)]}'
{
  "log": [
    {
      "commit": "5a0e3ad6af8660be21ca98a971cd00f331318c05",
      "tree": "5bfb7be11a03176a87296a43ac6647975c00a1d1",
      "parents": [
        "ed391f4ebf8f701d3566423ce8f17e614cde9806"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Tejun Heo",
        "email": "tj@kernel.org",
        "time": "Wed Mar 24 17:04:11 2010 +0900"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Tejun Heo",
        "email": "tj@kernel.org",
        "time": "Tue Mar 30 22:02:32 2010 +0900"
      },
      "message": "include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h\n\npercpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being\nincluded when building most .c files.  percpu.h includes slab.h which\nin turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files\nuniversally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.\n\npercpu.h -\u003e slab.h dependency is about to be removed.  Prepare for\nthis change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those\nheaders directly instead of assuming availability.  As this conversion\nneeds to touch large number of source files, the following script is\nused as the basis of conversion.\n\n  http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py\n\nThe script does the followings.\n\n* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that\n  only the necessary includes are there.  ie. if only gfp is used,\n  gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.\n\n* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include\n  blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms\n  to its surrounding.  It\u0027s put in the include block which contains\n  core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -\n  alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there\n  doesn\u0027t seem to be any matching order.\n\n* If the script can\u0027t find a place to put a new include (mostly\n  because the file doesn\u0027t have fitting include block), it prints out\n  an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the\n  file.\n\nThe conversion was done in the following steps.\n\n1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly\n   over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h\n   and ~3000 slab.h inclusions.  The script emitted errors for ~400\n   files.\n\n2. Each error was manually checked.  Some didn\u0027t need the inclusion,\n   some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or\n   embedding .c file was more appropriate for others.  This step added\n   inclusions to around 150 files.\n\n3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits\n   from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.\n\n4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.\n   e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab\n   APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.\n\n5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically\n   editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h\n   files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell.  Most gfp.h\n   inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually\n   wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros.  Each\n   slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as\n   necessary.\n\n6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.\n\n7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures\n   were fixed.  CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my\n   distributed build env didn\u0027t work with gcov compiles) and a few\n   more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things\n   build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).\n\n   * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.\n   * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig\n   * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig\n   * ia64 SMP allmodconfig\n   * s390 SMP allmodconfig\n   * alpha SMP allmodconfig\n   * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig\n\n8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as\n   a separate patch and serve as bisection point.\n\nGiven the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step\n6, I\u0027m fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.\nIf there is a breakage, it\u0027s likely to be something in one of the arch\nheaders which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of\nthe specific arch.\n\nSigned-off-by: Tejun Heo \u003ctj@kernel.org\u003e\nGuess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter \u003ccl@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nCc: Ingo Molnar \u003cmingo@redhat.com\u003e\nCc: Lee Schermerhorn \u003cLee.Schermerhorn@hp.com\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "ac22ba23b659e34a5961aec8c945608e471b0d5b",
      "tree": "6629c15380fe2db238fa078e912f4cf393708161",
      "parents": [
        "b0105eaefa7cce8f4a941d0fc6354b250d30e745"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Tyler Hicks",
        "email": "tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com",
        "time": "Wed Aug 12 01:06:54 2009 -0500"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Tyler Hicks",
        "email": "tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com",
        "time": "Wed Sep 23 09:10:32 2009 -0500"
      },
      "message": "eCryptfs: Check for O_RDONLY lower inodes when opening lower files\n\nIf the lower inode is read-only, don\u0027t attempt to open the lower file\nread/write and don\u0027t hand off the open request to the privileged\neCryptfs kthread for opening it read/write.  Instead, only try an\nunprivileged, read-only open of the file and give up if that fails.\nThis patch fixes an oops when eCryptfs is mounted on top of a read-only\nmount.\n\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nCc: Eric Sandeen \u003cesandeen@redhat.com\u003e\nCc: Dave Kleikamp \u003cshaggy@linux.vnet.ibm.com\u003e\nCc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net\nCc: stable \u003cstable@kernel.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Tyler Hicks \u003ctyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "745ca2475a6ac596e3d8d37c2759c0fbe2586227",
      "tree": "f87c34bdfbc8542477b16a014bbb4e3b415b286a",
      "parents": [
        "88e67f3b8898c5ea81d2916dd5b8bc9c0c35ba13"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "David Howells",
        "email": "dhowells@redhat.com",
        "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:22 2008 +1100"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "James Morris",
        "email": "jmorris@namei.org",
        "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:22 2008 +1100"
      },
      "message": "CRED: Pass credentials through dentry_open()\n\nPass credentials through dentry_open() so that the COW creds patch can have\nSELinux\u0027s flush_unauthorized_files() pass the appropriate creds back to itself\nwhen it opens its null chardev.\n\nThe security_dentry_open() call also now takes a creds pointer, as does the\ndentry_open hook in struct security_operations.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "746f1e558bc52b9693c1a1ecdab60f8392e5ff18",
      "tree": "a3253428affed93967c3ec67ba27ce8fe7d333c2",
      "parents": [
        "0293902a4d66fab27d0ddcc0766e05dae68f004e"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Michael Halcrow",
        "email": "mhalcrow@us.ibm.com",
        "time": "Wed Jul 23 21:30:02 2008 -0700"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org",
        "time": "Thu Jul 24 10:47:30 2008 -0700"
      },
      "message": "eCryptfs: Privileged kthread for lower file opens\n\neCryptfs would really like to have read-write access to all files in the\nlower filesystem.  Right now, the persistent lower file may be opened\nread-only if the attempt to open it read-write fails.  One way to keep\nfrom having to do that is to have a privileged kthread that can open the\nlower persistent file on behalf of the user opening the eCryptfs file;\nthis patch implements this functionality.\n\nThis patch will properly allow a less-privileged user to open the eCryptfs\nfile, followed by a more-privileged user opening the eCryptfs file, with\nthe first user only being able to read and the second user being able to\nboth read and write.  eCryptfs currently does this wrong; it will wind up\ncalling vfs_write() on a file that was opened read-only.  This is fixed in\nthis patch.\n\nSigned-off-by: Michael Halcrow \u003cmhalcrow@us.ibm.com\u003e\nCc: Dave Kleikamp \u003cshaggy@austin.ibm.com\u003e\nCc: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nCc: Eric Sandeen \u003csandeen@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n"
    }
  ]
}