)]}' { "log": [ { "commit": "152a649b647a8ef47bb74ff9e11850fa6001bedc", "tree": "ea626697e2cbf07f1cba973158b99125e98344ae", "parents": [ "e4a7ca29039e615ce13a61b9c6abfb2aa394e9a1" ], "author": { "name": "Casey Schaufler", "email": "casey@schaufler-ca.com", "time": "Tue Jan 27 19:56:30 2009 -0800" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Tue Jan 27 20:13:32 2009 -0800" }, "message": "smackfs load append mode fix\n\nGiven just how hard it is to find the code that uses MAY_APPEND\nit\u0027s probably not a big surprise that this went unnoticed for so\nlong. The Smack rules loading code is incorrectly setting the\nMAY_READ bit when MAY_APPEND is requested.\n\nSigned-off-by: Casey Schaufler \u003ccasey@schaufler-ca.com\u003e\nReviewed-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "0d54ee1c7850a954026deec4cd4885f331da35cc", "tree": "00f5219a49428dabca10428cbeaaa2c44e774808", "parents": [ "1de9e8e70f5acc441550ca75433563d91b269bbe" ], "author": { "name": "Vegard Nossum", "email": "vegard.nossum@gmail.com", "time": "Sat Jan 17 17:45:45 2009 +0100" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Sat Jan 17 14:24:46 2009 -0800" }, "message": "security: introduce missing kfree\n\nPlug this leak.\n\nAcked-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nCc: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nCc: \u003cstable@kernel.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Vegard Nossum \u003cvegard.nossum@gmail.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "938bb9f5e840eddbf54e4f62f6c5ba9b3ae12c9d", "tree": "a25324159ed8cc96b97a4d39aaf228bbd07e3824", "parents": [ "1e7bfb2134dfec37ce04fb3a4ca89299e892d10c" ], "author": { "name": "Heiko Carstens", "email": "heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com", "time": "Wed Jan 14 14:14:30 2009 +0100" }, "committer": { "name": "Heiko Carstens", "email": "heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com", "time": "Wed Jan 14 14:15:30 2009 +0100" }, "message": "[CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 28\n\nSigned-off-by: Heiko Carstens \u003cheiko.carstens@de.ibm.com\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "1e7bfb2134dfec37ce04fb3a4ca89299e892d10c", "tree": "99c676262e696754dcbfb2d6f59499972cd0c38c", "parents": [ "c4ea37c26a691ad0b7e86aa5884aab27830e95c9" ], "author": { "name": "Heiko Carstens", "email": "heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com", "time": "Wed Jan 14 14:14:29 2009 +0100" }, "committer": { "name": "Heiko Carstens", "email": "heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com", "time": "Wed Jan 14 14:15:29 2009 +0100" }, "message": "[CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 27\n\nSigned-off-by: Heiko Carstens \u003cheiko.carstens@de.ibm.com\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "c19a28e1193a6c854738d609ae9b2fe2f6e6bea4", "tree": "79a354f827a5d3656be3f55d18d31265750d9d06", "parents": [ "f15659628b43b27c20447c731456c39cbec973e9" ], "author": { "name": "Fernando Carrijo", "email": "fcarrijo@yahoo.com.br", "time": "Wed Jan 07 18:09:08 2009 -0800" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Thu Jan 08 08:31:14 2009 -0800" }, "message": "remove lots of double-semicolons\n\nCc: Ingo Molnar \u003cmingo@elte.hu\u003e\nCc: Thomas Gleixner \u003ctglx@linutronix.de\u003e\nAcked-by: Theodore Ts\u0027o \u003ctytso@mit.edu\u003e\nAcked-by: Mark Fasheh \u003cmfasheh@suse.com\u003e\nAcked-by: David S. Miller \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\nCc: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Casey Schaufler \u003ccasey@schaufler-ca.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Takashi Iwai \u003ctiwai@suse.de\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "0b82ac37b889ec881b645860da3775118effb3ca", "tree": "93407311725ac2588df5f37e261304a51064e200", "parents": [ "116e05751285c20edf5768ca3bcc00dad86181bb" ], "author": { "name": "Serge E. Hallyn", "email": "serue@us.ibm.com", "time": "Wed Jan 07 18:07:46 2009 -0800" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Thu Jan 08 08:31:03 2009 -0800" }, "message": "devices cgroup: allow mkfifo\n\nThe devcgroup_inode_permission() hook in the devices whitelist cgroup has\nalways bypassed access checks on fifos. But the mknod hook did not. The\ndevices whitelist is only about block and char devices, and fifos can\u0027t\neven be added to the whitelist, so fifos can\u0027t be created at all except by\ntasks which have \u0027a\u0027 in their whitelist (meaning they have access to all\ndevices).\n\nFix the behavior by bypassing access checks to mkfifo.\n\nSigned-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nCc: Li Zefan \u003clizf@cn.fujitsu.com\u003e\nCc: Pavel Emelyanov \u003cxemul@openvz.org\u003e\nCc: Paul Menage \u003cmenage@google.com\u003e\nCc: Lai Jiangshan \u003claijs@cn.fujitsu.com\u003e\nCc: KOSAKI Motohiro \u003ckosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com\u003e\nCc: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nReported-by: Daniel Lezcano \u003cdlezcano@fr.ibm.com\u003e\nCc: \u003cstable@kernel.org\u003e\t\t[2.6.27.x]\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "116e05751285c20edf5768ca3bcc00dad86181bb", "tree": "a95c51476e30fb1374dc50d6051c7216f23afa2f", "parents": [ "a47295e6bc42ad35f9c15ac66f598aa24debd4e2" ], "author": { "name": "Lai Jiangshan", "email": "laijs@cn.fujitsu.com", "time": "Wed Jan 07 18:07:45 2009 -0800" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Thu Jan 08 08:31:03 2009 -0800" }, "message": "devcgroup: use list_for_each_entry_rcu()\n\nWe should use list_for_each_entry_rcu in RCU read site.\n\nSigned-off-by: Lai Jiangshan \u003claijs@cn.fujitsu.com\u003e\nCc: Paul Menage \u003cmenage@google.com\u003e\nCc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki \u003ckamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com\u003e\nCc: Pavel Emelyanov \u003cxemul@openvz.org\u003e\nCc: Balbir Singh \u003cbalbir@in.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "ac8cc0fa5395fe2278e305a4cbed48e90d88d878", "tree": "515f577bfddd054ee4373228be7c974dfb8133af", "parents": [ "238c6d54830c624f34ac9cf123ac04aebfca5013", "3699c53c485bf0168e6500d0ed18bf931584dd7c" ], "author": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Wed Jan 07 09:58:22 2009 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Wed Jan 07 09:58:22 2009 +1100" }, "message": "Merge branch \u0027next\u0027 into for-linus\n" }, { "commit": "3699c53c485bf0168e6500d0ed18bf931584dd7c", "tree": "eee63a8ddbdb0665bc6a4a053a2405ca7a5b867f", "parents": [ "29881c4502ba05f46bc12ae8053d4e08d7e2615c" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Tue Jan 06 22:27:01 2009 +0000" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Wed Jan 07 09:38:48 2009 +1100" }, "message": "CRED: Fix regression in cap_capable() as shown up by sys_faccessat() [ver #3]\n\nFix a regression in cap_capable() due to:\n\n\tcommit 3b11a1decef07c19443d24ae926982bc8ec9f4c0\n\tAuthor: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\n\tDate: Fri Nov 14 10:39:26 2008 +1100\n\n\t CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task\n\nThe problem is that the above patch allows a process to have two sets of\ncredentials, and for the most part uses the subjective credentials when\naccessing current\u0027s creds.\n\nThere is, however, one exception: cap_capable(), and thus capable(), uses the\nreal/objective credentials of the target task, whether or not it is the current\ntask.\n\nOrdinarily this doesn\u0027t matter, since usually the two cred pointers in current\npoint to the same set of creds. However, sys_faccessat() makes use of this\nfacility to override the credentials of the calling process to make its test,\nwithout affecting the creds as seen from other processes.\n\nOne of the things sys_faccessat() does is to make an adjustment to the\neffective capabilities mask, which cap_capable(), as it stands, then ignores.\n\nThe affected capability check is in generic_permission():\n\n\tif (!(mask \u0026 MAY_EXEC) || execute_ok(inode))\n\t\tif (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))\n\t\t\treturn 0;\n\nThis change passes the set of credentials to be tested down into the commoncap\nand SELinux code. The security functions called by capable() and\nhas_capability() select the appropriate set of credentials from the process\nbeing checked.\n\nThis can be tested by compiling the following program from the XFS testsuite:\n\n/*\n * t_access_root.c - trivial test program to show permission bug.\n *\n * Written by Michael Kerrisk - copyright ownership not pursued.\n * Sourced from: http://linux.derkeiler.com/Mailing-Lists/Kernel/2003-10/6030.html\n */\n#include \u003climits.h\u003e\n#include \u003cunistd.h\u003e\n#include \u003cstdio.h\u003e\n#include \u003cstdlib.h\u003e\n#include \u003cfcntl.h\u003e\n#include \u003csys/stat.h\u003e\n\n#define UID 500\n#define GID 100\n#define PERM 0\n#define TESTPATH \"/tmp/t_access\"\n\nstatic void\nerrExit(char *msg)\n{\n perror(msg);\n exit(EXIT_FAILURE);\n} /* errExit */\n\nstatic void\naccessTest(char *file, int mask, char *mstr)\n{\n printf(\"access(%s, %s) returns %d\\n\", file, mstr, access(file, mask));\n} /* accessTest */\n\nint\nmain(int argc, char *argv[])\n{\n int fd, perm, uid, gid;\n char *testpath;\n char cmd[PATH_MAX + 20];\n\n testpath \u003d (argc \u003e 1) ? argv[1] : TESTPATH;\n perm \u003d (argc \u003e 2) ? strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 8) : PERM;\n uid \u003d (argc \u003e 3) ? atoi(argv[3]) : UID;\n gid \u003d (argc \u003e 4) ? atoi(argv[4]) : GID;\n\n unlink(testpath);\n\n fd \u003d open(testpath, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0);\n if (fd \u003d\u003d -1) errExit(\"open\");\n\n if (fchown(fd, uid, gid) \u003d\u003d -1) errExit(\"fchown\");\n if (fchmod(fd, perm) \u003d\u003d -1) errExit(\"fchmod\");\n close(fd);\n\n snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), \"ls -l %s\", testpath);\n system(cmd);\n\n if (seteuid(uid) \u003d\u003d -1) errExit(\"seteuid\");\n\n accessTest(testpath, 0, \"0\");\n accessTest(testpath, R_OK, \"R_OK\");\n accessTest(testpath, W_OK, \"W_OK\");\n accessTest(testpath, X_OK, \"X_OK\");\n accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK, \"R_OK | W_OK\");\n accessTest(testpath, R_OK | X_OK, \"R_OK | X_OK\");\n accessTest(testpath, W_OK | X_OK, \"W_OK | X_OK\");\n accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK, \"R_OK | W_OK | X_OK\");\n\n exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);\n} /* main */\n\nThis can be run against an Ext3 filesystem as well as against an XFS\nfilesystem. If successful, it will show:\n\n\t[root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043\n\t---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 03:00 /tmp/xxx\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns 0\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns 0\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns 0\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1\n\nIf unsuccessful, it will show:\n\n\t[root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043\n\t---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 02:56 /tmp/xxx\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns -1\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns -1\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns -1\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1\n\nI\u0027ve also tested the fix with the SELinux and syscalls LTP testsuites.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nTested-by: J. Bruce Fields \u003cbfields@citi.umich.edu\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "29881c4502ba05f46bc12ae8053d4e08d7e2615c", "tree": "536ea4ac63554e836438bd5f370ddecaa343f1f4", "parents": [ "76f7ba35d4b5219fcc4cb072134c020ec77d030d" ], "author": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Wed Jan 07 09:21:54 2009 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Wed Jan 07 09:21:54 2009 +1100" }, "message": "Revert \"CRED: Fix regression in cap_capable() as shown up by sys_faccessat() [ver #2]\"\n\nThis reverts commit 14eaddc967b16017d4a1a24d2be6c28ecbe06ed8.\n\nDavid has a better version to come.\n" }, { "commit": "520c85346666d4d9a6fcaaa8450542302dc28b91", "tree": "9c9cc9e2493b606104dd8602302ae28258ebeac0", "parents": [ "e8c82c2e23e3527e0c9dc195e432c16784d270fa", "4ae8978cf92a96257cd8998a49e781be83571d64" ], "author": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Mon Jan 05 18:32:06 2009 -0800" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Mon Jan 05 18:32:06 2009 -0800" }, "message": "Merge branch \u0027for-linus\u0027 of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6\n\n* \u0027for-linus\u0027 of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6:\n inotify: fix type errors in interfaces\n fix breakage in reiserfs_new_inode()\n fix the treatment of jfs special inodes\n vfs: remove duplicate code in get_fs_type()\n add a vfs_fsync helper\n sys_execve and sys_uselib do not call into fsnotify\n zero i_uid/i_gid on inode allocation\n inode-\u003ei_op is never NULL\n ntfs: don\u0027t NULL i_op\n isofs check for NULL -\u003ei_op in root directory is dead code\n affs: do not zero -\u003ei_op\n kill suid bit only for regular files\n vfs: lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_CUR) race condition\n" }, { "commit": "56ff5efad96182f4d3cb3dc6b07396762c658f16", "tree": "cb91f93aa2324573527165d56d230b606a3111ed", "parents": [ "acfa4380efe77e290d3a96b11cd4c9f24f4fbb18" ], "author": { "name": "Al Viro", "email": "viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk", "time": "Tue Dec 09 09:34:39 2008 -0500" }, "committer": { "name": "Al Viro", "email": "viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk", "time": "Mon Jan 05 11:54:28 2009 -0500" }, "message": "zero i_uid/i_gid on inode allocation\n\n... and don\u0027t bother in callers. Don\u0027t bother with zeroing i_blocks,\nwhile we are at it - it\u0027s already been zeroed.\n\ni_mode is not worth the effort; it has no common default value.\n\nSigned-off-by: Al Viro \u003cviro@zeniv.linux.org.uk\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "acfa4380efe77e290d3a96b11cd4c9f24f4fbb18", "tree": "d656232c7ef39c83681c2de4c8e28ba439242f66", "parents": [ "9742df331deb3fce95b321f38d4ea0c4e75edb63" ], "author": { "name": "Al Viro", "email": "viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk", "time": "Thu Dec 04 10:06:33 2008 -0500" }, "committer": { "name": "Al Viro", "email": "viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk", "time": "Mon Jan 05 11:54:28 2009 -0500" }, "message": "inode-\u003ei_op is never NULL\n\nWe used to have rather schizophrenic set of checks for NULL -\u003ei_op even\nthough it had been eliminated years ago. You\u0027d need to go out of your\nway to set it to NULL explicitly _and_ a bunch of code would die on\nsuch inodes anyway. After killing two remaining places that still\ndid that bogosity, all that crap can go away.\n\nSigned-off-by: Al Viro \u003cviro@zeniv.linux.org.uk\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "76f7ba35d4b5219fcc4cb072134c020ec77d030d", "tree": "971ec5f913a688d98e9be2a04b0c675adcc4166b", "parents": [ "14eaddc967b16017d4a1a24d2be6c28ecbe06ed8" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Jan 02 17:40:06 2009 -0500" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Jan 05 19:19:55 2009 +1100" }, "message": "SELinux: shrink sizeof av_inhert selinux_class_perm and context\n\nI started playing with pahole today and decided to put it against the\nselinux structures. Found we could save a little bit of space on x86_64\n(and no harm on i686) just reorganizing some structs.\n\nObject size changes:\nav_inherit: 24 -\u003e 16\nselinux_class_perm: 48 -\u003e 40\ncontext: 80 -\u003e 72\n\nAdmittedly there aren\u0027t many of av_inherit or selinux_class_perm\u0027s in\nthe kernel (33 and 1 respectively) But the change to the size of struct\ncontext reverberate out a bit. I can get some hard number if they are\nneeded, but I don\u0027t see why they would be. We do change which cacheline\ncontext-\u003elen and context-\u003estr would be on, but I don\u0027t see that as a\nproblem since we are clearly going to have to load both if the context\nis to be of any value. I\u0027ve run with the patch and don\u0027t seem to be\nhaving any problems.\n\nAn example of what\u0027s going on using struct av_inherit would be:\n\nform: to:\nstruct av_inherit {\t\t\tstruct av_inherit {\n\tu16 tclass;\t\t\t\tconst char **common_pts;\n\tconst char **common_pts;\t\tu32 common_base;\n\tu32 common_base;\t\t\tu16 tclass;\n};\n\n(notice all I did was move u16 tclass to the end of the struct instead\nof the beginning)\n\nMemory layout before the change:\nstruct av_inherit {\n\tu16 tclass; /* 2 */\n\t/* 6 bytes hole */\n\tconst char** common_pts; /* 8 */\n\tu32 common_base; /* 4 */\n\t/* 4 byes padding */\n\n\t/* size: 24, cachelines: 1 */\n\t/* sum members: 14, holes: 1, sum holes: 6 */\n\t/* padding: 4 */\n};\n\nMemory layout after the change:\nstruct av_inherit {\n\tconst char ** common_pts; /* 8 */\n\tu32 common_base; /* 4 */\n\tu16 tclass; /* 2 */\n\t/* 2 bytes padding */\n\n\t/* size: 16, cachelines: 1 */\n\t/* sum members: 14, holes: 0, sum holes: 0 */\n\t/* padding: 2 */\n};\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "14eaddc967b16017d4a1a24d2be6c28ecbe06ed8", "tree": "ce10216d592f0fa89ae02c4e4e9e9497010e7714", "parents": [ "5c8c40be4b5a2944483bfc1a45d6c3fa02551af3" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Wed Dec 31 15:15:42 2008 +0000" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Jan 05 11:17:04 2009 +1100" }, "message": "CRED: Fix regression in cap_capable() as shown up by sys_faccessat() [ver #2]\n\nFix a regression in cap_capable() due to:\n\n\tcommit 5ff7711e635b32f0a1e558227d030c7e45b4a465\n\tAuthor: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\n\tDate: Wed Dec 31 02:52:28 2008 +0000\n\n\t CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task\n\nThe problem is that the above patch allows a process to have two sets of\ncredentials, and for the most part uses the subjective credentials when\naccessing current\u0027s creds.\n\nThere is, however, one exception: cap_capable(), and thus capable(), uses the\nreal/objective credentials of the target task, whether or not it is the current\ntask.\n\nOrdinarily this doesn\u0027t matter, since usually the two cred pointers in current\npoint to the same set of creds. However, sys_faccessat() makes use of this\nfacility to override the credentials of the calling process to make its test,\nwithout affecting the creds as seen from other processes.\n\nOne of the things sys_faccessat() does is to make an adjustment to the\neffective capabilities mask, which cap_capable(), as it stands, then ignores.\n\nThe affected capability check is in generic_permission():\n\n\tif (!(mask \u0026 MAY_EXEC) || execute_ok(inode))\n\t\tif (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))\n\t\t\treturn 0;\n\nThis change splits capable() from has_capability() down into the commoncap and\nSELinux code. The capable() security op now only deals with the current\nprocess, and uses the current process\u0027s subjective creds. A new security op -\ntask_capable() - is introduced that can check any task\u0027s objective creds.\n\nstrictly the capable() security op is superfluous with the presence of the\ntask_capable() op, however it should be faster to call the capable() op since\ntwo fewer arguments need be passed down through the various layers.\n\nThis can be tested by compiling the following program from the XFS testsuite:\n\n/*\n * t_access_root.c - trivial test program to show permission bug.\n *\n * Written by Michael Kerrisk - copyright ownership not pursued.\n * Sourced from: http://linux.derkeiler.com/Mailing-Lists/Kernel/2003-10/6030.html\n */\n#include \u003climits.h\u003e\n#include \u003cunistd.h\u003e\n#include \u003cstdio.h\u003e\n#include \u003cstdlib.h\u003e\n#include \u003cfcntl.h\u003e\n#include \u003csys/stat.h\u003e\n\n#define UID 500\n#define GID 100\n#define PERM 0\n#define TESTPATH \"/tmp/t_access\"\n\nstatic void\nerrExit(char *msg)\n{\n perror(msg);\n exit(EXIT_FAILURE);\n} /* errExit */\n\nstatic void\naccessTest(char *file, int mask, char *mstr)\n{\n printf(\"access(%s, %s) returns %d\\n\", file, mstr, access(file, mask));\n} /* accessTest */\n\nint\nmain(int argc, char *argv[])\n{\n int fd, perm, uid, gid;\n char *testpath;\n char cmd[PATH_MAX + 20];\n\n testpath \u003d (argc \u003e 1) ? argv[1] : TESTPATH;\n perm \u003d (argc \u003e 2) ? strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 8) : PERM;\n uid \u003d (argc \u003e 3) ? atoi(argv[3]) : UID;\n gid \u003d (argc \u003e 4) ? atoi(argv[4]) : GID;\n\n unlink(testpath);\n\n fd \u003d open(testpath, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0);\n if (fd \u003d\u003d -1) errExit(\"open\");\n\n if (fchown(fd, uid, gid) \u003d\u003d -1) errExit(\"fchown\");\n if (fchmod(fd, perm) \u003d\u003d -1) errExit(\"fchmod\");\n close(fd);\n\n snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), \"ls -l %s\", testpath);\n system(cmd);\n\n if (seteuid(uid) \u003d\u003d -1) errExit(\"seteuid\");\n\n accessTest(testpath, 0, \"0\");\n accessTest(testpath, R_OK, \"R_OK\");\n accessTest(testpath, W_OK, \"W_OK\");\n accessTest(testpath, X_OK, \"X_OK\");\n accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK, \"R_OK | W_OK\");\n accessTest(testpath, R_OK | X_OK, \"R_OK | X_OK\");\n accessTest(testpath, W_OK | X_OK, \"W_OK | X_OK\");\n accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK, \"R_OK | W_OK | X_OK\");\n\n exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);\n} /* main */\n\nThis can be run against an Ext3 filesystem as well as against an XFS\nfilesystem. If successful, it will show:\n\n\t[root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043\n\t---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 03:00 /tmp/xxx\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns 0\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns 0\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns 0\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1\n\nIf unsuccessful, it will show:\n\n\t[root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043\n\t---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 02:56 /tmp/xxx\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns -1\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns -1\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns -1\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1\n\taccess(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1\n\nI\u0027ve also tested the fix with the SELinux and syscalls LTP testsuites.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "5c8c40be4b5a2944483bfc1a45d6c3fa02551af3", "tree": "d9a79fae500aa5172df7446a2c7a7bdd4e4d469c", "parents": [ "90bd49ab6649269cd10d0edc86d0e0f62864726a", "6d3dc07cbb1e88deed2e8710e215f232a56b1dce" ], "author": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Jan 05 08:56:01 2009 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Jan 05 08:56:01 2009 +1100" }, "message": "Merge branch \u0027master\u0027 of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/lblnet-2.6_next into next\n" }, { "commit": "5af75d8d58d0f9f7b7c0515b35786b22892d5f12", "tree": "65707c5309133a33140c39145ae91b7c1679a877", "parents": [ "36c4f1b18c8a7d0adb4085e7f531860b837bb6b0" ], "author": { "name": "Al Viro", "email": "viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk", "time": "Tue Dec 16 05:59:26 2008 -0500" }, "committer": { "name": "Al Viro", "email": "viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk", "time": "Sun Jan 04 15:14:42 2009 -0500" }, "message": "audit: validate comparison operations, store them in sane form\n\nDon\u0027t store the field-\u003eop in the messy (and very inconvenient for e.g.\naudit_comparator()) form; translate to dense set of values and do full\nvalidation of userland-submitted value while we are at it.\n\n-\u003eaudit_init_rule() and -\u003eaudit_match_rule() get new values now; in-tree\ninstances updated.\n\nSigned-off-by: Al Viro \u003cviro@zeniv.linux.org.uk\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "7d3b56ba37a95f1f370f50258ed3954c304c524b", "tree": "86102527b92f02450aa245f084ffb491c18d2e0a", "parents": [ "269b012321f2f1f8e4648c43a93bf432b42c6668", "ab14398abd195af91a744c320a52a1bce814dd1e" ], "author": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Sat Jan 03 12:04:39 2009 -0800" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Sat Jan 03 12:04:39 2009 -0800" }, "message": "Merge branch \u0027cpus4096-for-linus-3\u0027 of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip\n\n* \u0027cpus4096-for-linus-3\u0027 of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (77 commits)\n x86: setup_per_cpu_areas() cleanup\n cpumask: fix compile error when CONFIG_NR_CPUS is not defined\n cpumask: use alloc_cpumask_var_node where appropriate\n cpumask: convert shared_cpu_map in acpi_processor* structs to cpumask_var_t\n x86: use cpumask_var_t in acpi/boot.c\n x86: cleanup some remaining usages of NR_CPUS where s/b nr_cpu_ids\n sched: put back some stack hog changes that were undone in kernel/sched.c\n x86: enable cpus display of kernel_max and offlined cpus\n ia64: cpumask fix for is_affinity_mask_valid()\n cpumask: convert RCU implementations, fix\n xtensa: define __fls\n mn10300: define __fls\n m32r: define __fls\n h8300: define __fls\n frv: define __fls\n cris: define __fls\n cpumask: CONFIG_DISABLE_OBSOLETE_CPUMASK_FUNCTIONS\n cpumask: zero extra bits in alloc_cpumask_var_node\n cpumask: replace for_each_cpu_mask_nr with for_each_cpu in kernel/time/\n cpumask: convert mm/\n ...\n" }, { "commit": "4f4b6c1a94a8735bbdc030a2911cf395495645b6", "tree": "0572f8b8be03a32b4ae7b3deb4b1412226a0f598", "parents": [ "9e2f913df70b378379a358a44e7d286f7b765e8e" ], "author": { "name": "Rusty Russell", "email": "rusty@rustcorp.com.au", "time": "Thu Jan 01 10:12:15 2009 +1030" }, "committer": { "name": "Rusty Russell", "email": "rusty@rustcorp.com.au", "time": "Thu Jan 01 10:12:15 2009 +1030" }, "message": "cpumask: prepare for iterators to only go to nr_cpu_ids/nr_cpumask_bits.: core\n\nImpact: cleanup\n\nIn future, all cpumask ops will only be valid (in general) for bit\nnumbers \u003c nr_cpu_ids. So use that instead of NR_CPUS in iterators\nand other comparisons.\n\nThis is always safe: no cpu number can be \u003e\u003d nr_cpu_ids, and\nnr_cpu_ids is initialized to NR_CPUS at boot.\n\nSigned-off-by: Rusty Russell \u003crusty@rustcorp.com.au\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Mike Travis \u003ctravis@sgi.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Ingo Molnar \u003cmingo@elte.hu\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nCc: Eric Biederman \u003cebiederm@xmission.com\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "90bd49ab6649269cd10d0edc86d0e0f62864726a", "tree": "504e95359f2e021ae1ba4c53a1000dd08ad63c55", "parents": [ "6a94cb73064c952255336cc57731904174b2c58f" ], "author": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Dec 29 14:35:35 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Thu Jan 01 10:32:44 2009 +1100" }, "message": "keys: fix sparse warning by adding __user annotation to cast\n\nFix the following sparse warning:\n\n CC security/keys/key.o\n security/keys/keyctl.c:1297:10: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces)\n security/keys/keyctl.c:1297:10: expected char [noderef] \u003casn:1\u003e*buffer\n security/keys/keyctl.c:1297:10: got char *\u003cnoident\u003e\n\nwhich appears to be caused by lack of __user annotation to the cast of\na syscall argument.\n\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nAcked-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "be6d3e56a6b9b3a4ee44a0685e39e595073c6f0d", "tree": "3a770f4cc676efeba443b28caa1ad195eeff49bc", "parents": [ "6a94cb73064c952255336cc57731904174b2c58f" ], "author": { "name": "Kentaro Takeda", "email": "takedakn@nttdata.co.jp", "time": "Wed Dec 17 13:24:15 2008 +0900" }, "committer": { "name": "Al Viro", "email": "viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk", "time": "Wed Dec 31 18:07:37 2008 -0500" }, "message": "introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.\n\nAdd new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying\noperations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved.\n\nSigned-off-by: Kentaro Takeda \u003ctakedakn@nttdata.co.jp\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Tetsuo Handa \u003cpenguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Toshiharu Harada \u003charadats@nttdata.co.jp\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Al Viro \u003cviro@zeniv.linux.org.uk\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "6d3dc07cbb1e88deed2e8710e215f232a56b1dce", "tree": "4c294d1ddac8c9f417bcd406771993aa58106f6d", "parents": [ "277d342fc423fca5e66e677fe629d1b2f8f1b9e2" ], "author": { "name": "Casey Schaufler", "email": "casey@schaufler-ca.com", "time": "Wed Dec 31 12:54:12 2008 -0500" }, "committer": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Wed Dec 31 12:54:12 2008 -0500" }, "message": "smack: Add support for unlabeled network hosts and networks\n\nAdd support for unlabeled network hosts and networks.\nRelies heavily on Paul Moore\u0027s netlabel support.\n\nCreates a new entry in /smack called netlabel. Writes to /smack/netlabel\ntake the form:\n\n A.B.C.D LABEL\nor\n A.B.C.D/N LABEL\n\nwhere A.B.C.D is a network address, N is an integer between 0-32,\nand LABEL is the Smack label to be used. If /N is omitted /32 is\nassumed. N designates the netmask for the address. Entries are\nmatched by the most specific address/mask pair. 0.0.0.0/0 will\nmatch everything, while 192.168.1.117/32 will match exactly one\nhost.\n\nA new system label \"@\", pronounced \"web\", is defined. Processes\ncan not be assigned the web label. An address assigned the web\nlabel can be written to by any process, and packets coming from\na web address can be written to any socket. Use of the web label\nis a violation of any strict MAC policy, but the web label has\nbeen requested many times.\n\nThe nltype entry has been removed from /smack. It did not work right\nand the netlabel interface can be used to specify that all hosts\nbe treated as unlabeled.\n\nCIPSO labels on incoming packets will be honored, even from designated\nsingle label hosts. Single label hosts can only be written to by\nprocesses with labels that can write to the label of the host.\nPackets sent to single label hosts will always be unlabeled.\n\nOnce added a single label designation cannot be removed, however\nthe label may be changed.\n\nThe behavior of the ambient label remains unchanged.\n\n\nSigned-off-by: Casey Schaufler \u003ccasey@schaufler-ca.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "277d342fc423fca5e66e677fe629d1b2f8f1b9e2", "tree": "733f8694020df6ff8d9e21e2419b0df71aeb4351", "parents": [ "6c2e8ac0953fccdd24dc6c4b9e08e8f1cd68cf07" ], "author": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Wed Dec 31 12:54:11 2008 -0500" }, "committer": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Wed Dec 31 12:54:11 2008 -0500" }, "message": "selinux: Deprecate and schedule the removal of the the compat_net functionality\n\nThis patch is the first step towards removing the old \"compat_net\" code from\nthe kernel. Secmark, the \"compat_net\" replacement was first introduced in\n2.6.18 (September 2006) and the major Linux distributions with SELinux support\nhave transitioned to Secmark so it is time to start deprecating the \"compat_net\"\nmechanism. Testing a patched version of 2.6.28-rc6 with the initial release of\nFedora Core 5 did not show any problems when running in enforcing mode.\n\nThis patch adds an entry to the feature-removal-schedule.txt file and removes\nthe SECURITY_SELINUX_ENABLE_SECMARK_DEFAULT configuration option, forcing\nSecmark on by default although it can still be disabled at runtime. The patch\nalso makes the Secmark permission checks \"dynamic\" in the sense that they are\nonly executed when Secmark is configured; this should help prevent problems\nwith older distributions that have not yet migrated to Secmark.\n\nSigned-off-by: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "6c2e8ac0953fccdd24dc6c4b9e08e8f1cd68cf07", "tree": "c52e242ec5e5c2d131af2d9dbb038f78f724a74c", "parents": [ "6a94cb73064c952255336cc57731904174b2c58f" ], "author": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Wed Dec 31 12:54:11 2008 -0500" }, "committer": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Wed Dec 31 12:54:11 2008 -0500" }, "message": "netlabel: Update kernel configuration API\n\nUpdate the NetLabel kernel API to expose the new features added in kernel\nreleases 2.6.25 and 2.6.28: the static/fallback label functionality and network\naddress based selectors.\n\nSigned-off-by: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "eca1bf5b4fab56d2feb1572d34d59fcd92ea7df3", "tree": "58ce85049625d01d52f3b32a6035bce9dbbc4ebf", "parents": [ "3c92ec8ae91ecf59d88c798301833d7cf83f2179" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Mon Dec 29 00:41:51 2008 +0000" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Dec 29 14:24:43 2008 +1100" }, "message": "KEYS: Fix variable uninitialisation warnings\n\nFix variable uninitialisation warnings introduced in:\n\n\tcommit 8bbf4976b59fc9fc2861e79cab7beb3f6d647640\n\tAuthor: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\n\tDate: Fri Nov 14 10:39:14 2008 +1100\n\n\tKEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument\n\nAs:\n\n security/keys/keyctl.c: In function \u0027keyctl_negate_key\u0027:\n security/keys/keyctl.c:976: warning: \u0027dest_keyring\u0027 may be used uninitialized in this function\n security/keys/keyctl.c: In function \u0027keyctl_instantiate_key\u0027:\n security/keys/keyctl.c:898: warning: \u0027dest_keyring\u0027 may be used uninitialized in this function\n\nSome versions of gcc notice that get_instantiation_key() doesn\u0027t always set\n*_dest_keyring, but fail to observe that if this happens then *_dest_keyring\nwill not be read by the caller.\n\nReported-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "54d2f649a67109d877ca143c09cdeba61fe51bcf", "tree": "3ecea866513c1d95831c3e13b359ad8d631de1c7", "parents": [ "541ef5cbb8e68189d47272cea52a69abc30259bc", "81ea714bf148fce35e931edcbdfd3aedda20d1dc" ], "author": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Dec 29 09:57:38 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Dec 29 09:57:38 2008 +1100" }, "message": "Merge branch \u0027next\u0027 into for-linus\n" }, { "commit": "0191b625ca5a46206d2fb862bb08f36f2fcb3b31", "tree": "454d1842b1833d976da62abcbd5c47521ebe9bd7", "parents": [ "54a696bd07c14d3b1192d03ce7269bc59b45209a", "eb56092fc168bf5af199d47af50c0d84a96db898" ], "author": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Sun Dec 28 12:49:40 2008 -0800" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Sun Dec 28 12:49:40 2008 -0800" }, "message": "Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next-2.6\n\n* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next-2.6: (1429 commits)\n net: Allow dependancies of FDDI \u0026 Tokenring to be modular.\n igb: Fix build warning when DCA is disabled.\n net: Fix warning fallout from recent NAPI interface changes.\n gro: Fix potential use after free\n sfc: If AN is enabled, always read speed/duplex from the AN advertising bits\n sfc: When disabling the NIC, close the device rather than unregistering it\n sfc: SFT9001: Add cable diagnostics\n sfc: Add support for multiple PHY self-tests\n sfc: Merge top-level functions for self-tests\n sfc: Clean up PHY mode management in loopback self-test\n sfc: Fix unreliable link detection in some loopback modes\n sfc: Generate unique names for per-NIC workqueues\n 802.3ad: use standard ethhdr instead of ad_header\n 802.3ad: generalize out mac address initializer\n 802.3ad: initialize ports LACPDU from const initializer\n 802.3ad: remove typedef around ad_system\n 802.3ad: turn ports is_individual into a bool\n 802.3ad: turn ports is_enabled into a bool\n 802.3ad: make ntt bool\n ixgbe: Fix set_ringparam in ixgbe to use the same memory pools.\n ...\n\nFixed trivial IPv4/6 address printing conflicts in fs/cifs/connect.c due\nto the conversion to %pI (in this networking merge) and the addition of\ndoing IPv6 addresses (from the earlier merge of CIFS).\n" }, { "commit": "81ea714bf148fce35e931edcbdfd3aedda20d1dc", "tree": "e3cabfd2ce35bc8be542910bffc4b9b99288a7f4", "parents": [ "74192246910ff4fb95309ba1a683215644beeb62" ], "author": { "name": "Sergio Luis", "email": "sergio@larces.uece.br", "time": "Mon Dec 22 01:16:15 2008 -0300" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Thu Dec 25 12:14:55 2008 +1100" }, "message": "smackfs: check for allocation failures in smk_set_access()\n\nsmackfs: check for allocation failures in smk_set_access()\n\n While adding a new subject/object pair to smack_list, smk_set_access()\n didn\u0027t check the return of kzalloc().\n\n This patch changes smk_set_access() to return 0 or -ENOMEM, based on\n kzalloc()\u0027s return. It also updates its caller, smk_write_load(), to\n check for smk_set_access()\u0027s return, given it is no longer a void\n return function.\n\n Signed-off-by: Sergio Luis \u003csergio@larces.uece.br\u003e\n To: Casey Schaufler \u003ccasey@schaufler-ca.com\u003e\n Cc: Ahmed S. Darwish \u003cdarwish.07@gmail.com\u003e\n Cc: LSM \u003clinux-security-module@vger.kernel.org\u003e\n Cc: LKLM \u003clinux-kernel@vger.kernel.org\u003e\n\nAcked-by: Casey Schaufler \u003ccasey@schaufler-ca.com\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "74192246910ff4fb95309ba1a683215644beeb62", "tree": "ff6daed6c494ac83afad70049a28f20ec5770b44", "parents": [ "12204e24b1330428c3062faee10a0d80b8a5cb61" ], "author": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Dec 19 11:41:10 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Sat Dec 20 09:03:39 2008 +1100" }, "message": "SELinux: don\u0027t check permissions for kernel mounts\n\nDon\u0027t bother checking permissions when the kernel performs an\ninternal mount, as this should always be allowed.\n\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "12204e24b1330428c3062faee10a0d80b8a5cb61", "tree": "d92ee705a86f0ec2bf85c8a797239dbb840d5927", "parents": [ "459c19f524a9d89c65717a7d061d5f11ecf6bcb8" ], "author": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Dec 19 10:44:42 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Sat Dec 20 09:02:39 2008 +1100" }, "message": "security: pass mount flags to security_sb_kern_mount()\n\nPass mount flags to security_sb_kern_mount(), so security modules\ncan determine if a mount operation is being performed by the kernel.\n\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "459c19f524a9d89c65717a7d061d5f11ecf6bcb8", "tree": "e3026017e0d58736e46406f13bd370b75cfdf674", "parents": [ "1e641743f055f075ed9a4edd75f1fb1e05669ddc" ], "author": { "name": "Stephen Smalley", "email": "sds@tycho.nsa.gov", "time": "Fri Dec 05 09:12:19 2008 -0500" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Sat Dec 20 09:01:03 2008 +1100" }, "message": "SELinux: correctly detect proc filesystems of the form \"proc/foo\"\n\nMap all of these proc/ filesystem types to \"proc\" for the policy lookup at\nfilesystem mount time.\n\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "200036ca9b3f0b2250912142552ce56682190f95", "tree": "2588521766ea0d6ec0a79c18bceee1d81e30dab1", "parents": [ "9789cfe22e5d7bc10cad841a4ea96ecedb34b267" ], "author": { "name": "Hannes Eder", "email": "hannes@hanneseder.net", "time": "Mon Nov 24 22:14:43 2008 +0100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Tue Nov 25 06:33:17 2008 +0530" }, "message": "CRED: fix sparse warnings\n\nImpact: fix sparse warnings\n\nFix the following sparse warnings:\n\n security/security.c:228:2: warning: returning void-valued expression\n security/security.c:233:2: warning: returning void-valued expression\n security/security.c:616:2: warning: returning void-valued expression\n\nSigned-off-by: Hannes Eder \u003channes@hanneseder.net\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "e50a906e0200084f04f8f3b7c3a14b0442d1347f", "tree": "125b64c41d4a81f0fa67808ba6a4673b1be339c5", "parents": [ "2b828925652340277a889cbc11b2d0637f7cdaf7" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@redhat.com", "time": "Thu Nov 13 18:37:25 2008 -0500" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Sat Nov 15 08:50:52 2008 +1100" }, "message": "capabilities: define get_vfs_caps_from_disk when file caps are not enabled\n\nWhen CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is not set the audit system may\ntry to call into the capabilities function vfs_cap_from_file. This\npatch defines that function so kernels can build and work.\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "3a3b7ce9336952ea7b9564d976d068a238976c9d", "tree": "3f0a3be33022492161f534636a20a4b1059f8236", "parents": [ "1bfdc75ae077d60a01572a7781ec6264d55ab1b9" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:28 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:28 2008 +1100" }, "message": "CRED: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions\n\nAllow kernel services to override LSM settings appropriate to the actions\nperformed by a task by duplicating a set of credentials, modifying it and then\nusing task_struct::cred to point to it when performing operations on behalf of\na task.\n\nThis is used, for example, by CacheFiles which has to transparently access the\ncache on behalf of a process that thinks it is doing, say, NFS accesses with a\npotentially inappropriate (with respect to accessing the cache) set of\ncredentials.\n\nThis patch provides two LSM hooks for modifying a task security record:\n\n (*) security_kernel_act_as() which allows modification of the security datum\n with which a task acts on other objects (most notably files).\n\n (*) security_kernel_create_files_as() which allows modification of the\n security datum that is used to initialise the security data on a file that\n a task creates.\n\nThe patch also provides four new credentials handling functions, which wrap the\nLSM functions:\n\n (1) prepare_kernel_cred()\n\n Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service to use, based either on\n a daemon\u0027s credentials or on init_cred. All the keyrings are cleared.\n\n (2) set_security_override()\n\n Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials to a specific security\n context, assuming permission from the LSM policy.\n\n (3) set_security_override_from_ctx()\n\n As (2), but takes the security context as a string.\n\n (4) set_create_files_as()\n\n Set the file creation LSM security ID in a set of credentials to be the\n same as that on a particular inode.\n\nSigned-off-by: Casey Schaufler \u003ccasey@schaufler-ca.com\u003e [Smack changes]\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "1bfdc75ae077d60a01572a7781ec6264d55ab1b9", "tree": "627cbbca1232725bbea68677cb904bf36e73b35c", "parents": [ "3b11a1decef07c19443d24ae926982bc8ec9f4c0" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:27 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:27 2008 +1100" }, "message": "CRED: Add a kernel_service object class to SELinux\n\nAdd a \u0027kernel_service\u0027 object class to SELinux and give this object class two\naccess vectors: \u0027use_as_override\u0027 and \u0027create_files_as\u0027.\n\nThe first vector is used to grant a process the right to nominate an alternate\nprocess security ID for the kernel to use as an override for the SELinux\nsubjective security when accessing stuff on behalf of another process.\n\nFor example, CacheFiles when accessing the cache on behalf on a process\naccessing an NFS file needs to use a subjective security ID appropriate to the\ncache rather then the one the calling process is using. The cachefilesd\ndaemon will nominate the security ID to be used.\n\nThe second vector is used to grant a process the right to nominate a file\ncreation label for a kernel service to use.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "3b11a1decef07c19443d24ae926982bc8ec9f4c0", "tree": "b6555f0e5b07f4b2badd332a0a900b974920c49d", "parents": [ "98870ab0a5a3f1822aee681d2997017e1c87d026" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:26 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:26 2008 +1100" }, "message": "CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task\n\nDifferentiate the objective and real subjective credentials from the effective\nsubjective credentials on a task by introducing a second credentials pointer\ninto the task_struct.\n\ntask_struct::real_cred then refers to the objective and apparent real\nsubjective credentials of a task, as perceived by the other tasks in the\nsystem.\n\ntask_struct::cred then refers to the effective subjective credentials of a\ntask, as used by that task when it\u0027s actually running. These are not visible\nto the other tasks in the system.\n\n__task_cred(task) then refers to the objective/real credentials of the task in\nquestion.\n\ncurrent_cred() refers to the effective subjective credentials of the current\ntask.\n\nprepare_creds() uses the objective creds as a base and commit_creds() changes\nboth pointers in the task_struct (indeed commit_creds() requires them to be the\nsame).\n\noverride_creds() and revert_creds() change the subjective creds pointer only,\nand the former returns the old subjective creds. These are used by NFSD,\nfaccessat() and do_coredump(), and will by used by CacheFiles.\n\nIn SELinux, current_has_perm() is provided as an alternative to\ntask_has_perm(). This uses the effective subjective context of current,\nwhereas task_has_perm() uses the objective/real context of the subject.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "1d045980e1eff4800472f0e81df9460640c8eee9", "tree": "6c326912e7fc49cdcd02f219a22e6ffb843aceeb", "parents": [ "a6f76f23d297f70e2a6b3ec607f7aeeea9e37e8d" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:24 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:24 2008 +1100" }, "message": "CRED: Prettify commoncap.c\n\nPrettify commoncap.c.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nReviewed-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "a6f76f23d297f70e2a6b3ec607f7aeeea9e37e8d", "tree": "8f95617996d0974507f176163459212a7def8b9a", "parents": [ "d84f4f992cbd76e8f39c488cf0c5d123843923b1" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:24 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:24 2008 +1100" }, "message": "CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials\n\nMake execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set\nup the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point\nof no return.\n\nThis patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux\ntestsuite.\n\nThis patch makes several logical sets of alteration:\n\n (1) execve().\n\n The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part,\n replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm-\u003ecred). This means that\n all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point\n of no return with no possibility of failure.\n\n I would like to replace bprm-\u003ecap_effective with:\n\n\tcap_isclear(bprm-\u003ecap_effective)\n\n but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1\n (they always retain their parent\u0027s capability masks where normally they\u0027d\n be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()).\n\n The following sequence of events now happens:\n\n (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task\u0027s cred_exec_mutex is\n \t locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of\n \t creds that we make.\n\n (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current\n \t task\u0027s credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to\n \t bprm-\u003ecred.\n\n \t This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free()\n \t unnecessary, and so they\u0027ve been removed.\n\n (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately\n \t after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in\n \t bprm-\u003eunsafe for future reference.\n\n (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times.\n\n \t (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds\n \t attached to bprm-\u003ecred. Personality bit clearance is recorded,\n \t but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet\n \t fail.\n\n (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should\n\t calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm-\u003ecred.\n\n\t This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of\n\t security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed).\n\t Anything that might fail must be done at this point.\n\n (iii) bprm-\u003ecred_prepared is set to 1.\n\n\t bprm-\u003ecred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security\n\t calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux\n\t in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and\n\t not on the interpreter.\n\n (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This\n \t performs the following steps with regard to credentials:\n\n\t (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that\n\t may not be covered by commit_creds().\n\n (ii) Clear any bits in current-\u003epersonality that were deferred from\n (c.i).\n\n (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the\n \t new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to\n \t credentials:\n\n (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security\n requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that\n must be done before the credentials are changed.\n\n\t This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and\n\t security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed.\n\t This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail\n\t must have been done in (c.ii).\n\n (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single\n assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable\n should be part of struct creds.\n\n\t (iii) Unlocks the task\u0027s cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing\n\t PTRACE_ATTACH to take place.\n\n (iv) Clears The bprm-\u003ecred pointer as the credentials it was holding\n are now immutable.\n\n (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security\n alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed.\n SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers.\n\n (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds()\n \t to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock\n \t cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been\n \t made.\n\n (2) LSM interface.\n\n A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:\n\n (*) security_bprm_alloc(), -\u003ebprm_alloc_security()\n (*) security_bprm_free(), -\u003ebprm_free_security()\n\n \t Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those.\n\n (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), -\u003ebprm_apply_creds()\n (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), -\u003ebprm_post_apply_creds()\n\n \t Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(),\n \t security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds().\n\n (*) security_bprm_set(), -\u003ebprm_set_security()\n\n \t Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds().\n\n (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), -\u003ebprm_set_creds()\n\n \t New. The new credentials in bprm-\u003ecreds should be checked and set up\n \t as appropriate. bprm-\u003ecred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the\n \t second and subsequent calls.\n\n (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), -\u003ebprm_committing_creds()\n (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), -\u003ebprm_committed_creds()\n\n \t New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This\n \t includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not\n \t fail. When the former is called, the creds haven\u0027t yet been applied\n \t to the process; when the latter is called, they have.\n\n \t The former may access bprm-\u003ecred, the latter may not.\n\n (3) SELinux.\n\n SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM\n interface changes mentioned above:\n\n (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using\n \t the credentials-under-construction approach.\n\n (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on\n \t to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open().\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "d84f4f992cbd76e8f39c488cf0c5d123843923b1", "tree": "fc4a0349c42995715b93d0f7a3c78e9ea9b3f36e", "parents": [ "745ca2475a6ac596e3d8d37c2759c0fbe2586227" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:23 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:23 2008 +1100" }, "message": "CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials\n\nInaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the\ncredentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.\nA process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to\naccess or modify its own credentials.\n\nA mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect\nof PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to\nexecve().\n\nWith this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be\nchanged directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified\nand committed using something like the following sequence of events:\n\n\tstruct cred *new \u003d prepare_creds();\n\tint ret \u003d blah(new);\n\tif (ret \u003c 0) {\n\t\tabort_creds(new);\n\t\treturn ret;\n\t}\n\treturn commit_creds(new);\n\nThere are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active\ncredentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing\nCOW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter\nthe keys in a keyring in use by another task.\n\nTo help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in\nthe task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time\ndiscouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of\ncredentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be\nmodified, except under special circumstances:\n\n (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.\n\n (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.\n\nThe only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit\nusing the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be\nadded by a later patch).\n\nThis patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux\ntestsuite.\n\nThis patch makes several logical sets of alteration:\n\n (1) execve().\n\n This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the\n security code rather than altering the current creds directly.\n\n (2) Temporary credential overrides.\n\n do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and\n temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst\n preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex\n on the thread being dumped.\n\n This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the\n credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering\n the task\u0027s objective credentials.\n\n (3) LSM interface.\n\n A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:\n\n (*) security_capset_check(), -\u003ecapset_check()\n (*) security_capset_set(), -\u003ecapset_set()\n\n \t Removed in favour of security_capset().\n\n (*) security_capset(), -\u003ecapset()\n\n \t New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old\n \t creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new\n \t creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the\n \t new creds, are now const.\n\n (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), -\u003ebprm_apply_creds()\n\n \t Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be\n \t killed if it\u0027s an error.\n\n (*) security_task_alloc(), -\u003etask_alloc_security()\n\n \t Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().\n\n (*) security_cred_free(), -\u003ecred_free()\n\n \t New. Free security data attached to cred-\u003esecurity.\n\n (*) security_prepare_creds(), -\u003ecred_prepare()\n\n \t New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred-\u003esecurity.\n\n (*) security_commit_creds(), -\u003ecred_commit()\n\n \t New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new\n \t security by commit_creds().\n\n (*) security_task_post_setuid(), -\u003etask_post_setuid()\n\n \t Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().\n\n (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), -\u003etask_fix_setuid()\n\n \t Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by\n \t cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with\n \t setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather\n \t than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().\n\n (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), -\u003etask_reparent_to_init()\n\n \t Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred\n \t directly to init\u0027s credentials.\n\n\t NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux\u0027s osid no\n\t longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.\n\n (*) security_key_alloc(), -\u003ekey_alloc()\n (*) security_key_permission(), -\u003ekey_permission()\n\n \t Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to\n \t refer to the security context.\n\n (4) sys_capset().\n\n This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it\n calls have been merged.\n\n (5) reparent_to_kthreadd().\n\n This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using\n commit_thread() to point that way.\n\n (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()\n\n __sigqueue_alloc() can\u0027t stop the target task from changing its creds\n beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable\n user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if\n successful.\n\n switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be\n folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting\n __sigqueue_alloc().\n\n (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.\n\n The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and\n abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying\n it.\n\n security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This\n guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we\u0027ve finished.\n\n The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().\n\n Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into\n commit_creds().\n\n The get functions all simply access the data directly.\n\n (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().\n\n security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn\u0027t\n want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly\n rather than through an argument.\n\n Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even\n if it doesn\u0027t end up using it.\n\n (9) Keyrings.\n\n A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:\n\n (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have\n \t all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.\n \t They may want separating out again later.\n\n (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer\n \t rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.\n\n (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new\n \t thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread\n \t keyring.\n\n (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend\n \t the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.\n\n (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of\n \t credentials to be created, even though it\u0027s not strictly necessary for\n \t process or session keyrings (they\u0027re shared).\n\n(10) Usermode helper.\n\n The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its\n subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set\n of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process\n after it has been cloned.\n\n call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and\n call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven\u0027t been used. A\n special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided\n specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.\n\n call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the\n supplied keyring as the new session keyring.\n\n(11) SELinux.\n\n SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM\n interface changes mentioned above:\n\n (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the\n \t current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock\n \t that covers getting the ptracer\u0027s SID. Whilst this lock ensures that\n \t the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid\n \t until the lock is released, so there\u0027s no point doing it inside the\n \t lock.\n\n(12) is_single_threaded().\n\n This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into\n a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now\n wants to use it too.\n\n The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs\n with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn\u0027t good enough. We really want\n to know if they\u0027re part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).\n\n(13) nfsd.\n\n The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the\n credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials\n down to the functions it calls, but it can\u0027t do that until other patches\n in this series have been applied.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "745ca2475a6ac596e3d8d37c2759c0fbe2586227", "tree": "f87c34bdfbc8542477b16a014bbb4e3b415b286a", "parents": [ "88e67f3b8898c5ea81d2916dd5b8bc9c0c35ba13" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:22 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:22 2008 +1100" }, "message": "CRED: Pass credentials through dentry_open()\n\nPass credentials through dentry_open() so that the COW creds patch can have\nSELinux\u0027s flush_unauthorized_files() pass the appropriate creds back to itself\nwhen it opens its null chardev.\n\nThe security_dentry_open() call also now takes a creds pointer, as does the\ndentry_open hook in struct security_operations.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "88e67f3b8898c5ea81d2916dd5b8bc9c0c35ba13", "tree": "1ce706510a4062d69ca25801023825331d420be0", "parents": [ "6cc88bc45ce8043171089c9592da223dfab91823" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:21 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:21 2008 +1100" }, "message": "CRED: Make inode_has_perm() and file_has_perm() take a cred pointer\n\nMake inode_has_perm() and file_has_perm() take a cred pointer rather than a\ntask pointer.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "bb952bb98a7e479262c7eb25d5592545a3af147d", "tree": "9a2158c07a22a5fbddcec412944d2e7534eecc8f", "parents": [ "275bb41e9d058fbb327e7642f077e1beaeac162e" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:20 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:20 2008 +1100" }, "message": "CRED: Separate per-task-group keyrings from signal_struct\n\nSeparate per-task-group keyrings from signal_struct and dangle their anchor\nfrom the cred struct rather than the signal_struct.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nReviewed-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "275bb41e9d058fbb327e7642f077e1beaeac162e", "tree": "049fdbb39ca43e7b3b9abf36ad279b31488121bc", "parents": [ "c69e8d9c01db2adc503464993c358901c9af9de4" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:19 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:19 2008 +1100" }, "message": "CRED: Wrap access to SELinux\u0027s task SID\n\nWrap access to SELinux\u0027s task SID, using task_sid() and current_sid() as\nappropriate.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "c69e8d9c01db2adc503464993c358901c9af9de4", "tree": "bed94aaa9aeb7a7834d1c880f72b62a11a752c78", "parents": [ "86a264abe542cfececb4df129bc45a0338d8cdb9" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:19 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:19 2008 +1100" }, "message": "CRED: Use RCU to access another task\u0027s creds and to release a task\u0027s own creds\n\nUse RCU to access another task\u0027s creds and to release a task\u0027s own creds.\nThis means that it will be possible for the credentials of a task to be\nreplaced without another task (a) requiring a full lock to read them, and (b)\nseeing deallocated memory.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "86a264abe542cfececb4df129bc45a0338d8cdb9", "tree": "30152f04ba847f311028d5ca697f864c16c7ebb3", "parents": [ "f1752eec6145c97163dbce62d17cf5d928e28a27" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:18 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:18 2008 +1100" }, "message": "CRED: Wrap current-\u003ecred and a few other accessors\n\nWrap current-\u003ecred and a few other accessors to hide their actual\nimplementation.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "f1752eec6145c97163dbce62d17cf5d928e28a27", "tree": "16bc51166d38815092de36a461b845b0b4b522f9", "parents": [ "b6dff3ec5e116e3af6f537d4caedcad6b9e5082a" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:17 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:17 2008 +1100" }, "message": "CRED: Detach the credentials from task_struct\n\nDetach the credentials from task_struct, duplicating them in copy_process()\nand releasing them in __put_task_struct().\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "b6dff3ec5e116e3af6f537d4caedcad6b9e5082a", "tree": "9e76f972eb7ce9b84e0146c8e4126a3f86acb428", "parents": [ "15a2460ed0af7538ca8e6c610fe607a2cd9da142" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:16 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:16 2008 +1100" }, "message": "CRED: Separate task security context from task_struct\n\nSeparate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the\nsecurity data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers\npointing to it.\n\nNote that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in\nentry.S via asm-offsets.\n\nWith comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne \u003cmarc.c.dionne@gmail.com\u003e\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "15a2460ed0af7538ca8e6c610fe607a2cd9da142", "tree": "3611bc03e9c30fe0d11454f6966e6b0ca7f1dbd0", "parents": [ "1cdcbec1a3372c0c49c59d292e708fd07b509f18" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:15 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:15 2008 +1100" }, "message": "CRED: Constify the kernel_cap_t arguments to the capset LSM hooks\n\nConstify the kernel_cap_t arguments to the capset LSM hooks.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "1cdcbec1a3372c0c49c59d292e708fd07b509f18", "tree": "d1bd302c8d66862da45b494cbc766fb4caa5e23e", "parents": [ "8bbf4976b59fc9fc2861e79cab7beb3f6d647640" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:14 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:14 2008 +1100" }, "message": "CRED: Neuter sys_capset()\n\nTake away the ability for sys_capset() to affect processes other than current.\n\nThis means that current will not need to lock its own credentials when reading\nthem against interference by other processes.\n\nThis has effectively been the case for a while anyway, since:\n\n (1) Without LSM enabled, sys_capset() is disallowed.\n\n (2) With file-based capabilities, sys_capset() is neutered.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Andrew G. Morgan \u003cmorgan@kernel.org\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "8bbf4976b59fc9fc2861e79cab7beb3f6d647640", "tree": "9bd621217cbdfcf94aca5b220de7363254d7fc23", "parents": [ "e9e349b051d98799b743ebf248cc2d986fedf090" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:14 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:14 2008 +1100" }, "message": "KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument\n\nAlter the use of the key instantiation and negation functions\u0027 link-to-keyring\narguments. Currently this specifies a keyring in the target process to link\nthe key into, creating the keyring if it doesn\u0027t exist. This, however, can be\na problem for copy-on-write credentials as it means that the instantiating\nprocess can alter the credentials of the requesting process.\n\nThis patch alters the behaviour such that:\n\n (1) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given a specific\n keyring by ID (ringid \u003e\u003d 0), then that keyring will be used.\n\n (2) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given one of the\n special constants that refer to the requesting process\u0027s keyrings\n (KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING, all \u003c\u003d 0), then:\n\n (a) If sys_request_key() was given a keyring to use (destringid) then the\n \t key will be attached to that keyring.\n\n (b) If sys_request_key() was given a NULL keyring, then the key being\n \t instantiated will be attached to the default keyring as set by\n \t keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring().\n\n (3) No extra link will be made.\n\nDecision point (1) follows current behaviour, and allows those instantiators\nwho\u0027ve searched for a specifically named keyring in the requestor\u0027s keyring so\nas to partition the keys by type to still have their named keyrings.\n\nDecision point (2) allows the requestor to make sure that the key or keys that\nget produced by request_key() go where they want, whilst allowing the\ninstantiator to request that the key is retained. This is mainly useful for\nsituations where the instantiator makes a secondary request, the key for which\nshould be retained by the initial requestor:\n\n\t+-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+\n\t| | | | | |\n\t| Requestor |-------\u003e| Instantiator |-------\u003e| Instantiator |\n\t| | | | | |\n\t+-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+\n\t request_key() request_key()\n\nThis might be useful, for example, in Kerberos, where the requestor requests a\nticket, and then the ticket instantiator requests the TGT, which someone else\nthen has to go and fetch. The TGT, however, should be retained in the\nkeyrings of the requestor, not the first instantiator. To make this explict\nan extra special keyring constant is also added.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nReviewed-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "e9e349b051d98799b743ebf248cc2d986fedf090", "tree": "d59a46ae39d81d27bcf605663ce0e24d1c6db375", "parents": [ "76aac0e9a17742e60d408be1a706e9aaad370891" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:13 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:13 2008 +1100" }, "message": "KEYS: Disperse linux/key_ui.h\n\nDisperse the bits of linux/key_ui.h as the reason they were put here (keyfs)\ndidn\u0027t get in.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nReviewed-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "b103c59883f1ec6e4d548b25054608cb5724453c", "tree": "d7ab5f035674e8d49404b29bff6df64e2e83616d", "parents": [ "47d804bfa1857b0edcac972c86499dcd14df3cf2" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:11 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:11 2008 +1100" }, "message": "CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the capabilities code\n\nWrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from\nthe task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.\n\nChange most current-\u003e(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().\n\nChange some task-\u003ee?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id(). In some places it makes more\nsense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be\naddressed by later patches.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nReviewed-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nCc: Andrew G. Morgan \u003cmorgan@kernel.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "47d804bfa1857b0edcac972c86499dcd14df3cf2", "tree": "200b2d1190e29be40c771bf6a4e0db0ef9e7d383", "parents": [ "8192b0c482d7078fcdcb4854341b977426f6f09b" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:11 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:11 2008 +1100" }, "message": "CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the key management code\n\nWrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from\nthe task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.\n\nChange most current-\u003e(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().\n\nChange some task-\u003ee?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id(). In some places it makes more\nsense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be\naddressed by later patches.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nReviewed-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "7e452baf6b96b5aeba097afd91501d33d390cc97", "tree": "9b0e062d3677d50d731ffd0fba47423bfdee9253", "parents": [ "3ac38c3a2e7dac3f8f35a56eb85c27881a4c3833", "f21f237cf55494c3a4209de323281a3b0528da10" ], "author": { "name": "David S. Miller", "email": "davem@davemloft.net", "time": "Tue Nov 11 15:43:02 2008 -0800" }, "committer": { "name": "David S. Miller", "email": "davem@davemloft.net", "time": "Tue Nov 11 15:43:02 2008 -0800" }, "message": "Merge branch \u0027master\u0027 of master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6\n\nConflicts:\n\n\tdrivers/message/fusion/mptlan.c\n\tdrivers/net/sfc/ethtool.c\n\tnet/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c\n" }, { "commit": "066746796bd2f0a1ba210c0dded3b6ee4032692a", "tree": "868832ca0e199e4f173e23375cffb5fc3870402c", "parents": [ "a2f2945a99057c7d44043465906c6bb63c3368a0" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@redhat.com", "time": "Tue Nov 11 22:02:57 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Tue Nov 11 22:02:57 2008 +1100" }, "message": "Currently SELinux jumps through some ugly hoops to not audit a capbility\ncheck when determining if a process has additional powers to override\nmemory limits or when trying to read/write illegal file labels. Use\nthe new noaudit call instead.\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "06112163f5fd9e491a7f810443d81efa9d88e247", "tree": "48039f7488abbec36c0982a57405b57d47311dd6", "parents": [ "637d32dc720897616e8a1a4f9e9609e29d431800" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@redhat.com", "time": "Tue Nov 11 22:02:50 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Tue Nov 11 22:02:50 2008 +1100" }, "message": "Add a new capable interface that will be used by systems that use audit to\nmake an A or B type decision instead of a security decision. Currently\nthis is the case at least for filesystems when deciding if a process can use\nthe reserved \u0027root\u0027 blocks and for the case of things like the oom\nalgorithm determining if processes are root processes and should be less\nlikely to be killed. These types of security system requests should not be\naudited or logged since they are not really security decisions. It would be\npossible to solve this problem like the vm_enough_memory security check did\nby creating a new LSM interface and moving all of the policy into that\ninterface but proves the needlessly bloat the LSM and provide complex\nindirection.\n\nThis merely allows those decisions to be made where they belong and to not\nflood logs or printk with denials for thing that are not security decisions.\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "3fc689e96c0c90b6fede5946d6c31075e9464f69", "tree": "5e59b6c607eb595ababa74bad18787cfa49b16e9", "parents": [ "851f7ff56d9c21272f289dd85fb3f1b6cf7a6e10" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@redhat.com", "time": "Tue Nov 11 21:48:18 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Tue Nov 11 21:48:18 2008 +1100" }, "message": "Any time fcaps or a setuid app under SECURE_NOROOT is used to result in a\nnon-zero pE we will crate a new audit record which contains the entire set\nof known information about the executable in question, fP, fI, fE, fversion\nand includes the process\u0027s pE, pI, pP. Before and after the bprm capability\nare applied. This record type will only be emitted from execve syscalls.\n\nan example of making ping use fcaps instead of setuid:\n\nsetcap \"cat_net_raw+pe\" /bin/ping\n\ntype\u003dSYSCALL msg\u003daudit(1225742021.015:236): arch\u003dc000003e syscall\u003d59 success\u003dyes exit\u003d0 a0\u003d1457f30 a1\u003d14606b0 a2\u003d1463940 a3\u003d321b770a70 items\u003d2 ppid\u003d2929 pid\u003d2963 auid\u003d0 uid\u003d500 gid\u003d500 euid\u003d500 suid\u003d500 fsuid\u003d500 egid\u003d500 sgid\u003d500 fsgid\u003d500 tty\u003dpts0 ses\u003d3 comm\u003d\"ping\" exe\u003d\"/bin/ping\" subj\u003dunconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key\u003d(null)\ntype\u003dUNKNOWN[1321] msg\u003daudit(1225742021.015:236): fver\u003d2 fp\u003d0000000000002000 fi\u003d0000000000000000 fe\u003d1 old_pp\u003d0000000000000000 old_pi\u003d0000000000000000 old_pe\u003d0000000000000000 new_pp\u003d0000000000002000 new_pi\u003d0000000000000000 new_pe\u003d0000000000002000\ntype\u003dEXECVE msg\u003daudit(1225742021.015:236): argc\u003d2 a0\u003d\"ping\" a1\u003d\"127.0.0.1\"\ntype\u003dCWD msg\u003daudit(1225742021.015:236): cwd\u003d\"/home/test\"\ntype\u003dPATH msg\u003daudit(1225742021.015:236): item\u003d0 name\u003d\"/bin/ping\" inode\u003d49256 dev\u003dfd:00 mode\u003d0100755 ouid\u003d0 ogid\u003d0 rdev\u003d00:00 obj\u003dsystem_u:object_r:ping_exec_t:s0 cap_fp\u003d0000000000002000 cap_fe\u003d1 cap_fver\u003d2\ntype\u003dPATH msg\u003daudit(1225742021.015:236): item\u003d1 name\u003d(null) inode\u003d507915 dev\u003dfd:00 mode\u003d0100755 ouid\u003d0 ogid\u003d0 rdev\u003d00:00 obj\u003dsystem_u:object_r:ld_so_t:s0\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "c0b004413a46a0a5744e6d2b85220fe9d2c33d48", "tree": "f66ee9e4cf14ce961e42a9dd356927478bab4574", "parents": [ "9d36be76c55ad2c2bb29683b752b0d9ad2e4eeef" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@redhat.com", "time": "Tue Nov 11 21:48:10 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Tue Nov 11 21:48:10 2008 +1100" }, "message": "This patch add a generic cpu endian caps structure and externally available\nfunctions which retrieve fcaps information from disk. This information is\nnecessary so fcaps information can be collected and recorded by the audit\nsystem.\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "1f8f5cf6e4f038552a3e47b66085452c08556d71", "tree": "ccbfebc2fd565b8a979bde1f50d58b32328e4ddf", "parents": [ "3ad4f597058301c97f362e500a32f63f5c950a45" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Mon Nov 10 19:00:05 2008 +0000" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Mon Nov 10 13:20:57 2008 -0800" }, "message": "KEYS: Make request key instantiate the per-user keyrings\n\nMake request_key() instantiate the per-user keyrings so that it doesn\u0027t oops\nif it needs to get hold of the user session keyring because there isn\u0027t a\nsession keyring in place.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nTested-by: Steve French \u003csmfrench@gmail.com\u003e\nTested-by: Rutger Nijlunsing \u003crutger.nijlunsing@gmail.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "39c9aede2b4a252bd296c0a86be832c3d3d0a273", "tree": "2c802930511c40a6d150166a892e68f83fee9851", "parents": [ "1f29fae29709b4668979e244c09b2fa78ff1ad59" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@redhat.com", "time": "Wed Nov 05 09:34:42 2008 -0500" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Sun Nov 09 07:33:18 2008 +0800" }, "message": "SELinux: Use unknown perm handling to handle unknown netlink msg types\n\nCurrently when SELinux has not been updated to handle a netlink message\ntype the operation is denied with EINVAL. This patch will leave the\naudit/warning message so things get fixed but if policy chose to allow\nunknowns this will allow the netlink operation.\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "9eeda9abd1faf489f3df9a1f557975f4c8650363", "tree": "3e0a58e25b776cfbee193195460324dccb1886c7", "parents": [ "61c9eaf90081cbe6dc4f389e0056bff76eca19ec", "4bab0ea1d42dd1927af9df6fbf0003fc00617c50" ], "author": { "name": "David S. Miller", "email": "davem@davemloft.net", "time": "Thu Nov 06 22:43:03 2008 -0800" }, "committer": { "name": "David S. Miller", "email": "davem@davemloft.net", "time": "Thu Nov 06 22:43:03 2008 -0800" }, "message": "Merge branch \u0027master\u0027 of master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6\n\nConflicts:\n\n\tdrivers/net/wireless/ath5k/base.c\n\tnet/8021q/vlan_core.c\n" }, { "commit": "1f29fae29709b4668979e244c09b2fa78ff1ad59", "tree": "d50129066cd1f131551eb364d04542dfcf923050", "parents": [ "e21e696edb498c7f7eed42ba3096f6bbe13927b6" ], "author": { "name": "Serge E. Hallyn", "email": "serue@us.ibm.com", "time": "Wed Nov 05 16:08:52 2008 -0600" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Thu Nov 06 07:14:51 2008 +0800" }, "message": "file capabilities: add no_file_caps switch (v4)\n\nAdd a no_file_caps boot option when file capabilities are\ncompiled into the kernel (CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES\u003dy).\n\nThis allows distributions to ship a kernel with file capabilities\ncompiled in, without forcing users to use (and understand and\ntrust) them.\n\nWhen no_file_caps is specified at boot, then when a process executes\na file, any file capabilities stored with that file will not be\nused in the calculation of the process\u0027 new capability sets.\n\nThis means that booting with the no_file_caps boot option will\nnot be the same as booting a kernel with file capabilities\ncompiled out - in particular a task with CAP_SETPCAP will not\nhave any chance of passing capabilities to another task (which\nisn\u0027t \"really\" possible anyway, and which may soon by killed\naltogether by David Howells in any case), and it will instead\nbe able to put new capabilities in its pI. However since fI\nwill always be empty and pI is masked with fI, it gains the\ntask nothing.\n\nWe also support the extra prctl options, setting securebits and\ndropping capabilities from the per-process bounding set.\n\nThe other remaining difference is that killpriv, task_setscheduler,\nsetioprio, and setnice will continue to be hooked. That will\nbe noticable in the case where a root task changed its uid\nwhile keeping some caps, and another task owned by the new uid\ntries to change settings for the more privileged task.\n\nChangelog:\n\tNov 05 2008: (v4) trivial port on top of always-start-\\\n\t\twith-clear-caps patch\n\tSep 23 2008: nixed file_caps_enabled when file caps are\n\t\tnot compiled in as it isn\u0027t used.\n\t\tDocument no_file_caps in kernel-parameters.txt.\n\nSigned-off-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Andrew G. Morgan \u003cmorgan@kernel.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "e21e696edb498c7f7eed42ba3096f6bbe13927b6", "tree": "73b0bc28e45b0268f05c4b384a17bfb2140a73bc", "parents": [ "2f99db28af90957271a6448479c3e492ccf7c697", "75fa67706cce5272bcfc51ed646f2da21f3bdb6e" ], "author": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Thu Nov 06 07:12:34 2008 +0800" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Thu Nov 06 07:12:34 2008 +0800" }, "message": "Merge branch \u0027master\u0027 into next\n" }, { "commit": "2f99db28af90957271a6448479c3e492ccf7c697", "tree": "00386a75dd8c998621d2204609425b41be420f62", "parents": [ "41d9f9c524a53477467b7e0111ff3d644198f191" ], "author": { "name": "Michal Schmidt", "email": "mschmidt@redhat.com", "time": "Wed Nov 05 13:35:06 2008 +0100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Thu Nov 06 07:08:36 2008 +0800" }, "message": "selinux: recognize netlink messages for \u0027ip addrlabel\u0027\n\nIn enforcing mode \u0027/sbin/ip addrlabel\u0027 results in a SELinux error:\ntype\u003dSELINUX_ERR msg\u003daudit(1225698822.073:42): SELinux: unrecognized\nnetlink message type\u003d74 for sclass\u003d43\n\nThe problem is missing RTM_*ADDRLABEL entries in SELinux\u0027s netlink\nmessage types table.\n\nReported in https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id\u003d469423\n\nSigned-off-by: Michal Schmidt \u003cmschmidt@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "41d9f9c524a53477467b7e0111ff3d644198f191", "tree": "b891d648d756d7195bab5c0f55f105cd00d8f94a", "parents": [ "8b6a5a37f87a414ef8636e36ec75accb27bb7508" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@redhat.com", "time": "Tue Nov 04 15:18:26 2008 -0500" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Wed Nov 05 08:44:11 2008 +1100" }, "message": "SELinux: hold tasklist_lock and siglock while waking wait_chldexit\n\nSELinux has long been calling wake_up_interruptible() on\ncurrent-\u003eparent-\u003esignal-\u003ewait_chldexit without holding any locks. It\nappears that this operation should hold the tasklist_lock to dereference\ncurrent-\u003eparent and we should hold the siglock when waking up the\nsignal-\u003ewait_chldexit.\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "0a6d2fac615972142715d736289abeeb7382e81d", "tree": "828bd68949a5d4dd3a958c2be215695170b9b29c", "parents": [ "76f8bef0db031f03bf286c8bbccfaf83f0b22224", "37dd0bd04a3240d2922786d501e2f12cec858fbf" ], "author": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Sat Nov 01 09:50:38 2008 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Sat Nov 01 09:50:38 2008 -0700" }, "message": "Merge branch \u0027for-linus\u0027 of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6\n\n* \u0027for-linus\u0027 of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6:\n SELinux: properly handle empty tty_files list\n" }, { "commit": "3318a386e4ca68c76e0294363d29bdc46fcad670", "tree": "da0da58f10bcb7dd7a885f6032b46d1025af208b", "parents": [ "e06f42d6c127883e58b747048752f44ae208ae47" ], "author": { "name": "Serge Hallyn", "email": "serue@us.ibm.com", "time": "Thu Oct 30 11:52:23 2008 -0500" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Sat Nov 01 09:49:45 2008 -0700" }, "message": "file caps: always start with clear bprm-\u003ecaps_*\n\nWhile Linux doesn\u0027t honor setuid on scripts. However, it mistakenly\nbehaves differently for file capabilities.\n\nThis patch fixes that behavior by making sure that get_file_caps()\nbegins with empty bprm-\u003ecaps_*. That way when a script is loaded,\nits bprm-\u003ecaps_* may be filled when binfmt_misc calls prepare_binprm(),\nbut they will be cleared again when binfmt_elf calls prepare_binprm()\nnext to read the interpreter\u0027s file capabilities.\n\nSigned-off-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nAcked-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Andrew G. Morgan \u003cmorgan@kernel.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "37dd0bd04a3240d2922786d501e2f12cec858fbf", "tree": "d4fa5a124a95d33bf22276429a82822ec8d4810a", "parents": [ "721d5dfe7e516954c501d5e9d0dfab379cf4241a" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Oct 31 17:40:00 2008 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Sat Nov 01 09:38:48 2008 +1100" }, "message": "SELinux: properly handle empty tty_files list\n\nSELinux has wrongly (since 2004) had an incorrect test for an empty\ntty-\u003etty_files list. With an empty list selinux would be pointing to part\nof the tty struct itself and would then proceed to dereference that value\nand again dereference that result. An F10 change to plymouth on a ppc64\nsystem is actually currently triggering this bug. This patch uses\nlist_empty() to handle empty lists rather than looking at a meaningless\nlocation.\n\n[note, this fixes the oops reported in\nhttps://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id\u003d469079]\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "3685f25de1b0447fff381c420de1e25bd57c9efb", "tree": "90a5d87c0ced1b27f654606d50a9ff13ded6f862", "parents": [ "be859405487324ed548f1ba11dc949b8230ab991" ], "author": { "name": "Harvey Harrison", "email": "harvey.harrison@gmail.com", "time": "Fri Oct 31 00:56:49 2008 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "David S. Miller", "email": "davem@davemloft.net", "time": "Fri Oct 31 00:56:49 2008 -0700" }, "message": "misc: replace NIPQUAD()\n\nUsing NIPQUAD() with NIPQUAD_FMT, %d.%d.%d.%d or %u.%u.%u.%u\ncan be replaced with %pI4\n\nSigned-off-by: Harvey Harrison \u003charvey.harrison@gmail.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "a1744d3bee19d3b9cbfb825ab316a101b9c9f109", "tree": "c0e2324c09beca0eb5782eb5abf241ea2b7a4a11", "parents": [ "275f165fa970174f8a98205529750e8abb6c0a33", "a432226614c5616e3cfd211e0acffa0acfb4770c" ], "author": { "name": "David S. Miller", "email": "davem@davemloft.net", "time": "Fri Oct 31 00:17:34 2008 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "David S. Miller", "email": "davem@davemloft.net", "time": "Fri Oct 31 00:17:34 2008 -0700" }, "message": "Merge branch \u0027master\u0027 of master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6\n\nConflicts:\n\n\tdrivers/net/wireless/p54/p54common.c\n" }, { "commit": "731572d39fcd3498702eda4600db4c43d51e0b26", "tree": "f892907ae20539845f353d72d2a2bf202b67e007", "parents": [ "6c89161b10f5771ee0b51ada0fce0e8835e72ade" ], "author": { "name": "Alan Cox", "email": "alan@redhat.com", "time": "Wed Oct 29 14:01:20 2008 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Thu Oct 30 11:38:47 2008 -0700" }, "message": "nfsd: fix vm overcommit crash\n\nJunjiro R. Okajima reported a problem where knfsd crashes if you are\nusing it to export shmemfs objects and run strict overcommit. In this\nsituation the current-\u003emm based modifier to the overcommit goes through a\nNULL pointer.\n\nWe could simply check for NULL and skip the modifier but we\u0027ve caught\nother real bugs in the past from mm being NULL here - cases where we did\nneed a valid mm set up (eg the exec bug about a year ago).\n\nTo preserve the checks and get the logic we want shuffle the checking\naround and add a new helper to the vm_ security wrappers\n\nAlso fix a current-\u003emm reference in nommu that should use the passed mm\n\n[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]\n[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]\nReported-by: Junjiro R. Okajima \u003chooanon05@yahoo.co.jp\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Alan Cox \u003calan@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "8b6a5a37f87a414ef8636e36ec75accb27bb7508", "tree": "26ff1dddb3c8727118b24819e83b4b7c500ff595", "parents": [ "0da939b0058742ad2d8580b7db6b966d0fc72252" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@redhat.com", "time": "Wed Oct 29 17:06:46 2008 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Oct 31 02:00:52 2008 +1100" }, "message": "SELinux: check open perms in dentry_open not inode_permission\n\nSome operations, like searching a directory path or connecting a unix domain\nsocket, make explicit calls into inode_permission. Our choices are to\neither try to come up with a signature for all of the explicit calls to\ninode_permission and do not check open on those, or to move the open checks to\ndentry_open where we know this is always an open operation. This patch moves\nthe checks to dentry_open.\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "5b095d98928fdb9e3b75be20a54b7a6cbf6ca9ad", "tree": "b6caa0cdbaac016447a790881ad4a6c5dfce6900", "parents": [ "4b7a4274ca63dadd9c4f17fc953f3a5d19855c4c" ], "author": { "name": "Harvey Harrison", "email": "harvey.harrison@gmail.com", "time": "Wed Oct 29 12:52:50 2008 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "David S. Miller", "email": "davem@davemloft.net", "time": "Wed Oct 29 12:52:50 2008 -0700" }, "message": "net: replace %p6 with %pI6\n\nSigned-off-by: Harvey Harrison \u003charvey.harrison@gmail.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "1afa67f5e70b4733d5b237df61e6d639af6283bb", "tree": "34912ebf8e13c40e00bc5ab13c365a5556d684ca", "parents": [ "b071195deba14b37ce896c26f20349b46e5f9fd2" ], "author": { "name": "Harvey Harrison", "email": "harvey.harrison@gmail.com", "time": "Tue Oct 28 16:06:44 2008 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "David S. Miller", "email": "davem@davemloft.net", "time": "Tue Oct 28 16:06:44 2008 -0700" }, "message": "misc: replace NIP6_FMT with %p6 format specifier\n\nThe iscsi_ibft.c changes are almost certainly a bugfix as the\npointer \u0027ip\u0027 is a u8 *, so they never print the last 8 bytes\nof the IPv6 address, and the eight bytes they do print have\na zero byte with them in each 16-bit word.\n\nOther than that, this should cause no difference in functionality.\n\nSigned-off-by: Harvey Harrison \u003charvey.harrison@gmail.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "def8b4faff5ca349beafbbfeb2c51f3602a6ef3a", "tree": "a90fbb0b6ae2a49c507465801f31df77bc5ebf9d", "parents": [ "b057efd4d226fcc3a92b0dc6d8ea8e8185ecb260" ], "author": { "name": "Alexey Dobriyan", "email": "adobriyan@gmail.com", "time": "Tue Oct 28 13:24:06 2008 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "David S. Miller", "email": "davem@davemloft.net", "time": "Tue Oct 28 13:24:06 2008 -0700" }, "message": "net: reduce structures when XFRM\u003dn\n\nifdef out\n* struct sk_buff::sp\t\t(pointer)\n* struct dst_entry::xfrm\t(pointer)\n* struct sock::sk_policy\t(2 pointers)\n\nSigned-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan \u003cadobriyan@gmail.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "99ebcf8285df28f32fd2d1c19a7166e70f00309c", "tree": "caf45f39a77026b2fae2413c145067a1e5164701", "parents": [ "72558dde738b06cc01e16b3247a9659ca739e22d", "c465a76af658b443075d6efee1c3131257643020" ], "author": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Mon Oct 20 13:19:56 2008 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Mon Oct 20 13:19:56 2008 -0700" }, "message": "Merge branch \u0027v28-timers-for-linus\u0027 of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip\n\n* \u0027v28-timers-for-linus\u0027 of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (36 commits)\n fix documentation of sysrq-q really\n Fix documentation of sysrq-q\n timer_list: add base address to clock base\n timer_list: print cpu number of clockevents device\n timer_list: print real timer address\n NOHZ: restart tick device from irq_enter()\n NOHZ: split tick_nohz_restart_sched_tick()\n NOHZ: unify the nohz function calls in irq_enter()\n timers: fix itimer/many thread hang, fix\n timers: fix itimer/many thread hang, v3\n ntp: improve adjtimex frequency rounding\n timekeeping: fix rounding problem during clock update\n ntp: let update_persistent_clock() sleep\n hrtimer: reorder struct hrtimer to save 8 bytes on 64bit builds\n posix-timers: lock_timer: make it readable\n posix-timers: lock_timer: kill the bogus -\u003eit_id check\n posix-timers: kill -\u003eit_sigev_signo and -\u003eit_sigev_value\n posix-timers: sys_timer_create: cleanup the error handling\n posix-timers: move the initialization of timer-\u003esigq from send to create path\n posix-timers: sys_timer_create: simplify and s/tasklist/rcu/\n ...\n\nFix trivial conflicts due to sysrq-q description clahes in\nDocumentation/sysrq.txt and drivers/char/sysrq.c\n" }, { "commit": "47c59803becb55b72b26cdab3838d621a15badc8", "tree": "63711f3e41f46288e2fa18db0b4ed734e9b1f668", "parents": [ "c012a54ae0b2ee2c73499f54596e0f5257288fec" ], "author": { "name": "Lai Jiangshan", "email": "laijs@cn.fujitsu.com", "time": "Sat Oct 18 20:28:07 2008 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Mon Oct 20 08:52:38 2008 -0700" }, "message": "devcgroup: remove spin_lock()\n\nSince we introduced rcu for read side, spin_lock is used only for update.\nBut we always hold cgroup_lock() when update, so spin_lock() is not need.\n\nAdditional cleanup:\n1) include linux/rcupdate.h explicitly\n2) remove unused variable cur_devcgroup in devcgroup_update_access()\n\nSigned-off-by: Lai Jiangshan \u003claijs@cn.fujitsu.com\u003e\nAcked-by: \"Serge E. Hallyn\" \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nCc: Paul Menage \u003cmenage@google.com\u003e\nCc: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "c012a54ae0b2ee2c73499f54596e0f5257288fec", "tree": "4fab77415948c241c563a4de1e8e29fcc0604828", "parents": [ "2cdc7241a290bb2b9ef4c2e2969a4a3ed92abb63" ], "author": { "name": "Li Zefan", "email": "lizf@cn.fujitsu.com", "time": "Sat Oct 18 20:28:07 2008 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Mon Oct 20 08:52:38 2008 -0700" }, "message": "devcgroup: remove unused variable\n\nSigned-off-by: Li Zefan \u003clizf@cn.fujitsu.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nCc: Paul Menage \u003cmenage@google.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "2cdc7241a290bb2b9ef4c2e2969a4a3ed92abb63", "tree": "c544eeca8ed7777580ebd91f97778792d5ff6d07", "parents": [ "886465f407e57d6c3c81013c919ea670ce1ae0d0" ], "author": { "name": "Li Zefan", "email": "lizf@cn.fujitsu.com", "time": "Sat Oct 18 20:28:06 2008 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Mon Oct 20 08:52:38 2008 -0700" }, "message": "devcgroup: use kmemdup()\n\nThis saves 40 bytes on my x86_32 box.\n\nSigned-off-by: Li Zefan \u003clizf@cn.fujitsu.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nCc: Paul Menage \u003cmenage@google.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "c465a76af658b443075d6efee1c3131257643020", "tree": "63c28c9fab02dedec7f03cee4a3ef7fe4dc1c072", "parents": [ "2d42244ae71d6c7b0884b5664cf2eda30fb2ae68", "1b02469088ac7a13d7e622b618b7410d0f1ce5ec", "fb02fbc14d17837b4b7b02dbb36142c16a7bf208", "d40e944c25fb4642adb2a4c580a48218a9f3f824", "1508487e7f16d992ad23cabd3712563ff912f413", "322acf6585f3c4e82ee32a246b0483ca0f6ad3f4" ], "author": { "name": "Thomas Gleixner", "email": "tglx@linutronix.de", "time": "Mon Oct 20 13:14:06 2008 +0200" }, "committer": { "name": "Thomas Gleixner", "email": "tglx@linutronix.de", "time": "Mon Oct 20 13:14:06 2008 +0200" }, "message": "Merge branches \u0027timers/clocksource\u0027, \u0027timers/hrtimers\u0027, \u0027timers/nohz\u0027, \u0027timers/ntp\u0027, \u0027timers/posixtimers\u0027 and \u0027timers/debug\u0027 into v28-timers-for-linus\n" }, { "commit": "a447c0932445f92ce6f4c1bd020f62c5097a7842", "tree": "bacf05bc7f9764515cdd6f7dc5e2254776b4f160", "parents": [ "54cebc68c81eacac41a21bdfe99dc889d3882c60" ], "author": { "name": "Steven Whitehouse", "email": "swhiteho@redhat.com", "time": "Mon Oct 13 10:46:57 2008 +0100" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Mon Oct 13 10:10:37 2008 -0700" }, "message": "vfs: Use const for kernel parser table\n\nThis is a much better version of a previous patch to make the parser\ntables constant. Rather than changing the typedef, we put the \"const\" in\nall the various places where its required, allowing the __initconst\nexception for nfsroot which was the cause of the previous trouble.\n\nThis was posted for review some time ago and I believe its been in -mm\nsince then.\n\nSigned-off-by: Steven Whitehouse \u003cswhiteho@redhat.com\u003e\nCc: Alexander Viro \u003caviro@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "8d71ff0bef9cf4e70108a9a2762f2361e607abde", "tree": "a79487fceb6ec18e956373a3019416a43b269f1d", "parents": [ "244dc4e54b73567fae7f8fd9ba56584be9375442", "92562927826fceb2f8e69c89e28161b8c1e0b125" ], "author": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Mon Oct 13 10:00:44 2008 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Mon Oct 13 10:00:44 2008 -0700" }, "message": "Merge branch \u0027for-linus\u0027 of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6\n\n* \u0027for-linus\u0027 of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (24 commits)\n integrity: special fs magic\n As pointed out by Jonathan Corbet, the timer must be deleted before\n ERROR: code indent should use tabs where possible\n The tpm_dev_release function is only called for platform devices, not pnp\n Protect tpm_chip_list when transversing it.\n Renames num_open to is_open, as only one process can open the file at a time.\n Remove the BKL calls from the TPM driver, which were added in the overall\n netlabel: Add configuration support for local labeling\n cipso: Add support for native local labeling and fixup mapping names\n netlabel: Changes to the NetLabel security attributes to allow LSMs to pass full contexts\n selinux: Cache NetLabel secattrs in the socket\u0027s security struct\n selinux: Set socket NetLabel based on connection endpoint\n netlabel: Add functionality to set the security attributes of a packet\n netlabel: Add network address selectors to the NetLabel/LSM domain mapping\n netlabel: Add a generic way to create ordered linked lists of network addrs\n netlabel: Replace protocol/NetLabel linking with refrerence counts\n smack: Fix missing calls to netlbl_skbuff_err()\n selinux: Fix missing calls to netlbl_skbuff_err()\n selinux: Fix a problem in security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr()\n selinux: Better local/forward check in selinux_ip_postroute()\n ...\n" }, { "commit": "934e6ebf96e8c1a0f299e64129fdaebc1132a427", "tree": "ab4bd754997b097f06a5cfefd9e3671d56e628f4", "parents": [ "2cb5998b5f0ccc886fdda3509059eef297b49577" ], "author": { "name": "Alan Cox", "email": "alan@redhat.com", "time": "Mon Oct 13 10:40:43 2008 +0100" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Mon Oct 13 09:51:41 2008 -0700" }, "message": "tty: Redo current tty locking\n\nCurrently it is sometimes locked by the tty mutex and sometimes by the\nsighand lock. The latter is in fact correct and now we can hand back referenced\nobjects we can fix this up without problems around sleeping functions.\n\nSigned-off-by: Alan Cox \u003calan@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "452a00d2ee288f2cbc36f676edd06cb14d2878c1", "tree": "c8251c73924a6ac9b174bc557357bfeff0c8d1a8", "parents": [ "f4d2a6c2096b764decb20070b1bf4356de9144a8" ], "author": { "name": "Alan Cox", "email": "alan@redhat.com", "time": "Mon Oct 13 10:39:13 2008 +0100" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Mon Oct 13 09:51:41 2008 -0700" }, "message": "tty: Make get_current_tty use a kref\n\nWe now return a kref covered tty reference. That ensures the tty structure\ndoesn\u0027t go away when you have a return from get_current_tty. This is not\nenough to protect you from most of the resources being freed behind your\nback - yet.\n\n[Updated to include fixes for SELinux problems found by Andrew Morton and\n an s390 leak found while debugging the former]\n\nSigned-off-by: Alan Cox \u003calan@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "92562927826fceb2f8e69c89e28161b8c1e0b125", "tree": "e44f22406ea4d3753a4834feed7e7d271da28ab8", "parents": [ "93db628658197aa46bd7f83d429908b6f187ec9c" ], "author": { "name": "Mimi Zohar", "email": "zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com", "time": "Tue Oct 07 14:00:12 2008 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Oct 13 09:47:43 2008 +1100" }, "message": "integrity: special fs magic\n\nDiscussion on the mailing list questioned the use of these\nmagic values in userspace, concluding these values are already\nexported to userspace via statfs and their correct/incorrect\nusage is left up to the userspace application.\n\n - Move special fs magic number definitions to magic.h\n - Add magic.h include\n\nSigned-off-by: Mimi Zohar \u003czohar@us.ibm.com\u003e\nReviewed-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "0da939b0058742ad2d8580b7db6b966d0fc72252", "tree": "47cb109fdf97135191bff5db4e3bfc905136bf8b", "parents": [ "4bdec11f560b8f405a011288a50e65b1a81b3654", "d91d40799165b0c84c97e7c71fb8039494ff07dc" ], "author": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Sat Oct 11 09:26:14 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Sat Oct 11 09:26:14 2008 +1100" }, "message": "Merge branch \u0027master\u0027 of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/lblnet-2.6_next into next\n" }, { "commit": "8d75899d033617316e06296b7c0729612f56aba0", "tree": "47ab64d46b26b86089e20c337e9ba22b00e2d94f", "parents": [ "6c5b3fc0147f79d714d2fe748b5869d7892ef2e7" ], "author": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Fri Oct 10 10:16:33 2008 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Fri Oct 10 10:16:33 2008 -0400" }, "message": "netlabel: Changes to the NetLabel security attributes to allow LSMs to pass full contexts\n\nThis patch provides support for including the LSM\u0027s secid in addition to\nthe LSM\u0027s MLS information in the NetLabel security attributes structure.\n\nSigned-off-by: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "6c5b3fc0147f79d714d2fe748b5869d7892ef2e7", "tree": "2cff691b2d4da2afd69660cb4ee647f6b553cdf9", "parents": [ "014ab19a69c325f52d7bae54ceeda73d6307ae0c" ], "author": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Fri Oct 10 10:16:33 2008 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Fri Oct 10 10:16:33 2008 -0400" }, "message": "selinux: Cache NetLabel secattrs in the socket\u0027s security struct\n\nPrevious work enabled the use of address based NetLabel selectors, which\nwhile highly useful, brought the potential for additional per-packet overhead\nwhen used. This patch attempts to mitigate some of that overhead by caching\nthe NetLabel security attribute struct within the SELinux socket security\nstructure. This should help eliminate the need to recreate the NetLabel\nsecattr structure for each packet resulting in less overhead.\n\nSigned-off-by: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "014ab19a69c325f52d7bae54ceeda73d6307ae0c", "tree": "8a69c490accb7d5454bdfeb8c078d846729aeb60", "parents": [ "948bf85c1bc9a84754786a9d5dd99b7ecc46451e" ], "author": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Fri Oct 10 10:16:33 2008 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Fri Oct 10 10:16:33 2008 -0400" }, "message": "selinux: Set socket NetLabel based on connection endpoint\n\nPrevious work enabled the use of address based NetLabel selectors, which while\nhighly useful, brought the potential for additional per-packet overhead when\nused. This patch attempts to solve that by applying NetLabel socket labels\nwhen sockets are connect()\u0027d. This should alleviate the per-packet NetLabel\nlabeling for all connected sockets (yes, it even works for connected DGRAM\nsockets).\n\nSigned-off-by: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\nReviewed-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "948bf85c1bc9a84754786a9d5dd99b7ecc46451e", "tree": "a4706be1f4a5a37408774ef3c4cab8cf2e7775b5", "parents": [ "63c41688743760631188cf0f4ae986a6793ccb0a" ], "author": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Fri Oct 10 10:16:32 2008 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Fri Oct 10 10:16:32 2008 -0400" }, "message": "netlabel: Add functionality to set the security attributes of a packet\n\nThis patch builds upon the new NetLabel address selector functionality by\nproviding the NetLabel KAPI and CIPSO engine support needed to enable the\nnew packet-based labeling. The only new addition to the NetLabel KAPI at\nthis point is shown below:\n\n * int netlbl_skbuff_setattr(skb, family, secattr)\n\n... and is designed to be called from a Netfilter hook after the packet\u0027s\nIP header has been populated such as in the FORWARD or LOCAL_OUT hooks.\n\nThis patch also provides the necessary SELinux hooks to support this new\nfunctionality. Smack support is not currently included due to uncertainty\nregarding the permissions needed to expand the Smack network access controls.\n\nSigned-off-by: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\nReviewed-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "b1edeb102397546438ab4624489c6ccd7b410d97", "tree": "ce7033f678ffe46ec3f517bb2771b9cbb04d62bb", "parents": [ "a8134296ba9940b5b271d908666e532d34430a3c" ], "author": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Fri Oct 10 10:16:31 2008 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Fri Oct 10 10:16:31 2008 -0400" }, "message": "netlabel: Replace protocol/NetLabel linking with refrerence counts\n\nNetLabel has always had a list of backpointers in the CIPSO DOI definition\nstructure which pointed to the NetLabel LSM domain mapping structures which\nreferenced the CIPSO DOI struct. The rationale for this was that when an\nadministrator removed a CIPSO DOI from the system all of the associated\nNetLabel LSM domain mappings should be removed as well; a list of\nbackpointers made this a simple operation.\n\nUnfortunately, while the backpointers did make the removal easier they were\na bit of a mess from an implementation point of view which was making\nfurther development difficult. Since the removal of a CIPSO DOI is a\nrealtively rare event it seems to make sense to remove this backpointer\nlist as the optimization was hurting us more then it was helping. However,\nwe still need to be able to track when a CIPSO DOI definition is being used\nso replace the backpointer list with a reference count. In order to\npreserve the current functionality of removing the associated LSM domain\nmappings when a CIPSO DOI is removed we walk the LSM domain mapping table,\nremoving the relevant entries.\n\nSigned-off-by: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\nReviewed-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "a8134296ba9940b5b271d908666e532d34430a3c", "tree": "28ef03dc3c6a56bd43e5c9d4b8b303749e815342", "parents": [ "dfaebe9825ff34983778f287101bc5f3bce00640" ], "author": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Fri Oct 10 10:16:31 2008 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Fri Oct 10 10:16:31 2008 -0400" }, "message": "smack: Fix missing calls to netlbl_skbuff_err()\n\nSmack needs to call netlbl_skbuff_err() to let NetLabel do the necessary\nprotocol specific error handling.\n\nSigned-off-by: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Casey Schaufler \u003ccasey@schaufler-ca.com\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "dfaebe9825ff34983778f287101bc5f3bce00640", "tree": "4dccdcdcecd57fc8bfc083ff30d9e0ecb2e7ecba", "parents": [ "99d854d231ce141850b988bdc7e2e7c78f49b03a" ], "author": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Fri Oct 10 10:16:31 2008 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Fri Oct 10 10:16:31 2008 -0400" }, "message": "selinux: Fix missing calls to netlbl_skbuff_err()\n\nAt some point I think I messed up and dropped the calls to netlbl_skbuff_err()\nwhich are necessary for CIPSO to send error notifications to remote systems.\nThis patch re-introduces the error handling calls into the SELinux code.\n\nSigned-off-by: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "99d854d231ce141850b988bdc7e2e7c78f49b03a", "tree": "d9da2a23471f38f6b25ec2bcfe982622ee51adba", "parents": [ "d8395c876bb8a560c8a032887e191b95499a25d6" ], "author": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Fri Oct 10 10:16:30 2008 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Fri Oct 10 10:16:30 2008 -0400" }, "message": "selinux: Fix a problem in security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr()\n\nCurrently when SELinux fails to allocate memory in\nsecurity_netlbl_sid_to_secattr() the NetLabel LSM domain field is set to\nNULL which triggers the default NetLabel LSM domain mapping which may not\nalways be the desired mapping. This patch fixes this by returning an error\nwhen the kernel is unable to allocate memory. This could result in more\nfailures on a system with heavy memory pressure but it is the \"correct\"\nthing to do.\n\nSigned-off-by: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "d8395c876bb8a560c8a032887e191b95499a25d6", "tree": "6c2ef0d59e04b90a9ef673fa34e1c042d22f128e", "parents": [ "948a72438d4178d0728c4b0a38836d280b846939" ], "author": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Fri Oct 10 10:16:30 2008 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Fri Oct 10 10:16:30 2008 -0400" }, "message": "selinux: Better local/forward check in selinux_ip_postroute()\n\nIt turns out that checking to see if skb-\u003esk is NULL is not a very good\nindicator of a forwarded packet as some locally generated packets also have\nskb-\u003esk set to NULL. Fix this by not only checking the skb-\u003esk field but also\nthe IP[6]CB(skb)-\u003eflags field for the IP[6]SKB_FORWARDED flag. While we are\nat it, we are calling selinux_parse_skb() much earlier than we really should\nresulting in potentially wasted cycles parsing packets for information we\nmight no use; so shuffle the code around a bit to fix this.\n\nSigned-off-by: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "aa86290089a1e57b4bdbbb4720072233f66bd5b2", "tree": "9ab16f4d22056297f1571bb7b2b988bff84c8a10", "parents": [ "accc609322ef5ed44cba6d2d70c741afc76385fb" ], "author": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Fri Oct 10 10:16:29 2008 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Fri Oct 10 10:16:29 2008 -0400" }, "message": "selinux: Correctly handle IPv4 packets on IPv6 sockets in all cases\n\nWe did the right thing in a few cases but there were several areas where we\ndetermined a packet\u0027s address family based on the socket\u0027s address family which\nis not the right thing to do since we can get IPv4 packets on IPv6 sockets.\nThis patch fixes these problems by either taking the address family directly\nfrom the packet.\n\nSigned-off-by: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "accc609322ef5ed44cba6d2d70c741afc76385fb", "tree": "4a86c08a2fad7302b14e0f419b5e6bd11111330f", "parents": [ "561967010edef40f539dacf2aa125e20773ab40b" ], "author": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Fri Oct 10 10:16:29 2008 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Fri Oct 10 10:16:29 2008 -0400" }, "message": "selinux: Cleanup the NetLabel glue code\n\nWe were doing a lot of extra work in selinux_netlbl_sock_graft() what wasn\u0027t\nnecessary so this patch removes that code. It also removes the redundant\nsecond argument to selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid() which allows us to simplify a\nfew other functions.\n\nSigned-off-by: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "3040a6d5a2655c7967bd42b5fb4903d48daa747f", "tree": "a4342a6b272a8be9acc16131d39d971536a3e8da", "parents": [ "b5ff7df3df9efab511244d5a299fce706c71af48" ], "author": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Fri Oct 03 10:51:15 2008 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Sat Oct 04 08:25:18 2008 +1000" }, "message": "selinux: Fix an uninitialized variable BUG/panic in selinux_secattr_to_sid()\n\nAt some point during the 2.6.27 development cycle two new fields were added\nto the SELinux context structure, a string pointer and a length field. The\ncode in selinux_secattr_to_sid() was not modified and as a result these two\nfields were left uninitialized which could result in erratic behavior,\nincluding kernel panics, when NetLabel is used. This patch fixes the\nproblem by fully initializing the context in selinux_secattr_to_sid() before\nuse and reducing the level of direct context manipulation done to help\nprevent future problems.\n\nPlease apply this to the 2.6.27-rcX release stream.\n\nSigned-off-by: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "81990fbdd18b9cfdc93dc221ff3250f81468aed8", "tree": "7c8298b58173e9e67f972890bdb209590ac93cab", "parents": [ "ea6b184f7d521a503ecab71feca6e4057562252b" ], "author": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Fri Oct 03 10:51:15 2008 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Sat Oct 04 08:18:18 2008 +1000" }, "message": "selinux: Fix an uninitialized variable BUG/panic in selinux_secattr_to_sid()\n\nAt some point during the 2.6.27 development cycle two new fields were added\nto the SELinux context structure, a string pointer and a length field. The\ncode in selinux_secattr_to_sid() was not modified and as a result these two\nfields were left uninitialized which could result in erratic behavior,\nincluding kernel panics, when NetLabel is used. This patch fixes the\nproblem by fully initializing the context in selinux_secattr_to_sid() before\nuse and reducing the level of direct context manipulation done to help\nprevent future problems.\n\nPlease apply this to the 2.6.27-rcX release stream.\n\nSigned-off-by: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "ea6b184f7d521a503ecab71feca6e4057562252b", "tree": "89724ca76ba9bc8a7029f3fd3edc49557ec6ab40", "parents": [ "de45e806a84909648623119dfe6fc1d31e71ceba" ], "author": { "name": "Stephen Smalley", "email": "sds@tycho.nsa.gov", "time": "Mon Sep 22 15:41:19 2008 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Tue Sep 30 00:26:53 2008 +1000" }, "message": "selinux: use default proc sid on symlinks\n\nAs we are not concerned with fine-grained control over reading of\nsymlinks in proc, always use the default proc SID for all proc symlinks.\nThis should help avoid permission issues upon changes to the proc tree\nas in the /proc/net -\u003e /proc/self/net example.\nThis does not alter labeling of symlinks within /proc/pid directories.\nls -Zd /proc/net output before and after the patch should show the difference.\n\nSigned-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" } ], "next": "de45e806a84909648623119dfe6fc1d31e71ceba" }