)]}' { "log": [ { "commit": "fcf634098c00dd9cd247447368495f0b79be12d1", "tree": "77fc98cd461bd52ba3b14e833d54a115ffbbd7bc", "parents": [ "32ea845d5bafc37b7406bea1aee3005407cb0900" ], "author": { "name": "Christopher Yeoh", "email": "cyeoh@au1.ibm.com", "time": "Mon Oct 31 17:06:39 2011 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Mon Oct 31 17:30:44 2011 -0700" }, "message": "Cross Memory Attach\n\nThe basic idea behind cross memory attach is to allow MPI programs doing\nintra-node communication to do a single copy of the message rather than a\ndouble copy of the message via shared memory.\n\nThe following patch attempts to achieve this by allowing a destination\nprocess, given an address and size from a source process, to copy memory\ndirectly from the source process into its own address space via a system\ncall. There is also a symmetrical ability to copy from the current\nprocess\u0027s address space into a destination process\u0027s address space.\n\n- Use of /proc/pid/mem has been considered, but there are issues with\n using it:\n - Does not allow for specifying iovecs for both src and dest, assuming\n preadv or pwritev was implemented either the area read from or\n written to would need to be contiguous.\n - Currently mem_read allows only processes who are currently\n ptrace\u0027ing the target and are still able to ptrace the target to read\n from the target. This check could possibly be moved to the open call,\n but its not clear exactly what race this restriction is stopping\n (reason appears to have been lost)\n - Having to send the fd of /proc/self/mem via SCM_RIGHTS on unix\n domain socket is a bit ugly from a userspace point of view,\n especially when you may have hundreds if not (eventually) thousands\n of processes that all need to do this with each other\n - Doesn\u0027t allow for some future use of the interface we would like to\n consider adding in the future (see below)\n - Interestingly reading from /proc/pid/mem currently actually\n involves two copies! (But this could be fixed pretty easily)\n\nAs mentioned previously use of vmsplice instead was considered, but has\nproblems. Since you need the reader and writer working co-operatively if\nthe pipe is not drained then you block. Which requires some wrapping to\ndo non blocking on the send side or polling on the receive. In all to all\ncommunication it requires ordering otherwise you can deadlock. And in the\nexample of many MPI tasks writing to one MPI task vmsplice serialises the\ncopying.\n\nThere are some cases of MPI collectives where even a single copy interface\ndoes not get us the performance gain we could. For example in an\nMPI_Reduce rather than copy the data from the source we would like to\ninstead use it directly in a mathops (say the reduce is doing a sum) as\nthis would save us doing a copy. We don\u0027t need to keep a copy of the data\nfrom the source. I haven\u0027t implemented this, but I think this interface\ncould in the future do all this through the use of the flags - eg could\nspecify the math operation and type and the kernel rather than just\ncopying the data would apply the specified operation between the source\nand destination and store it in the destination.\n\nAlthough we don\u0027t have a \"second user\" of the interface (though I\u0027ve had\nsome nibbles from people who may be interested in using it for intra\nprocess messaging which is not MPI). This interface is something which\nhardware vendors are already doing for their custom drivers to implement\nfast local communication. And so in addition to this being useful for\nOpenMPI it would mean the driver maintainers don\u0027t have to fix things up\nwhen the mm changes.\n\nThere was some discussion about how much faster a true zero copy would\ngo. Here\u0027s a link back to the email with some testing I did on that:\n\nhttp://marc.info/?l\u003dlinux-mm\u0026m\u003d130105930902915\u0026w\u003d2\n\nThere is a basic man page for the proposed interface here:\n\nhttp://ozlabs.org/~cyeoh/cma/process_vm_readv.txt\n\nThis has been implemented for x86 and powerpc, other architecture should\nmainly (I think) just need to add syscall numbers for the process_vm_readv\nand process_vm_writev. There are 32 bit compatibility versions for\n64-bit kernels.\n\nFor arch maintainers there are some simple tests to be able to quickly\nverify that the syscalls are working correctly here:\n\nhttp://ozlabs.org/~cyeoh/cma/cma-test-20110718.tgz\n\nSigned-off-by: Chris Yeoh \u003cyeohc@au1.ibm.com\u003e\nCc: Ingo Molnar \u003cmingo@elte.hu\u003e\nCc: \"H. Peter Anvin\" \u003chpa@zytor.com\u003e\nCc: Thomas Gleixner \u003ctglx@linutronix.de\u003e\nCc: Arnd Bergmann \u003carnd@arndb.de\u003e\nCc: Paul Mackerras \u003cpaulus@samba.org\u003e\nCc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt \u003cbenh@kernel.crashing.org\u003e\nCc: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nCc: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nCc: \u003clinux-man@vger.kernel.org\u003e\nCc: \u003clinux-arch@vger.kernel.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "ee009e4a0d4555ed522a631bae9896399674f064", "tree": "ee309fb4a98d9e7792cec99935c2d33652b3f440", "parents": [ "fdd1b94581782a2ddf9124414e5b7a5f48ce2f9c" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Mon Mar 07 15:06:20 2011 +0000" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Tue Mar 08 11:17:22 2011 +1100" }, "message": "KEYS: Add an iovec version of KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE\n\nAdd a keyctl op (KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV) that is like KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE, but\ntakes an iovec array and concatenates the data in-kernel into one buffer.\nSince the KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE copies the data anyway, this isn\u0027t too much of a\nproblem.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "fdd1b94581782a2ddf9124414e5b7a5f48ce2f9c", "tree": "ce83bfd1f0b1a7d4b9521bdb3d6afef1bff1d4f2", "parents": [ "b9fffa3877a3ebbe0a5ad5a247358e2f7df15b24" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Mon Mar 07 15:06:09 2011 +0000" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Tue Mar 08 11:17:18 2011 +1100" }, "message": "KEYS: Add a new keyctl op to reject a key with a specified error code\n\nAdd a new keyctl op to reject a key with a specified error code. This works\nmuch the same as negating a key, and so keyctl_negate_key() is made a special\ncase of keyctl_reject_key(). The difference is that keyctl_negate_key()\nselects ENOKEY as the error to be reported.\n\nTypically the key would be rejected with EKEYEXPIRED, EKEYREVOKED or\nEKEYREJECTED, but this is not mandatory.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "973c9f4f49ca96a53bcf6384c4c59ccd26c33906", "tree": "e3535a43c1e5cb5f0c06c040f58bc25c9b869fd1", "parents": [ "a8b17ed019bd40d3bfa20439d9c36a99f9be9180" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Thu Jan 20 16:38:33 2011 +0000" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Fri Jan 21 14:59:30 2011 -0800" }, "message": "KEYS: Fix up comments in key management code\n\nFix up comments in the key management code. No functional changes.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "a8b17ed019bd40d3bfa20439d9c36a99f9be9180", "tree": "beb3b08575aa01c7ebb24939b678d533b1f59adf", "parents": [ "9093ba53b7f26dbb5210de1157769e59e34bbe23" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Thu Jan 20 16:38:27 2011 +0000" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Fri Jan 21 14:59:29 2011 -0800" }, "message": "KEYS: Do some style cleanup in the key management code.\n\nDo a bit of a style clean up in the key management code. No functional\nchanges.\n\nDone using:\n\n perl -p -i -e \u0027s!^/[*]*/\\n!!\u0027 security/keys/*.c\n perl -p -i -e \u0027s!} /[*] end [a-z0-9_]*[(][)] [*]/\\n!}\\n!\u0027 security/keys/*.c\n sed -i -s -e \": next\" -e N -e \u0027s/^\\n[}]$/}/\u0027 -e t -e P -e \u0027s/^.*\\n//\u0027 -e \"b next\" security/keys/*.c\n\nTo remove /*****/ lines, remove comments on the closing brace of a\nfunction to name the function and remove blank lines before the closing\nbrace of a function.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "ee18d64c1f632043a02e6f5ba5e045bb26a5465f", "tree": "80b5a4d530ec7d5fd69799920f0db7b78aba6b9d", "parents": [ "d0420c83f39f79afb82010c2d2cafd150eef651b" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Wed Sep 02 09:14:21 2009 +0100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Wed Sep 02 21:29:22 2009 +1000" }, "message": "KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process\u0027s session keyring on its parent [try #6]\n\nAdd a keyctl to install a process\u0027s session keyring onto its parent. This\nreplaces the parent\u0027s session keyring. Because the COW credential code does\nnot permit one process to change another process\u0027s credentials directly, the\nchange is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this\nwill be after a wait*() syscall.\n\nTo support this, three new security hooks have been provided:\ncred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in\nthe blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if\nthe process may replace its parent\u0027s session keyring.\n\nThe replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details\nas its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and\nthe session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.\n\nNote that this requires alteration to each architecture\u0027s notify_resume path.\nThis has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of\nwhich need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the\nreplacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace\nexecution.\n\nThis allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and\nthe VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to\nalter the parent process\u0027s PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn\u0027t use\nPAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session\nkeyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed\nthe newpag flag.\n\nThis can be tested with the following program:\n\n\t#include \u003cstdio.h\u003e\n\t#include \u003cstdlib.h\u003e\n\t#include \u003ckeyutils.h\u003e\n\n\t#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT\t18\n\n\t#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) \u003d\u003d -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)\n\n\tint main(int argc, char **argv)\n\t{\n\t\tkey_serial_t keyring, key;\n\t\tlong ret;\n\n\t\tkeyring \u003d keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);\n\t\tOSERROR(keyring, \"keyctl_join_session_keyring\");\n\n\t\tkey \u003d add_key(\"user\", \"a\", \"b\", 1, keyring);\n\t\tOSERROR(key, \"add_key\");\n\n\t\tret \u003d keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);\n\t\tOSERROR(ret, \"KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT\");\n\n\t\treturn 0;\n\t}\n\nCompiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:\n\n\t[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show\n\tSession Keyring\n\t -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses\n\t355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \\_ keyring: _uid.4043\n\t[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag\n\t[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show\n\tSession Keyring\n\t -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses\n\t1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \\_ user: a\n\t[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello\n\t[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show\n\tSession Keyring\n\t -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello\n\t340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \\_ user: a\n\nWhere the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named\n\u0027a\u0027 into it and then installs it on its parent.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "70a5bb72b55e82fbfbf1e22cae6975fac58a1e2d", "tree": "8e6dcaf5630388d81b23845f293789f2d6a3596b", "parents": [ "4a38e122e2cc6294779021ff4ccc784a3997059e" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Tue Apr 29 01:01:26 2008 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Tue Apr 29 08:06:16 2008 -0700" }, "message": "keys: add keyctl function to get a security label\n\nAdd a keyctl() function to get the security label of a key.\n\nThe following is added to Documentation/keys.txt:\n\n (*) Get the LSM security context attached to a key.\n\n\tlong keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY, key_serial_t key, char *buffer,\n\t\t size_t buflen)\n\n This function returns a string that represents the LSM security context\n attached to a key in the buffer provided.\n\n Unless there\u0027s an error, it always returns the amount of data it could\n produce, even if that\u0027s too big for the buffer, but it won\u0027t copy more\n than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy\n will take place.\n\n A NUL character is included at the end of the string if the buffer is\n sufficiently big. This is included in the returned count. If no LSM is\n in force then an empty string will be returned.\n\n A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be\n successful.\n\n[akpm@linux-foundation.org: declare keyctl_get_security()]\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nCc: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\nCc: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@sous-sol.org\u003e\nCc: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nCc: Kevin Coffman \u003ckwc@citi.umich.edu\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "cd354f1ae75e6466a7e31b727faede57a1f89ca5", "tree": "09a2da1672465fefbc7fe06ff4e6084f1dd14c6b", "parents": [ "3fc605a2aa38899c12180ca311f1eeb61a6d867e" ], "author": { "name": "Tim Schmielau", "email": "tim@physik3.uni-rostock.de", "time": "Wed Feb 14 00:33:14 2007 -0800" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org", "time": "Wed Feb 14 08:09:54 2007 -0800" }, "message": "[PATCH] remove many unneeded #includes of sched.h\n\nAfter Al Viro (finally) succeeded in removing the sched.h #include in module.h\nrecently, it makes sense again to remove other superfluous sched.h includes.\nThere are quite a lot of files which include it but don\u0027t actually need\nanything defined in there. Presumably these includes were once needed for\nmacros that used to live in sched.h, but moved to other header files in the\ncourse of cleaning it up.\n\nTo ease the pain, this time I did not fiddle with any header files and only\nremoved #includes from .c-files, which tend to cause less trouble.\n\nCompile tested against 2.6.20-rc2 and 2.6.20-rc2-mm2 (with offsets) on alpha,\narm, i386, ia64, mips, powerpc, and x86_64 with allnoconfig, defconfig,\nallmodconfig, and allyesconfig as well as a few randconfigs on x86_64 and all\nconfigs in arch/arm/configs on arm. I also checked that no new warnings were\nintroduced by the patch (actually, some warnings are removed that were emitted\nby unnecessarily included header files).\n\nSigned-off-by: Tim Schmielau \u003ctim@physik3.uni-rostock.de\u003e\nAcked-by: Russell King \u003crmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "b5f545c880a2a47947ba2118b2509644ab7a2969", "tree": "8720e02262b0ff6309ae79603f6c63965296d378", "parents": [ "cab8eb594e84b434d20412fc5a3985b0bee3ab9f" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Sun Jan 08 01:02:47 2006 -0800" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org", "time": "Sun Jan 08 20:13:53 2006 -0800" }, "message": "[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys\n\nMake it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to\ninstantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4.\n\nThe patch makes the following changes:\n\n (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type\n to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be\n spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the\n rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance.\n\n The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation\n name are passed to the method.\n\n (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key\n to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in\n /proc/pid/cmdline.\n\n This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the\n patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no\n longer there.\n\n A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow.\n\n (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this\n key will retrieve the information.\n\n (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the\n authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here\n for the caller\u0027s set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the\n lowest level of the session keyring.\n\n This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to\n switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and\n so is usable in multithreaded programs.\n\n The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec.\n\n (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that\n permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated\n key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated\n with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread\u0027s keyrings.\n\n This function can also clear the assumption.\n\n (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently\n assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY).\n\n (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is\n assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if\n instantiation is successful.\n\n (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the\n file of permissions functions.\n\n (9) The documentation is updated.\n\nFrom: \u003cValdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu\u003e\n\n Build fix.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nCc: Trond Myklebust \u003ctrond.myklebust@fys.uio.no\u003e\nCc: Alexander Zangerl \u003caz@bond.edu.au\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "017679c4d45783158dba1dd6f79e712c22bb3d9a", "tree": "a536f0b581eacd88a64077f5ff15b29d23fc6405", "parents": [ "cd140a5c1f456f50897af4a2e9a23d228a5fe719" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Sun Jan 08 01:02:43 2006 -0800" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@g5.osdl.org", "time": "Sun Jan 08 20:13:53 2006 -0800" }, "message": "[PATCH] keys: Permit key expiry time to be set\n\nAdd a new keyctl function that allows the expiry time to be set on a key or\nremoved from a key, provided the caller has attribute modification access.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nCc: Trond Myklebust \u003ctrond.myklebust@fys.uio.no\u003e\nCc: Alexander Zangerl \u003caz@bond.edu.au\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "3e30148c3d524a9c1c63ca28261bc24c457eb07a", "tree": "a2fcc46cc11fe871ad976c07476d934a07313576", "parents": [ "8589b4e00e352f983259140f25a262d973be6bc5" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Thu Jun 23 22:00:56 2005 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org", "time": "Fri Jun 24 00:05:19 2005 -0700" }, "message": "[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key\n\nThe attached patch makes the following changes:\n\n (1) There\u0027s a new special key type called \".request_key_auth\".\n\n This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and\n another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be\n created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.\n\n Authorisation keys hold two references:\n\n (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being\n \t constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,\n \t rendering it of no further use.\n\n (b) The \"authorising process\". This is either:\n\n \t (i) the process that called request_key(), or:\n\n \t (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an\n \t authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising\n \t process referred to by that authorisation key will also be\n \t referred to by the new authorisation key.\n\n\t This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests\n\t will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with\n\t the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.\n\n (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to\n /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.\n\n (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if\n it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the\n calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process\n specified therein and it will use the specified process\u0027s credentials\n (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process\u0027s\n credentials.\n\n This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging\n to the authorising process.\n\n (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn\u0027t have\n direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the\n keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the\n calling process\u0027s session keyring, and is searchable using the\n credentials of the authorising process.\n\n This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging\n to the authorising process.\n\n (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or\n KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather\n than the process doing the instantiation.\n\n (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which\n request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is\n done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*\n constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.\n\n (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another\n process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits\n a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.\n\nSigned-Off-By: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot \u003cbenoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@osdl.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@osdl.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2", "tree": "0bba044c4ce775e45a88a51686b5d9f90697ea9d", "parents": [], "author": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org", "time": "Sat Apr 16 15:20:36 2005 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org", "time": "Sat Apr 16 15:20:36 2005 -0700" }, "message": "Linux-2.6.12-rc2\n\nInitial git repository build. I\u0027m not bothering with the full history,\neven though we have it. We can create a separate \"historical\" git\narchive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it\u0027s about\n3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early\ngit days unnecessarily complicated, when we don\u0027t have a lot of good\ninfrastructure for it.\n\nLet it rip!\n" } ] }