diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 5c6f2cd..db1fca9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1547,6 +1547,18 @@
 	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
 }
 
+/* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
+static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+				     struct file *file,
+				     u32 av)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
+	ad.u.path = file->f_path;
+	return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad, 0);
+}
+
 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
    access an inode in a given way.  Check access to the
    descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
@@ -2141,14 +2153,14 @@
 			struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
 
 			/* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
-			   Use path_has_perm on the tty path directly rather
-			   than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
-			   file may belong to another process and we are only
-			   interested in the inode-based check here. */
+			   Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
+			   rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
+			   open file may belong to another process and we are
+			   only interested in the inode-based check here. */
 			file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
 						struct tty_file_private, list);
 			file = file_priv->file;
-			if (path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
+			if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
 				drop_tty = 1;
 		}
 		spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
@@ -3259,7 +3271,7 @@
 	 * new inode label or new policy.
 	 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
 	 */
-	return path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, open_file_to_av(file));
+	return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
 }
 
 /* task security operations */