)]}'
{
  "log": [
    {
      "commit": "caabe240574aec05b2f5667414ce80f9075c2ba1",
      "tree": "d92bf96b009bd0b0caec44c21348812b06805909",
      "parents": [
        "b6bb324dbddd704b4b9a85971e1f7ae79abb2e1d"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "David Howells",
        "email": "dhowells@redhat.com",
        "time": "Sat Oct 20 01:19:29 2012 +0100"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Linus Torvalds",
        "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org",
        "time": "Fri Oct 19 17:30:40 2012 -0700"
      },
      "message": "MODSIGN: Move the magic string to the end of a module and eliminate the search\n\nEmit the magic string that indicates a module has a signature after the\nsignature data instead of before it.  This allows module_sig_check() to\nbe made simpler and faster by the elimination of the search for the\nmagic string.  Instead we just need to do a single memcmp().\n\nThis works because at the end of the signature data there is the\nfixed-length signature information block.  This block then falls\nimmediately prior to the magic number.\n\nFrom the contents of the information block, it is trivial to calculate\nthe size of the signature data and thus the size of the actual module\ndata.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "631cc66eb9eaa7296e303197ff1eb0f55e32b61d",
      "tree": "631c962060a776a16ec35c477e99d4ef87c8db24",
      "parents": [
        "d441108c6f77541bb66fcd5b3389415b4c232008"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "David Howells",
        "email": "dhowells@redhat.com",
        "time": "Wed Sep 26 10:09:51 2012 +0100"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Rusty Russell",
        "email": "rusty@rustcorp.com.au",
        "time": "Wed Oct 10 20:01:22 2012 +1030"
      },
      "message": "MODSIGN: Provide module signing public keys to the kernel\n\nInclude a PGP keyring containing the public keys required to perform module\nverification in the kernel image during build and create a special keyring\nduring boot which is then populated with keys of crypto type holding the public\nkeys found in the PGP keyring.\n\nThese can be seen by root:\n\n[root@andromeda ~]# cat /proc/keys\n07ad4ee0 I-----     1 perm 3f010000     0     0 crypto    modsign.0: RSA 87b9b3bd []\n15c7f8c3 I-----     1 perm 1f030000     0     0 keyring   .module_sign: 1/4\n...\n\nIt is probably worth permitting root to invalidate these keys, resulting in\ntheir removal and preventing further modules from being loaded with that key.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Rusty Russell \u003crusty@rustcorp.com.au\u003e\n"
    },
    {
      "commit": "106a4ee258d14818467829bf0e12aeae14c16cd7",
      "tree": "4a5d002eceff4a028ebc8d88223b1ed735bee224",
      "parents": [
        "c26fd69fa00916a31a47f5f096fd7be924106df8"
      ],
      "author": {
        "name": "Rusty Russell",
        "email": "rusty@rustcorp.com.au",
        "time": "Wed Sep 26 10:09:40 2012 +0100"
      },
      "committer": {
        "name": "Rusty Russell",
        "email": "rusty@rustcorp.com.au",
        "time": "Wed Oct 10 20:00:55 2012 +1030"
      },
      "message": "module: signature checking hook\n\nWe do a very simple search for a particular string appended to the module\n(which is cache-hot and about to be SHA\u0027d anyway).  There\u0027s both a config\noption and a boot parameter which control whether we accept or fail with\nunsigned modules and modules that are signed with an unknown key.\n\nIf module signing is enabled, the kernel will be tainted if a module is\nloaded that is unsigned or has a signature for which we don\u0027t have the\nkey.\n\n(Useful feedback and tweaks by David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e)\n\nSigned-off-by: Rusty Russell \u003crusty@rustcorp.com.au\u003e\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Rusty Russell \u003crusty@rustcorp.com.au\u003e\n"
    }
  ]
}