[AUDIT] Don't allow ptrace to fool auditing, log arch of audited syscalls.
We were calling ptrace_notify() after auditing the syscall and arguments,
but the debugger could have _changed_ them before the syscall was actually
invoked. Reorder the calls to fix that.
While we're touching ever call to audit_syscall_entry(), we also make it
take an extra argument: the architecture of the syscall which was made,
because some architectures allow more than one type of syscall.
Also add an explicit success/failure flag to audit_syscall_exit(), for
the benefit of architectures which return that in a condition register
rather than only returning a single register.
Change type of syscall return value to 'long' not 'int'.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
diff --git a/arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace.c
index 354a287..3c76333 100644
--- a/arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -304,14 +304,17 @@
void do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
- if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
- audit_syscall_entry(current, regs->gpr[0],
- regs->gpr[3], regs->gpr[4],
- regs->gpr[5], regs->gpr[6]);
-
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
&& (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED))
do_syscall_trace();
+
+ if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
+ audit_syscall_entry(current,
+ test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT)?AUDIT_ARCH_PPC:AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64,
+ regs->gpr[0],
+ regs->gpr[3], regs->gpr[4],
+ regs->gpr[5], regs->gpr[6]);
+
}
void do_syscall_trace_leave(struct pt_regs *regs)
@@ -319,7 +322,9 @@
secure_computing(regs->gpr[0]);
if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
- audit_syscall_exit(current, regs->result);
+ audit_syscall_exit(current,
+ (regs->ccr&0x1000)?AUDITSC_FAILURE:AUDITSC_SUCCESS,
+ regs->result);
if ((test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
|| test_thread_flag(TIF_SINGLESTEP))