)]}' { "log": [ { "commit": "1d1c7ddbfab358445a542715551301b7fc363e28", "tree": "d4421834d109b206f39c2019ea039fd42ed22e1d", "parents": [ "bae43c9945ebeef15e7952e317efb02393d3bfc7" ], "author": { "name": "Ingo Molnar", "email": "mingo@elte.hu", "time": "Thu Dec 11 14:59:31 2008 +0100" }, "committer": { "name": "Ingo Molnar", "email": "mingo@elte.hu", "time": "Thu Dec 11 15:45:55 2008 +0100" }, "message": "perf counters: add prctl interface to disable/enable counters\n\nAdd a way for self-monitoring tasks to disable/enable counters summarily,\nvia a prctl:\n\n\tPR_TASK_PERF_COUNTERS_DISABLE\t\t31\n\tPR_TASK_PERF_COUNTERS_ENABLE\t\t32\n\nSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar \u003cmingo@elte.hu\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "6976675d94042fbd446231d1bd8b7de71a980ada", "tree": "2d2acebb8078dd373115ecbdac5423f7d4fa7d72", "parents": [ "654c8e0b1c623b156c5b92f28d914ab38c9c2c90" ], "author": { "name": "Arjan van de Ven", "email": "arjan@linux.intel.com", "time": "Mon Sep 01 15:52:40 2008 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Arjan van de Ven", "email": "arjan@linux.intel.com", "time": "Fri Sep 05 21:35:30 2008 -0700" }, "message": "hrtimer: create a \"timer_slack\" field in the task struct\n\nWe want to be able to control the default \"rounding\" that is used by\nselect() and poll() and friends. This is a per process property\n(so that we can have a \"nice\" like program to start certain programs with\na looser or stricter rounding) that can be set/get via a prctl().\n\nFor this purpose, a field called \"timer_slack_ns\" is added to the task\nstruct. In addition, a field called \"default_timer_slack\"ns\" is added\nso that tasks easily can temporarily to a more/less accurate slack and then\nback to the default.\n\nThe default value of the slack is set to 50 usec; this is significantly less\nthan 2.6.27\u0027s average select() and poll() timing error but still allows\nthe kernel to group timers somewhat to preserve power behavior. Applications\nand admins can override this via the prctl()\n\nSigned-off-by: Arjan van de Ven \u003carjan@linux.intel.com\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "3898b1b4ebff8dcfbcf1807e0661585e06c9a91c", "tree": "69a338864dfe654f68064a599c5d0da460df34ac", "parents": [ "4016a1390d07f15b267eecb20e76a48fd5c524ef" ], "author": { "name": "Andrew G. Morgan", "email": "morgan@kernel.org", "time": "Mon Apr 28 02:13:40 2008 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Mon Apr 28 08:58:26 2008 -0700" }, "message": "capabilities: implement per-process securebits\n\nFilesystem capability support makes it possible to do away with (set)uid-0\nbased privilege and use capabilities instead. That is, with filesystem\nsupport for capabilities but without this present patch, it is (conceptually)\npossible to manage a system with capabilities alone and never need to obtain\nprivilege via (set)uid-0.\n\nOf course, conceptually isn\u0027t quite the same as currently possible since few\nuser applications, certainly not enough to run a viable system, are currently\nprepared to leverage capabilities to exercise privilege. Further, many\napplications exist that may never get upgraded in this way, and the kernel\nwill continue to want to support their setuid-0 base privilege needs.\n\nWhere pure-capability applications evolve and replace setuid-0 binaries, it is\ndesirable that there be a mechanisms by which they can contain their\nprivilege. In addition to leveraging the per-process bounding and inheritable\nsets, this should include suppressing the privilege of the uid-0 superuser\nfrom the process\u0027 tree of children.\n\nThe feature added by this patch can be leveraged to suppress the privilege\nassociated with (set)uid-0. This suppression requires CAP_SETPCAP to\ninitiate, and only immediately affects the \u0027current\u0027 process (it is inherited\nthrough fork()/exec()). This reimplementation differs significantly from the\nhistorical support for securebits which was system-wide, unwieldy and which\nhas ultimately withered to a dead relic in the source of the modern kernel.\n\nWith this patch applied a process, that is capable(CAP_SETPCAP), can now drop\nall legacy privilege (through uid\u003d0) for itself and all subsequently\nfork()\u0027d/exec()\u0027d children with:\n\n prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 0x2f);\n\nThis patch represents a no-op unless CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is\nenabled at configure time.\n\n[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix uninitialised var warning]\n[serue@us.ibm.com: capabilities: use cap_task_prctl when !CONFIG_SECURITY]\nSigned-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan \u003cmorgan@kernel.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nReviewed-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nCc: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nCc: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "8fb402bccf203ecca8f9e0202b8fd3c937dece6f", "tree": "4f102f9cc81dedbf9271f728a4b1e6e731a6a174", "parents": [ "5deb45e39b946901ae028ccd3a1d0b35fa387475" ], "author": { "name": "Erik Bosman", "email": "ebn310@few.vu.nl", "time": "Fri Apr 11 18:54:17 2008 +0200" }, "committer": { "name": "Ingo Molnar", "email": "mingo@elte.hu", "time": "Sat Apr 19 19:19:55 2008 +0200" }, "message": "generic, x86: add prctl commands PR_GET_TSC and PR_SET_TSC\n\nThis patch adds prctl commands that make it possible\nto deny the execution of timestamp counters in userspace.\nIf this is not implemented on a specific architecture,\nprctl will return -EINVAL.\n\nned-off-by: Erik Bosman \u003cejbosman@cs.vu.nl\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar \u003cmingo@elte.hu\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Thomas Gleixner \u003ctglx@linutronix.de\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "3b7391de67da515c91f48aa371de77cb6cc5c07e", "tree": "22b9f5d9d1c36b374eb5765219aca3c7e1f23486", "parents": [ "46c383cc4530ccc438cb325e92e11eb21dd3d4fc" ], "author": { "name": "Serge E. Hallyn", "email": "serue@us.ibm.com", "time": "Mon Feb 04 22:29:45 2008 -0800" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org", "time": "Tue Feb 05 09:44:20 2008 -0800" }, "message": "capabilities: introduce per-process capability bounding set\n\nThe capability bounding set is a set beyond which capabilities cannot grow.\n Currently cap_bset is per-system. It can be manipulated through sysctl,\nbut only init can add capabilities. Root can remove capabilities. By\ndefault it includes all caps except CAP_SETPCAP.\n\nThis patch makes the bounding set per-process when file capabilities are\nenabled. It is inherited at fork from parent. Noone can add elements,\nCAP_SETPCAP is required to remove them.\n\nOne example use of this is to start a safer container. For instance, until\ndevice namespaces or per-container device whitelists are introduced, it is\nbest to take CAP_MKNOD away from a container.\n\nThe bounding set will not affect pP and pE immediately. It will only\naffect pP\u0027 and pE\u0027 after subsequent exec()s. It also does not affect pI,\nand exec() does not constrain pI\u0027. So to really start a shell with no way\nof regain CAP_MKNOD, you would do\n\n\tprctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, CAP_MKNOD);\n\tcap_t cap \u003d cap_get_proc();\n\tcap_value_t caparray[1];\n\tcaparray[0] \u003d CAP_MKNOD;\n\tcap_set_flag(cap, CAP_INHERITABLE, 1, caparray, CAP_DROP);\n\tcap_set_proc(cap);\n\tcap_free(cap);\n\nThe following test program will get and set the bounding\nset (but not pI). For instance\n\n\t./bset get\n\t\t(lists capabilities in bset)\n\t./bset drop cap_net_raw\n\t\t(starts shell with new bset)\n\t\t(use capset, setuid binary, or binary with\n\t\tfile capabilities to try to increase caps)\n\n************************************************************\ncap_bound.c\n************************************************************\n #include \u003csys/prctl.h\u003e\n #include \u003clinux/capability.h\u003e\n #include \u003csys/types.h\u003e\n #include \u003cunistd.h\u003e\n #include \u003cstdio.h\u003e\n #include \u003cstdlib.h\u003e\n #include \u003cstring.h\u003e\n\n #ifndef PR_CAPBSET_READ\n #define PR_CAPBSET_READ 23\n #endif\n\n #ifndef PR_CAPBSET_DROP\n #define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24\n #endif\n\nint usage(char *me)\n{\n\tprintf(\"Usage: %s get\\n\", me);\n\tprintf(\" %s drop \u003ccapability\u003e\\n\", me);\n\treturn 1;\n}\n\n #define numcaps 32\nchar *captable[numcaps] \u003d {\n\t\"cap_chown\",\n\t\"cap_dac_override\",\n\t\"cap_dac_read_search\",\n\t\"cap_fowner\",\n\t\"cap_fsetid\",\n\t\"cap_kill\",\n\t\"cap_setgid\",\n\t\"cap_setuid\",\n\t\"cap_setpcap\",\n\t\"cap_linux_immutable\",\n\t\"cap_net_bind_service\",\n\t\"cap_net_broadcast\",\n\t\"cap_net_admin\",\n\t\"cap_net_raw\",\n\t\"cap_ipc_lock\",\n\t\"cap_ipc_owner\",\n\t\"cap_sys_module\",\n\t\"cap_sys_rawio\",\n\t\"cap_sys_chroot\",\n\t\"cap_sys_ptrace\",\n\t\"cap_sys_pacct\",\n\t\"cap_sys_admin\",\n\t\"cap_sys_boot\",\n\t\"cap_sys_nice\",\n\t\"cap_sys_resource\",\n\t\"cap_sys_time\",\n\t\"cap_sys_tty_config\",\n\t\"cap_mknod\",\n\t\"cap_lease\",\n\t\"cap_audit_write\",\n\t\"cap_audit_control\",\n\t\"cap_setfcap\"\n};\n\nint getbcap(void)\n{\n\tint comma\u003d0;\n\tunsigned long i;\n\tint ret;\n\n\tprintf(\"i know of %d capabilities\\n\", numcaps);\n\tprintf(\"capability bounding set:\");\n\tfor (i\u003d0; i\u003cnumcaps; i++) {\n\t\tret \u003d prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ, i);\n\t\tif (ret \u003c 0)\n\t\t\tperror(\"prctl\");\n\t\telse if (ret\u003d\u003d1)\n\t\t\tprintf(\"%s%s\", (comma++) ? \", \" : \" \", captable[i]);\n\t}\n\tprintf(\"\\n\");\n\treturn 0;\n}\n\nint capdrop(char *str)\n{\n\tunsigned long i;\n\n\tint found\u003d0;\n\tfor (i\u003d0; i\u003cnumcaps; i++) {\n\t\tif (strcmp(captable[i], str) \u003d\u003d 0) {\n\t\t\tfound\u003d1;\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif (!found)\n\t\treturn 1;\n\tif (prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, i)) {\n\t\tperror(\"prctl\");\n\t\treturn 1;\n\t}\n\treturn 0;\n}\n\nint main(int argc, char *argv[])\n{\n\tif (argc\u003c2)\n\t\treturn usage(argv[0]);\n\tif (strcmp(argv[1], \"get\")\u003d\u003d0)\n\t\treturn getbcap();\n\tif (strcmp(argv[1], \"drop\")!\u003d0 || argc\u003c3)\n\t\treturn usage(argv[0]);\n\tif (capdrop(argv[2])) {\n\t\tprintf(\"unknown capability\\n\");\n\t\treturn 1;\n\t}\n\treturn execl(\"/bin/bash\", \"/bin/bash\", NULL);\n}\n************************************************************\n\n[serue@us.ibm.com: fix typo]\nSigned-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan \u003cmorgan@kernel.org\u003e\nCc: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nCc: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nCc: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@sous-sol.org\u003e\nCc: Casey Schaufler \u003ccasey@schaufler-ca.com\u003ea\nSigned-off-by: \"Serge E. Hallyn\" \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nTested-by: Jiri Slaby \u003cjirislaby@gmail.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "1d9d02feeee89e9132034d504c9a45eeaf618a3d", "tree": "a4324cce8acd77cace3b1d4cf3a1e61783707e5c", "parents": [ "be0ef957c9eed4ebae873ee3fbcfb9dfde486dec" ], "author": { "name": "Andrea Arcangeli", "email": "andrea@cpushare.com", "time": "Sun Jul 15 23:41:32 2007 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org", "time": "Mon Jul 16 09:05:50 2007 -0700" }, "message": "move seccomp from /proc to a prctl\n\nThis reduces the memory footprint and it enforces that only the current\ntask can enable seccomp on itself (this is a requirement for a\nstrightforward [modulo preempt ;) ] TIF_NOTSC implementation).\n\nSigned-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli \u003candrea@cpushare.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "651d765d0b2c72d33430487c8b6ef64c60cd2134", "tree": "3a7253dc0b80585a03ddd581e0c00fc0f8bda7a0", "parents": [ "3b5e905ee3bd23e9311951890aba57a0dbc81ca4" ], "author": { "name": "Anton Blanchard", "email": "anton@samba.org", "time": "Wed Jun 07 16:10:19 2006 +1000" }, "committer": { "name": "Paul Mackerras", "email": "paulus@samba.org", "time": "Fri Jun 09 21:24:13 2006 +1000" }, "message": "[PATCH] Add a prctl to change the endianness of a process.\n\nThis new prctl is intended for changing the execution mode of the\nprocessor, on processors that support both a little-endian mode and a\nbig-endian mode. It is intended for use by programs such as\ninstruction set emulators (for example an x86 emulator on PowerPC),\nwhich may find it convenient to use the processor in an alternate\nendianness mode when executing translated instructions.\n\nNote that this does not imply the existence of a fully-fledged ABI for\nboth endiannesses, or of compatibility code for converting system\ncalls done in the non-native endianness mode. The program is expected\nto arrange for all of its system call arguments to be presented in the\nnative endianness.\n\nSwitching between big and little-endian mode will require some care in\nconstructing the instruction sequence for the switch. Generally the\ninstructions up to the instruction that invokes the prctl system call\nwill have to be in the old endianness, and subsequent instructions\nwill have to be in the new endianness.\n\nSigned-off-by: Anton Blanchard \u003canton@samba.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Paul Mackerras \u003cpaulus@samba.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2", "tree": "0bba044c4ce775e45a88a51686b5d9f90697ea9d", "parents": [], "author": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org", "time": "Sat Apr 16 15:20:36 2005 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org", "time": "Sat Apr 16 15:20:36 2005 -0700" }, "message": "Linux-2.6.12-rc2\n\nInitial git repository build. I\u0027m not bothering with the full history,\neven though we have it. We can create a separate \"historical\" git\narchive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it\u0027s about\n3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early\ngit days unnecessarily complicated, when we don\u0027t have a lot of good\ninfrastructure for it.\n\nLet it rip!\n" } ] }