[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]\nSigned-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nCc: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nCc: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nCc: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@sous-sol.org\u003e\nCc: Andrew Morgan \u003cmorgan@kernel.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morgan \u003cmorgan@kernel.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Adrian Bunk \u003cbunk@kernel.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "20510f2f4e2dabb0ff6c13901807627ec9452f98",
      "tree": "d64b9eeb90d577f7f9688a215c4c6c3c2405188a",
      "parents": [
        "5c3b447457789374cdb7b03afe2540d48c649a36"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Tue Oct 16 23:31:32 2007 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org",
        "time": "Wed Oct 17 08:43:07 2007 -0700"
      },
      "message": "security: Convert LSM into a static interface\n\nConvert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security\nmodule is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the\noverall security architecture.\n\nNeedlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API\nabuse.\n\nParameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified\nat boot.\n\nThe SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed.\n\nIn a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM.  The modular interface\nis thus unecessary and broken infrastructure.  It is used only by out-of-tree\nmodules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and\ndangerous, e.g.  silently re-vectoring SELinux.\n\n[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups]\n[akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix]\n[randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc]\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@sous-sol.org\u003e\nCc: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nCc: \"Serge E. Hallyn\" \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Arjan van de Ven \u003carjan@infradead.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Randy Dunlap \u003crandy.dunlap@oracle.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "3bc1fa8ae18f281b40903cce94baba10c3cf9d88",
      "tree": "9097244b28cbf4eba16368803272af0fc70224d5",
      "parents": [
        "cd1c6a48ac16b360746f9f111895931d332c35dd"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Chris Wright",
        "email": "chrisw@sous-sol.org",
        "time": "Fri Sep 29 01:59:49 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Fri Sep 29 09:18:10 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] LSM: remove BSD secure level security module\n\nThis code has suffered from broken core design and lack of developer\nattention.  Broken security modules are too dangerous to leave around.  It\nis time to remove this one.\n\nSigned-off-by: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@sous-sol.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Michael Halcrow \u003cmhalcrow@us.ibm.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nCc: Davi Arnaut \u003cdavi.arnaut@gmail.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman \u003cgregkh@suse.de\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Alan Cox \u003calan@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "06ec7be557a1259611d6093a00463c42650dc71a",
      "tree": "b83cdbc8405e0a174939d36e4fe40fb8adb51071",
      "parents": [
        "e51f6d343789a4f0a2a7587ad7ec7746969d5c1c"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Michael LeMay",
        "email": "mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil",
        "time": "Mon Jun 26 00:24:56 2006 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org",
        "time": "Mon Jun 26 09:58:18 2006 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] keys: restrict contents of /proc/keys to Viewable keys\n\nRestrict /proc/keys such that only those keys to which the current task is\ngranted View permission are presented.\n\nThe documentation is also updated to reflect these changes.\n\nSigned-off-by: Michael LeMay \u003cmdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "df71837d5024e2524cd51c93621e558aa7dd9f3f",
      "tree": "58938f1d46f3c6713b63e5a785e82fdbb10121a1",
      "parents": [
        "88026842b0a760145aa71d69e74fbc9ec118ca44"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Trent Jaeger",
        "email": "tjaeger@cse.psu.edu",
        "time": "Tue Dec 13 23:12:27 2005 -0800"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "David S. Miller",
        "email": "davem@sunset.davemloft.net",
        "time": "Tue Jan 03 13:10:24 2006 -0800"
      },
      "message": "[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction.\n\nThis patch series implements per packet access control via the\nextension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in\nthe XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security\nassociations to label packets.  Extensions to the SELinux LSM are\nincluded that leverage the patch for this purpose.\n\nThis patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem,\npfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a\nsocket to use only authorized security associations (or no security\nassociation) to send/receive network packets.\n\nPatch purpose:\n\nThe patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on\nthe strongly authenticated IPSec security association.  Such access\ncontrols augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP\naddress.  The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be\nspoofed.  By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote\nhosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism.\nThis enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application\nif the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to\nenforce the access control policy.\n\nPatch design approach:\n\nThe overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by\nuser-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a\nsecurity context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM\nsubsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via\nsecurity associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those\npolicies.\n\nA presentation available at\nwww.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf\nfrom the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach.\n\nPatch implementation details:\n\nOn output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or\nxfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of\nthe socket and the same security context is required for resultant\nsecurity association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in\nipsec-tools).  This is enforced in xfrm_state_find.\n\nOn input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket\n(at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must\nalso match the security association being used.\n\nThe patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec.\nThe existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as\nbefore.\n\nAlso, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is\nminimal.  The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the\ncombination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec\nprocessing proceeds as in the original case.\n\nTesting:\n\nThe pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools.  ipsec-tools have\nbeen modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version\n0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security\nassociations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation\nusing the security contexts via racoon.\n\nThe xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set\nsecurity contexts.  These programs are also available from me, and\ncontain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing\nthis interface.  Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel\nbehavior.\n\nSigned-off-by: Trent Jaeger \u003ctjaeger@cse.psu.edu\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Herbert Xu \u003cherbert@gondor.apana.org.au\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "2c40579bdc2a94977fcff2521d5b53a97c33e77a",
      "tree": "04da3ba2070d46115e93ddbb148e035666862d84",
      "parents": [
        "5a73c308754e27829c94544e010f133019cbd432"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Adrian Bunk",
        "email": "bunk@stusta.de",
        "time": "Mon Aug 22 18:20:50 2005 +0200"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Chris Wright",
        "email": "chrisw@osdl.org",
        "time": "Mon Aug 22 14:10:22 2005 -0700"
      },
      "message": "[PATCH] SECURITY must depend on SYSFS\n\nCONFIG_SECURITY\u003dy and CONFIG_SYSFS\u003dn results in the following compile\nerror:\n\n\u003c--  snip  --\u003e\n\n...\n  LD      vmlinux\nsecurity/built-in.o: In function `securityfs_init\u0027:\ninode.c:(.init.text+0x1c2): undefined reference to `kernel_subsys\u0027\nmake: *** [vmlinux] Error 1\n\n\u003c--  snip  --\u003e\n\nSigned-off-by: Adrian Bunk \u003cbunk@stusta.de\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@osdl.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
      "tree": "0bba044c4ce775e45a88a51686b5d9f90697ea9d",
      "parents": [],
      "author": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org",
        "time": "Sat Apr 16 15:20:36 2005 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org",
        "time": "Sat Apr 16 15:20:36 2005 -0700"
      },
      "message": "Linux-2.6.12-rc2\n\nInitial git repository build. I\u0027m not bothering with the full history,\neven though we have it. We can create a separate \"historical\" git\narchive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it\u0027s about\n3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early\ngit days unnecessarily complicated, when we don\u0027t have a lot of good\ninfrastructure for it.\n\nLet it rip!\n"
    }
  ]
}