)]}' { "log": [ { "commit": "2606fd1fa5710205b23ee859563502aa18362447", "tree": "f79becd7010a2da1a765829fce0e09327cd50531", "parents": [ "15714f7b58011cf3948cab2988abea560240c74f" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@redhat.com", "time": "Wed Oct 13 16:24:41 2010 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Thu Oct 21 10:12:48 2010 +1100" }, "message": "secmark: make secmark object handling generic\n\nRight now secmark has lots of direct selinux calls. Use all LSM calls and\nremove all SELinux specific knowledge. The only SELinux specific knowledge\nwe leave is the mode. The only point is to make sure that other LSMs at\nleast test this generic code before they assume it works. (They may also\nhave to make changes if they do not represent labels as strings)\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Patrick McHardy \u003ckaber@trash.net\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "b34d8915c413acb51d837a45fb8747b61f65c020", "tree": "ced5fac166324634653d84b1afe2b958b3904f4d", "parents": [ "e8a89cebdbaab14caaa26debdb4ffd493b8831af", "f33ebbe9da2c3c24664a0ad4f8fd83f293547e63" ], "author": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Tue Aug 10 12:07:51 2010 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Tue Aug 10 12:07:51 2010 -0700" }, "message": "Merge branch \u0027writable_limits\u0027 of git://decibel.fi.muni.cz/~xslaby/linux\n\n* \u0027writable_limits\u0027 of git://decibel.fi.muni.cz/~xslaby/linux:\n unistd: add __NR_prlimit64 syscall numbers\n rlimits: implement prlimit64 syscall\n rlimits: switch more rlimit syscalls to do_prlimit\n rlimits: redo do_setrlimit to more generic do_prlimit\n rlimits: add rlimit64 structure\n rlimits: do security check under task_lock\n rlimits: allow setrlimit to non-current tasks\n rlimits: split sys_setrlimit\n rlimits: selinux, do rlimits changes under task_lock\n rlimits: make sure -\u003erlim_max never grows in sys_setrlimit\n rlimits: add task_struct to update_rlimit_cpu\n rlimits: security, add task_struct to setrlimit\n\nFix up various system call number conflicts. We not only added fanotify\nsystem calls in the meantime, but asm-generic/unistd.h added a wait4\nalong with a range of reserved per-architecture system calls.\n" }, { "commit": "dce3a3d2ee038d230323fe06b061dbaace6b8f94", "tree": "0c3f258fe162379db0fbbb2de783d8dbd8b15c92", "parents": [ "b8bc83ab4dcbc9938b95a90bbb50d89d1904d5ab" ], "author": { "name": "Chihau Chau", "email": "chihau@gmail.com", "time": "Fri Jul 16 12:11:54 2010 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Aug 02 15:35:00 2010 +1000" }, "message": "Security: capability: code style issue\n\nThis fix a little code style issue deleting a space between a function\nname and a open parenthesis.\n\nSigned-off-by: Chihau Chau \u003cchihau@gmail.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Andrew G. Morgan \u003cmorgan@kernel.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "ea0d3ab239fba48d6e998b19c28d78f765963007", "tree": "c1e20273bf121a4f404ca7ac2a012161b0e0201e", "parents": [ "3e62cbb8436f6c0cb799c8b7f106de7f662a7b8d" ], "author": { "name": "Tetsuo Handa", "email": "penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp", "time": "Wed Jun 02 13:24:43 2010 +0900" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Aug 02 15:33:40 2010 +1000" }, "message": "LSM: Remove unused arguments from security_path_truncate().\n\nWhen commit be6d3e56a6b9b3a4ee44a0685e39e595073c6f0d \"introduce new LSM hooks\nwhere vfsmount is available.\" was proposed, regarding security_path_truncate(),\nonly \"struct file *\" argument (which AppArmor wanted to use) was removed.\nBut length and time_attrs arguments are not used by TOMOYO nor AppArmor.\nThus, let\u0027s remove these arguments.\n\nSigned-off-by: Tetsuo Handa \u003cpenguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp\u003e\nAcked-by: Nick Piggin \u003cnpiggin@suse.de\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "8fd00b4d7014b00448eb33cf0590815304769798", "tree": "f97cc5b4401dd038e539dae7ad66066383012866", "parents": [ "2f7989efd4398d92b8adffce2e07dd043a0895fe" ], "author": { "name": "Jiri Slaby", "email": "jirislaby@gmail.com", "time": "Wed Aug 26 18:41:16 2009 +0200" }, "committer": { "name": "Jiri Slaby", "email": "jirislaby@gmail.com", "time": "Fri Jul 16 09:48:45 2010 +0200" }, "message": "rlimits: security, add task_struct to setrlimit\n\nAdd task_struct to task_setrlimit of security_operations to be able to set\nrlimit of task other than current.\n\nSigned-off-by: Jiri Slaby \u003cjirislaby@gmail.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "c80901f2755c582e3096e6708028a8daca59e6e2", "tree": "eaf353e1736d7f7f99f04b4c086e4bbbff4af854", "parents": [ "7762fbfffdbce8191f5236d5053b290035d3d749" ], "author": { "name": "Tetsuo Handa", "email": "penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp", "time": "Fri May 14 12:01:26 2010 +0900" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon May 17 09:27:20 2010 +1000" }, "message": "LSM: Add __init to fixup function.\n\nregister_security() became __init function.\nSo do verify() and security_fixup_ops().\n\nSigned-off-by: Tetsuo Handa \u003cpenguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "05b90496f2f366b9d3eea468351888ddf010782a", "tree": "5c6b3c5167d4577043e74bb8590a6a4ed48c0bdf", "parents": [ "3011a344cdcda34cdbcb40c3fb3d1a6e89954abb" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@redhat.com", "time": "Wed Apr 07 15:15:25 2010 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Apr 12 12:19:19 2010 +1000" }, "message": "security: remove dead hook acct\n\nUnused hook. Remove.\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "3011a344cdcda34cdbcb40c3fb3d1a6e89954abb", "tree": "43db9abc5f96cd8ec31a4a24f0d52dae76680a1c", "parents": [ "6307f8fee295b364716d28686df6e69c2fee751a" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@redhat.com", "time": "Wed Apr 07 15:15:19 2010 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Apr 12 12:19:18 2010 +1000" }, "message": "security: remove dead hook key_session_to_parent\n\nUnused hook. Remove.\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "6307f8fee295b364716d28686df6e69c2fee751a", "tree": "da2d51edcca32dd71c2a3a6f74bf56e88a60293f", "parents": [ "06ad187e280e725e356c62c3a30ddcd01564f8be" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@redhat.com", "time": "Wed Apr 07 15:15:13 2010 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Apr 12 12:19:18 2010 +1000" }, "message": "security: remove dead hook task_setgroups\n\nUnused hook. Remove.\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "06ad187e280e725e356c62c3a30ddcd01564f8be", "tree": "5406ae3382d62971ed8b981533075657aa18d16b", "parents": [ "43ed8c3b4573d5f5cd314937fee63b4ab046ac5f" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@redhat.com", "time": "Wed Apr 07 15:15:08 2010 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Apr 12 12:19:17 2010 +1000" }, "message": "security: remove dead hook task_setgid\n\nUnused hook. Remove.\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "43ed8c3b4573d5f5cd314937fee63b4ab046ac5f", "tree": "bb3f094daa6f0c3f49c4c47fb5ac1c80a26e9698", "parents": [ "0968d0060a3c885e53d453380266c7792a55d302" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@redhat.com", "time": "Wed Apr 07 15:15:02 2010 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Apr 12 12:19:16 2010 +1000" }, "message": "security: remove dead hook task_setuid\n\nUnused hook. Remove.\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "0968d0060a3c885e53d453380266c7792a55d302", "tree": "b8511f3bf4aa4cfb21421ab5dde8346f0119dbe3", "parents": [ "9d5ed77dadc66a72b40419c91df942adfa55a102" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@redhat.com", "time": "Wed Apr 07 15:14:56 2010 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Apr 12 12:19:15 2010 +1000" }, "message": "security: remove dead hook cred_commit\n\nUnused hook. Remove.\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "9d5ed77dadc66a72b40419c91df942adfa55a102", "tree": "eb55062edf757a7b7fe707adda7178181f8a4427", "parents": [ "91a9420f5826db482030c21eca8c507271bbc441" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@redhat.com", "time": "Wed Apr 07 15:14:50 2010 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Apr 12 12:19:15 2010 +1000" }, "message": "security: remove dead hook inode_delete\n\nUnused hook. Remove.\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "91a9420f5826db482030c21eca8c507271bbc441", "tree": "e5e400622884c8c0cd373c51ee4a3822c853aaa5", "parents": [ "3db291017753e539af64c8bab373785f34e43ed2" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@redhat.com", "time": "Wed Apr 07 15:14:45 2010 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Apr 12 12:18:32 2010 +1000" }, "message": "security: remove dead hook sb_post_pivotroot\n\nUnused hook. Remove.\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "3db291017753e539af64c8bab373785f34e43ed2", "tree": "e6759c7dea1774465b6bf2860a0c2f283c0b34fa", "parents": [ "82dab10453d65ad9ca551de5b8925673ca05c7e9" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@redhat.com", "time": "Wed Apr 07 15:14:39 2010 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Apr 12 12:18:31 2010 +1000" }, "message": "security: remove dead hook sb_post_addmount\n\nUnused hook. Remove.\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "82dab10453d65ad9ca551de5b8925673ca05c7e9", "tree": "942bf24adb67b534fa3080dbbfa1ffe33b7c16bd", "parents": [ "4b61d12c84293ac061909f27f567c1905e4d90e3" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@redhat.com", "time": "Wed Apr 07 15:14:33 2010 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Apr 12 12:18:30 2010 +1000" }, "message": "security: remove dead hook sb_post_remount\n\nUnused hook. Remove.\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "4b61d12c84293ac061909f27f567c1905e4d90e3", "tree": "dfab10311d1b6be7667600307c72379c6779d32d", "parents": [ "231923bd0e06cba69f7c2028f4a68602b8d22160" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@redhat.com", "time": "Wed Apr 07 15:14:27 2010 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Apr 12 12:18:30 2010 +1000" }, "message": "security: remove dead hook sb_umount_busy\n\nUnused hook. Remove.\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "231923bd0e06cba69f7c2028f4a68602b8d22160", "tree": "91e3864e87f3de86de8ad0ed55a829cbdf797545", "parents": [ "353633100d8d684ac0acae4ce93fb833f92881f4" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@redhat.com", "time": "Wed Apr 07 15:14:21 2010 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Apr 12 12:18:29 2010 +1000" }, "message": "security: remove dead hook sb_umount_close\n\nUnused hook. Remove.\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "353633100d8d684ac0acae4ce93fb833f92881f4", "tree": "d45effdd09f5ef2f2c44bbcfcca8751cc5cdbd7d", "parents": [ "c1a7368a6f0b18b10fdec87972da680ebdf03794" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@redhat.com", "time": "Wed Apr 07 15:14:15 2010 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Apr 12 12:18:28 2010 +1000" }, "message": "security: remove sb_check_sb hooks\n\nUnused hook. Remove it.\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "189b3b1c89761054fee3438f063d7f257306e2d8", "tree": "8099352fa731fca91b95d862ac0d7199f21ca54d", "parents": [ "2ae3ba39389b51d8502123de0a59374bec899c4d" ], "author": { "name": "wzt.wzt@gmail.com", "email": "wzt.wzt@gmail.com", "time": "Tue Feb 23 23:15:28 2010 +0800" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Wed Feb 24 08:11:02 2010 +1100" }, "message": "Security: add static to security_ops and default_security_ops variable\n\nEnhance the security framework to support resetting the active security\nmodule. This eliminates the need for direct use of the security_ops and\ndefault_security_ops variables outside of security.c, so make security_ops\nand default_security_ops static. Also remove the secondary_ops variable as\na cleanup since there is no use for that. secondary_ops was originally used by\nSELinux to call the \"secondary\" security module (capability or dummy),\nbut that was replaced by direct calls to capability and the only\nremaining use is to save and restore the original security ops pointer\nvalue if SELinux is disabled by early userspace based on /etc/selinux/config.\nFurther, if we support this directly in the security framework, then we can\njust use \u0026default_security_ops for this purpose since that is now available.\n\nSigned-off-by: Zhitong Wang \u003czhitong.wangzt@alibaba-inc.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "dd8dbf2e6880e30c00b18600c962d0cb5a03c555", "tree": "24835aaf40cec5ceb2aeecccde9240ee173f70f1", "parents": [ "6e65f92ff0d6f18580737321718d09035085a3fb" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@redhat.com", "time": "Tue Nov 03 16:35:32 2009 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Tue Nov 10 09:33:46 2009 +1100" }, "message": "security: report the module name to security_module_request\n\nFor SELinux to do better filtering in userspace we send the name of the\nmodule along with the AVC denial when a program is denied module_request.\n\nExample output:\n\ntype\u003dSYSCALL msg\u003daudit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : arch\u003dx86_64 syscall\u003dwrite success\u003dyes exit\u003d2 a0\u003d3 a1\u003d7fc28c0d56c0 a2\u003d2 a3\u003d7fffca0d7440 items\u003d0 ppid\u003d1727 pid\u003d1729 auid\u003dunset uid\u003droot gid\u003droot euid\u003droot suid\u003droot fsuid\u003droot egid\u003droot sgid\u003droot fsgid\u003droot tty\u003d(none) ses\u003dunset comm\u003drpc.nfsd exe\u003d/usr/sbin/rpc.nfsd subj\u003dsystem_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 key\u003d(null)\ntype\u003dAVC msg\u003daudit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : avc: denied { module_request } for pid\u003d1729 comm\u003drpc.nfsd kmod\u003d\"net-pf-10\" scontext\u003dsystem_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 tcontext\u003dsystem_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tclass\u003dsystem\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "8b8efb44033c7e86b3dc76f825c693ec92ae30e9", "tree": "8cf43afc59f88f36a86f3a8165770bccec28b3c3", "parents": [ "89eda06837094ce9f34fae269b8773fcfd70f046" ], "author": { "name": "Tetsuo Handa", "email": "penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp", "time": "Sun Oct 04 21:49:48 2009 +0900" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Oct 12 10:56:02 2009 +1100" }, "message": "LSM: Add security_path_chroot().\n\nThis patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chroot() operations.\n\nThis hook is used by TOMOYO.\n\nSigned-off-by: Tetsuo Handa \u003cpenguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "89eda06837094ce9f34fae269b8773fcfd70f046", "tree": "dc11701c68ebcc8346d7567cfb53b9c7327ef445", "parents": [ "941fc5b2bf8f7dd1d0a9c502e152fa719ff6578e" ], "author": { "name": "Tetsuo Handa", "email": "penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp", "time": "Sun Oct 04 21:49:47 2009 +0900" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Oct 12 10:56:00 2009 +1100" }, "message": "LSM: Add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown().\n\nThis patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chmod()/chown()\noperations. Since notify_change() does not receive \"struct vfsmount *\",\nwe add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown() to the caller of\nnotify_change().\n\nThese hooks are used by TOMOYO.\n\nSigned-off-by: Tetsuo Handa \u003cpenguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "1ee65e37e904b959c24404139f5752edc66319d5", "tree": "587c1ef70ae7ee41a7b9b531161a4ef5689838f7", "parents": [ "b1ab7e4b2a88d3ac13771463be8f302ce1616cfc" ], "author": { "name": "David P. Quigley", "email": "dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov", "time": "Thu Sep 03 14:25:57 2009 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Thu Sep 10 10:11:24 2009 +1000" }, "message": "LSM/SELinux: inode_{get,set,notify}secctx hooks to access LSM security context information.\n\nThis patch introduces three new hooks. The inode_getsecctx hook is used to get\nall relevant information from an LSM about an inode. The inode_setsecctx is\nused to set both the in-core and on-disk state for the inode based on a context\nderived from inode_getsecctx.The final hook inode_notifysecctx will notify the\nLSM of a change for the in-core state of the inode in question. These hooks are\nfor use in the labeled NFS code and addresses concerns of how to set security\non an inode in a multi-xattr LSM. For historical reasons Stephen Smalley\u0027s\nexplanation of the reason for these hooks is pasted below.\n\nQuote Stephen Smalley\n\ninode_setsecctx: Change the security context of an inode. Updates the\nin core security context managed by the security module and invokes the\nfs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing\nxattrs that represent the context. Example usage: NFS server invokes\nthis hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the\nbacking file system to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR\noperation.\n\ninode_notifysecctx: Notify the security module of what the security\ncontext of an inode should be. Initializes the incore security context\nmanaged by the security module for this inode. Example usage: NFS\nclient invokes this hook to initialize the security context in its\nincore inode to the value provided by the server for the file when the\nserver returned the file\u0027s attributes to the client.\n\nSigned-off-by: David P. Quigley \u003cdpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "ee18d64c1f632043a02e6f5ba5e045bb26a5465f", "tree": "80b5a4d530ec7d5fd69799920f0db7b78aba6b9d", "parents": [ "d0420c83f39f79afb82010c2d2cafd150eef651b" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Wed Sep 02 09:14:21 2009 +0100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Wed Sep 02 21:29:22 2009 +1000" }, "message": "KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process\u0027s session keyring on its parent [try #6]\n\nAdd a keyctl to install a process\u0027s session keyring onto its parent. This\nreplaces the parent\u0027s session keyring. Because the COW credential code does\nnot permit one process to change another process\u0027s credentials directly, the\nchange is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this\nwill be after a wait*() syscall.\n\nTo support this, three new security hooks have been provided:\ncred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in\nthe blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if\nthe process may replace its parent\u0027s session keyring.\n\nThe replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details\nas its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and\nthe session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.\n\nNote that this requires alteration to each architecture\u0027s notify_resume path.\nThis has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of\nwhich need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the\nreplacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace\nexecution.\n\nThis allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and\nthe VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to\nalter the parent process\u0027s PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn\u0027t use\nPAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session\nkeyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed\nthe newpag flag.\n\nThis can be tested with the following program:\n\n\t#include \u003cstdio.h\u003e\n\t#include \u003cstdlib.h\u003e\n\t#include \u003ckeyutils.h\u003e\n\n\t#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT\t18\n\n\t#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) \u003d\u003d -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)\n\n\tint main(int argc, char **argv)\n\t{\n\t\tkey_serial_t keyring, key;\n\t\tlong ret;\n\n\t\tkeyring \u003d keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);\n\t\tOSERROR(keyring, \"keyctl_join_session_keyring\");\n\n\t\tkey \u003d add_key(\"user\", \"a\", \"b\", 1, keyring);\n\t\tOSERROR(key, \"add_key\");\n\n\t\tret \u003d keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);\n\t\tOSERROR(ret, \"KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT\");\n\n\t\treturn 0;\n\t}\n\nCompiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:\n\n\t[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show\n\tSession Keyring\n\t -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses\n\t355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \\_ keyring: _uid.4043\n\t[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag\n\t[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show\n\tSession Keyring\n\t -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses\n\t1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \\_ user: a\n\t[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello\n\t[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show\n\tSession Keyring\n\t -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello\n\t340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \\_ user: a\n\nWhere the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named\n\u0027a\u0027 into it and then installs it on its parent.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "2b980dbd77d229eb60588802162c9659726b11f4", "tree": "78a7f734d0721029e4b4c961ca61d35abe9e6dbc", "parents": [ "d8e180dcd5bbbab9cd3ff2e779efcf70692ef541" ], "author": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Fri Aug 28 18:12:43 2009 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Tue Sep 01 08:29:48 2009 +1000" }, "message": "lsm: Add hooks to the TUN driver\n\nThe TUN driver lacks any LSM hooks which makes it difficult for LSM modules,\nsuch as SELinux, to enforce access controls on network traffic generated by\nTUN users; this is particularly problematic for virtualization apps such as\nQEMU and KVM. This patch adds three new LSM hooks designed to control the\ncreation and attachment of TUN devices, the hooks are:\n\n * security_tun_dev_create()\n Provides access control for the creation of new TUN devices\n\n * security_tun_dev_post_create()\n Provides the ability to create the necessary socket LSM state for newly\n created TUN devices\n\n * security_tun_dev_attach()\n Provides access control for attaching to existing, persistent TUN devices\n and the ability to update the TUN device\u0027s socket LSM state as necessary\n\nSigned-off-by: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@parisplace.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nAcked-by: David S. Miller \u003cdavem@davemloft.net\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "9188499cdb117d86a1ea6b04374095b098d56936", "tree": "7c0dd23f2c98630c426cbd0bfbf5e46cc689091e", "parents": [ "a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@redhat.com", "time": "Thu Aug 13 09:44:57 2009 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Aug 14 11:18:37 2009 +1000" }, "message": "security: introducing security_request_module\n\nCalling request_module() will trigger a userspace upcall which will load a\nnew module into the kernel. This can be a dangerous event if the process\nable to trigger request_module() is able to control either the modprobe\nbinary or the module binary. This patch adds a new security hook to\nrequest_module() which can be used by an LSM to control a processes ability\nto call request_module().\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "7c73875e7dda627040b12c19b01db634fa7f0fd1", "tree": "f8f4df20bdcafb1bd981c8a7b0797d13b2625b27", "parents": [ "012a5299a29672039f42944a37984558393ef769" ], "author": { "name": "Eric Paris", "email": "eparis@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Jul 31 12:53:58 2009 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Thu Aug 06 09:02:17 2009 +1000" }, "message": "Capabilities: move cap_file_mmap to commoncap.c\n\nCurrently we duplicate the mmap_min_addr test in cap_file_mmap and in\nsecurity_file_mmap if !CONFIG_SECURITY. This patch moves cap_file_mmap\ninto commoncap.c and then calls that function directly from\nsecurity_file_mmap ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY like all of the other capability\nchecks are done.\n\nSigned-off-by: Eric Paris \u003ceparis@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "9e48858f7d36a6a3849f1d1b40c3bf5624b4ee7c", "tree": "5d8fe586c5b1bbab36acc3b76b2b4dd1bc538968", "parents": [ "86abcf9cebf7b5ceb33facde297face5ec4d2260" ], "author": { "name": "Ingo Molnar", "email": "mingo@elte.hu", "time": "Thu May 07 19:26:19 2009 +1000" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Thu Jun 25 00:18:05 2009 +1000" }, "message": "security: rename ptrace_may_access \u003d\u003e ptrace_access_check\n\nThe -\u003eptrace_may_access() methods are named confusingly - the real\nptrace_may_access() returns a bool, while these security checks have\na retval convention.\n\nRename it to ptrace_access_check, to reduce the confusion factor.\n\n[ Impact: cleanup, no code changed ]\n\nSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar \u003cmingo@elte.hu\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "8651d5c0b1f874c5b8307ae2b858bc40f9f02482", "tree": "c09bee8fdc4c659d155b47911dc87ce4c09b6676", "parents": [ "58bfbb51ff2b0fdc6c732ff3d72f50aa632b67a2" ], "author": { "name": "Paul Moore", "email": "paul.moore@hp.com", "time": "Fri Mar 27 17:10:48 2009 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Sat Mar 28 15:01:37 2009 +1100" }, "message": "lsm: Remove the socket_post_accept() hook\n\nThe socket_post_accept() hook is not currently used by any in-tree modules\nand its existence continues to cause problems by confusing people about\nwhat can be safely accomplished using this hook. If a legitimate need for\nthis hook arises in the future it can always be reintroduced.\n\nSigned-off-by: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "be6d3e56a6b9b3a4ee44a0685e39e595073c6f0d", "tree": "3a770f4cc676efeba443b28caa1ad195eeff49bc", "parents": [ "6a94cb73064c952255336cc57731904174b2c58f" ], "author": { "name": "Kentaro Takeda", "email": "takedakn@nttdata.co.jp", "time": "Wed Dec 17 13:24:15 2008 +0900" }, "committer": { "name": "Al Viro", "email": "viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk", "time": "Wed Dec 31 18:07:37 2008 -0500" }, "message": "introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.\n\nAdd new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying\noperations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved.\n\nSigned-off-by: Kentaro Takeda \u003ctakedakn@nttdata.co.jp\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Tetsuo Handa \u003cpenguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Toshiharu Harada \u003charadats@nttdata.co.jp\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Al Viro \u003cviro@zeniv.linux.org.uk\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "12204e24b1330428c3062faee10a0d80b8a5cb61", "tree": "d92ee705a86f0ec2bf85c8a797239dbb840d5927", "parents": [ "459c19f524a9d89c65717a7d061d5f11ecf6bcb8" ], "author": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Dec 19 10:44:42 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Sat Dec 20 09:02:39 2008 +1100" }, "message": "security: pass mount flags to security_sb_kern_mount()\n\nPass mount flags to security_sb_kern_mount(), so security modules\ncan determine if a mount operation is being performed by the kernel.\n\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "3a3b7ce9336952ea7b9564d976d068a238976c9d", "tree": "3f0a3be33022492161f534636a20a4b1059f8236", "parents": [ "1bfdc75ae077d60a01572a7781ec6264d55ab1b9" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:28 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:28 2008 +1100" }, "message": "CRED: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions\n\nAllow kernel services to override LSM settings appropriate to the actions\nperformed by a task by duplicating a set of credentials, modifying it and then\nusing task_struct::cred to point to it when performing operations on behalf of\na task.\n\nThis is used, for example, by CacheFiles which has to transparently access the\ncache on behalf of a process that thinks it is doing, say, NFS accesses with a\npotentially inappropriate (with respect to accessing the cache) set of\ncredentials.\n\nThis patch provides two LSM hooks for modifying a task security record:\n\n (*) security_kernel_act_as() which allows modification of the security datum\n with which a task acts on other objects (most notably files).\n\n (*) security_kernel_create_files_as() which allows modification of the\n security datum that is used to initialise the security data on a file that\n a task creates.\n\nThe patch also provides four new credentials handling functions, which wrap the\nLSM functions:\n\n (1) prepare_kernel_cred()\n\n Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service to use, based either on\n a daemon\u0027s credentials or on init_cred. All the keyrings are cleared.\n\n (2) set_security_override()\n\n Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials to a specific security\n context, assuming permission from the LSM policy.\n\n (3) set_security_override_from_ctx()\n\n As (2), but takes the security context as a string.\n\n (4) set_create_files_as()\n\n Set the file creation LSM security ID in a set of credentials to be the\n same as that on a particular inode.\n\nSigned-off-by: Casey Schaufler \u003ccasey@schaufler-ca.com\u003e [Smack changes]\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "a6f76f23d297f70e2a6b3ec607f7aeeea9e37e8d", "tree": "8f95617996d0974507f176163459212a7def8b9a", "parents": [ "d84f4f992cbd76e8f39c488cf0c5d123843923b1" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:24 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:24 2008 +1100" }, "message": "CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials\n\nMake execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set\nup the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point\nof no return.\n\nThis patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux\ntestsuite.\n\nThis patch makes several logical sets of alteration:\n\n (1) execve().\n\n The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part,\n replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm-\u003ecred). This means that\n all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point\n of no return with no possibility of failure.\n\n I would like to replace bprm-\u003ecap_effective with:\n\n\tcap_isclear(bprm-\u003ecap_effective)\n\n but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1\n (they always retain their parent\u0027s capability masks where normally they\u0027d\n be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()).\n\n The following sequence of events now happens:\n\n (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task\u0027s cred_exec_mutex is\n \t locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of\n \t creds that we make.\n\n (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current\n \t task\u0027s credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to\n \t bprm-\u003ecred.\n\n \t This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free()\n \t unnecessary, and so they\u0027ve been removed.\n\n (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately\n \t after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in\n \t bprm-\u003eunsafe for future reference.\n\n (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times.\n\n \t (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds\n \t attached to bprm-\u003ecred. Personality bit clearance is recorded,\n \t but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet\n \t fail.\n\n (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should\n\t calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm-\u003ecred.\n\n\t This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of\n\t security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed).\n\t Anything that might fail must be done at this point.\n\n (iii) bprm-\u003ecred_prepared is set to 1.\n\n\t bprm-\u003ecred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security\n\t calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux\n\t in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and\n\t not on the interpreter.\n\n (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This\n \t performs the following steps with regard to credentials:\n\n\t (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that\n\t may not be covered by commit_creds().\n\n (ii) Clear any bits in current-\u003epersonality that were deferred from\n (c.i).\n\n (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the\n \t new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to\n \t credentials:\n\n (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security\n requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that\n must be done before the credentials are changed.\n\n\t This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and\n\t security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed.\n\t This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail\n\t must have been done in (c.ii).\n\n (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single\n assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable\n should be part of struct creds.\n\n\t (iii) Unlocks the task\u0027s cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing\n\t PTRACE_ATTACH to take place.\n\n (iv) Clears The bprm-\u003ecred pointer as the credentials it was holding\n are now immutable.\n\n (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security\n alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed.\n SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers.\n\n (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds()\n \t to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock\n \t cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been\n \t made.\n\n (2) LSM interface.\n\n A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:\n\n (*) security_bprm_alloc(), -\u003ebprm_alloc_security()\n (*) security_bprm_free(), -\u003ebprm_free_security()\n\n \t Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those.\n\n (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), -\u003ebprm_apply_creds()\n (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), -\u003ebprm_post_apply_creds()\n\n \t Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(),\n \t security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds().\n\n (*) security_bprm_set(), -\u003ebprm_set_security()\n\n \t Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds().\n\n (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), -\u003ebprm_set_creds()\n\n \t New. The new credentials in bprm-\u003ecreds should be checked and set up\n \t as appropriate. bprm-\u003ecred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the\n \t second and subsequent calls.\n\n (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), -\u003ebprm_committing_creds()\n (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), -\u003ebprm_committed_creds()\n\n \t New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This\n \t includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not\n \t fail. When the former is called, the creds haven\u0027t yet been applied\n \t to the process; when the latter is called, they have.\n\n \t The former may access bprm-\u003ecred, the latter may not.\n\n (3) SELinux.\n\n SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM\n interface changes mentioned above:\n\n (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using\n \t the credentials-under-construction approach.\n\n (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on\n \t to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open().\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "d84f4f992cbd76e8f39c488cf0c5d123843923b1", "tree": "fc4a0349c42995715b93d0f7a3c78e9ea9b3f36e", "parents": [ "745ca2475a6ac596e3d8d37c2759c0fbe2586227" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:23 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:23 2008 +1100" }, "message": "CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials\n\nInaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the\ncredentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.\nA process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to\naccess or modify its own credentials.\n\nA mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect\nof PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to\nexecve().\n\nWith this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be\nchanged directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified\nand committed using something like the following sequence of events:\n\n\tstruct cred *new \u003d prepare_creds();\n\tint ret \u003d blah(new);\n\tif (ret \u003c 0) {\n\t\tabort_creds(new);\n\t\treturn ret;\n\t}\n\treturn commit_creds(new);\n\nThere are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active\ncredentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing\nCOW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter\nthe keys in a keyring in use by another task.\n\nTo help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in\nthe task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time\ndiscouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of\ncredentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be\nmodified, except under special circumstances:\n\n (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.\n\n (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.\n\nThe only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit\nusing the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be\nadded by a later patch).\n\nThis patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux\ntestsuite.\n\nThis patch makes several logical sets of alteration:\n\n (1) execve().\n\n This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the\n security code rather than altering the current creds directly.\n\n (2) Temporary credential overrides.\n\n do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and\n temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst\n preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex\n on the thread being dumped.\n\n This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the\n credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering\n the task\u0027s objective credentials.\n\n (3) LSM interface.\n\n A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:\n\n (*) security_capset_check(), -\u003ecapset_check()\n (*) security_capset_set(), -\u003ecapset_set()\n\n \t Removed in favour of security_capset().\n\n (*) security_capset(), -\u003ecapset()\n\n \t New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old\n \t creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new\n \t creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the\n \t new creds, are now const.\n\n (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), -\u003ebprm_apply_creds()\n\n \t Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be\n \t killed if it\u0027s an error.\n\n (*) security_task_alloc(), -\u003etask_alloc_security()\n\n \t Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().\n\n (*) security_cred_free(), -\u003ecred_free()\n\n \t New. Free security data attached to cred-\u003esecurity.\n\n (*) security_prepare_creds(), -\u003ecred_prepare()\n\n \t New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred-\u003esecurity.\n\n (*) security_commit_creds(), -\u003ecred_commit()\n\n \t New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new\n \t security by commit_creds().\n\n (*) security_task_post_setuid(), -\u003etask_post_setuid()\n\n \t Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().\n\n (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), -\u003etask_fix_setuid()\n\n \t Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by\n \t cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with\n \t setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather\n \t than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().\n\n (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), -\u003etask_reparent_to_init()\n\n \t Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred\n \t directly to init\u0027s credentials.\n\n\t NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux\u0027s osid no\n\t longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.\n\n (*) security_key_alloc(), -\u003ekey_alloc()\n (*) security_key_permission(), -\u003ekey_permission()\n\n \t Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to\n \t refer to the security context.\n\n (4) sys_capset().\n\n This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it\n calls have been merged.\n\n (5) reparent_to_kthreadd().\n\n This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using\n commit_thread() to point that way.\n\n (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()\n\n __sigqueue_alloc() can\u0027t stop the target task from changing its creds\n beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable\n user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if\n successful.\n\n switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be\n folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting\n __sigqueue_alloc().\n\n (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.\n\n The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and\n abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying\n it.\n\n security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This\n guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we\u0027ve finished.\n\n The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().\n\n Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into\n commit_creds().\n\n The get functions all simply access the data directly.\n\n (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().\n\n security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn\u0027t\n want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly\n rather than through an argument.\n\n Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even\n if it doesn\u0027t end up using it.\n\n (9) Keyrings.\n\n A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:\n\n (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have\n \t all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.\n \t They may want separating out again later.\n\n (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer\n \t rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.\n\n (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new\n \t thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread\n \t keyring.\n\n (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend\n \t the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.\n\n (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of\n \t credentials to be created, even though it\u0027s not strictly necessary for\n \t process or session keyrings (they\u0027re shared).\n\n(10) Usermode helper.\n\n The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its\n subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set\n of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process\n after it has been cloned.\n\n call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and\n call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven\u0027t been used. A\n special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided\n specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.\n\n call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the\n supplied keyring as the new session keyring.\n\n(11) SELinux.\n\n SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM\n interface changes mentioned above:\n\n (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the\n \t current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock\n \t that covers getting the ptracer\u0027s SID. Whilst this lock ensures that\n \t the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid\n \t until the lock is released, so there\u0027s no point doing it inside the\n \t lock.\n\n(12) is_single_threaded().\n\n This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into\n a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now\n wants to use it too.\n\n The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs\n with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn\u0027t good enough. We really want\n to know if they\u0027re part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).\n\n(13) nfsd.\n\n The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the\n credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials\n down to the functions it calls, but it can\u0027t do that until other patches\n in this series have been applied.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "745ca2475a6ac596e3d8d37c2759c0fbe2586227", "tree": "f87c34bdfbc8542477b16a014bbb4e3b415b286a", "parents": [ "88e67f3b8898c5ea81d2916dd5b8bc9c0c35ba13" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:22 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:22 2008 +1100" }, "message": "CRED: Pass credentials through dentry_open()\n\nPass credentials through dentry_open() so that the COW creds patch can have\nSELinux\u0027s flush_unauthorized_files() pass the appropriate creds back to itself\nwhen it opens its null chardev.\n\nThe security_dentry_open() call also now takes a creds pointer, as does the\ndentry_open hook in struct security_operations.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "f1752eec6145c97163dbce62d17cf5d928e28a27", "tree": "16bc51166d38815092de36a461b845b0b4b522f9", "parents": [ "b6dff3ec5e116e3af6f537d4caedcad6b9e5082a" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:17 2008 +1100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Fri Nov 14 10:39:17 2008 +1100" }, "message": "CRED: Detach the credentials from task_struct\n\nDetach the credentials from task_struct, duplicating them in copy_process()\nand releasing them in __put_task_struct().\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "5cd9c58fbe9ec92b45b27e131719af4f2bd9eb40", "tree": "8573db001b4dc3c2ad97102dda42b841c40b5f6c", "parents": [ "8d0968abd03ec6b407df117adc773562386702fa" ], "author": { "name": "David Howells", "email": "dhowells@redhat.com", "time": "Thu Aug 14 11:37:28 2008 +0100" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Thu Aug 14 22:59:43 2008 +1000" }, "message": "security: Fix setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable()\n\nFix the setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() as it could corrupt the flags\nthe target process if that is not the current process and it is trying to\nchange its own flags in a different way at the same time.\n\n__capable() is using neither atomic ops nor locking to protect t-\u003eflags. This\npatch removes __capable() and introduces has_capability() that doesn\u0027t set\nPF_SUPERPRIV on the process being queried.\n\nThis patch further splits security_ptrace() in two:\n\n (1) security_ptrace_may_access(). This passes judgement on whether one\n process may access another only (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH for ptrace() and\n PTRACE_MODE_READ for /proc), and takes a pointer to the child process.\n current is the parent.\n\n (2) security_ptrace_traceme(). This passes judgement on PTRACE_TRACEME only,\n and takes only a pointer to the parent process. current is the child.\n\n In Smack and commoncap, this uses has_capability() to determine whether\n the parent will be permitted to use PTRACE_ATTACH if normal checks fail.\n This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV.\n\nTwo of the instances of __capable() actually only act on current, and so have\nbeen changed to calls to capable().\n\nOf the places that were using __capable():\n\n (1) The OOM killer calls __capable() thrice when weighing the killability of a\n process. All of these now use has_capability().\n\n (2) cap_ptrace() and smack_ptrace() were using __capable() to check to see\n whether the parent was allowed to trace any process. As mentioned above,\n these have been split. For PTRACE_ATTACH and /proc, capable() is now\n used, and for PTRACE_TRACEME, has_capability() is used.\n\n (3) cap_safe_nice() only ever saw current, so now uses capable().\n\n (4) smack_setprocattr() rejected accesses to tasks other than current just\n after calling __capable(), so the order of these two tests have been\n switched and capable() is used instead.\n\n (5) In smack_file_send_sigiotask(), we need to allow privileged processes to\n receive SIGIO on files they\u0027re manipulating.\n\n (6) In smack_task_wait(), we let a process wait for a privileged process,\n whether or not the process doing the waiting is privileged.\n\nI\u0027ve tested this with the LTP SELinux and syscalls testscripts.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Howells \u003cdhowells@redhat.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Casey Schaufler \u003ccasey@schaufler-ca.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Andrew G. Morgan \u003cmorgan@kernel.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Al Viro \u003cviro@zeniv.linux.org.uk\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "b77b0646ef4efe31a7449bb3d9360fd00f95433d", "tree": "f8487fe832fbe23400c9f98e808555f0251fb158", "parents": [ "a110343f0d6d41f68b7cf8c00b57a3172c67f816" ], "author": { "name": "Al Viro", "email": "viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk", "time": "Thu Jul 17 09:37:02 2008 -0400" }, "committer": { "name": "Al Viro", "email": "viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk", "time": "Sat Jul 26 20:53:22 2008 -0400" }, "message": "[PATCH] pass MAY_OPEN to vfs_permission() explicitly\n\n... and get rid of the last \"let\u0027s deduce mask from nameidata-\u003eflags\"\nbit.\n\nSigned-off-by: Al Viro \u003cviro@zeniv.linux.org.uk\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "6f0f0fd496333777d53daff21a4e3b28c4d03a6d", "tree": "202de67376fce2547b44ae5b016d6424c3c7409c", "parents": [ "93cbace7a058bce7f99319ef6ceff4b78cf45051" ], "author": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Thu Jul 10 17:02:07 2008 +0900" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Jul 14 15:04:06 2008 +1000" }, "message": "security: remove register_security hook\n\nThe register security hook is no longer required, as the capability\nmodule is always registered. LSMs wishing to stack capability as\na secondary module should do so explicitly.\n\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nAcked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman \u003cgregkh@suse.de\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "5915eb53861c5776cfec33ca4fcc1fd20d66dd27", "tree": "d4895b96dfdc227a3abe2f13c093b6f53ac3aef8", "parents": [ "b478a9f9889c81e88077d1495daadee64c0af541" ], "author": { "name": "Miklos Szeredi", "email": "mszeredi@suse.cz", "time": "Thu Jul 03 20:56:05 2008 +0200" }, "committer": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Mon Jul 14 15:03:04 2008 +1000" }, "message": "security: remove dummy module\n\nRemove the dummy module and make the \"capability\" module the default.\n\nCompile and boot tested.\n\nSigned-off-by: Miklos Szeredi \u003cmszeredi@suse.cz\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "3898b1b4ebff8dcfbcf1807e0661585e06c9a91c", "tree": "69a338864dfe654f68064a599c5d0da460df34ac", "parents": [ "4016a1390d07f15b267eecb20e76a48fd5c524ef" ], "author": { "name": "Andrew G. Morgan", "email": "morgan@kernel.org", "time": "Mon Apr 28 02:13:40 2008 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Mon Apr 28 08:58:26 2008 -0700" }, "message": "capabilities: implement per-process securebits\n\nFilesystem capability support makes it possible to do away with (set)uid-0\nbased privilege and use capabilities instead. That is, with filesystem\nsupport for capabilities but without this present patch, it is (conceptually)\npossible to manage a system with capabilities alone and never need to obtain\nprivilege via (set)uid-0.\n\nOf course, conceptually isn\u0027t quite the same as currently possible since few\nuser applications, certainly not enough to run a viable system, are currently\nprepared to leverage capabilities to exercise privilege. Further, many\napplications exist that may never get upgraded in this way, and the kernel\nwill continue to want to support their setuid-0 base privilege needs.\n\nWhere pure-capability applications evolve and replace setuid-0 binaries, it is\ndesirable that there be a mechanisms by which they can contain their\nprivilege. In addition to leveraging the per-process bounding and inheritable\nsets, this should include suppressing the privilege of the uid-0 superuser\nfrom the process\u0027 tree of children.\n\nThe feature added by this patch can be leveraged to suppress the privilege\nassociated with (set)uid-0. This suppression requires CAP_SETPCAP to\ninitiate, and only immediately affects the \u0027current\u0027 process (it is inherited\nthrough fork()/exec()). This reimplementation differs significantly from the\nhistorical support for securebits which was system-wide, unwieldy and which\nhas ultimately withered to a dead relic in the source of the modern kernel.\n\nWith this patch applied a process, that is capable(CAP_SETPCAP), can now drop\nall legacy privilege (through uid\u003d0) for itself and all subsequently\nfork()\u0027d/exec()\u0027d children with:\n\n prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 0x2f);\n\nThis patch represents a no-op unless CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is\nenabled at configure time.\n\n[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix uninitialised var warning]\n[serue@us.ibm.com: capabilities: use cap_task_prctl when !CONFIG_SECURITY]\nSigned-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan \u003cmorgan@kernel.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nReviewed-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nCc: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nCc: Paul Moore \u003cpaul.moore@hp.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "aedb60a67c10a0861af179725d060765262ba0fb", "tree": "4a4a316f9f7d1ab0bf4da2cdd5c802bfb05c947f", "parents": [ "457fb605834504af294916411be128a9b21fc3f6" ], "author": { "name": "Serge Hallyn", "email": "serge@hallyn.com", "time": "Fri Feb 29 15:14:57 2008 +0000" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@linux-foundation.org", "time": "Thu Mar 20 09:46:36 2008 -0700" }, "message": "file capabilities: remove cap_task_kill()\n\nThe original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:\n\n\tcheck_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks.\n\tHowever with file capabilities it becomes possible for an\n\tunprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities\n\tresulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.\n\nHowever now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission\ngranted) when p-\u003euid\u003d\u003dcurrent-\u003euid, the whole hook is worthless,\nand only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases\nwhere it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases\nare basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent\nas per the check in check_kill_permission().\n\nOne example of a still-broken application is \u0027at\u0027 for non-root users.\n\nThis patch removes cap_task_kill().\n\nSigned-off-by: Serge Hallyn \u003cserge@hallyn.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Andrew G. Morgan \u003cmorgan@kernel.org\u003e\nEarlier-version-tested-by: Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino \u003clcapitulino@mandriva.com.br\u003e\nAcked-by: Casey Schaufler \u003ccasey@schaufler-ca.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "b53767719b6cd8789392ea3e7e2eb7b8906898f0", "tree": "a0279dc93c79b94d3865b0f19f6b7b353e20608c", "parents": [ "57c521ce6125e15e99e56c902cb8da96bee7b36d" ], "author": { "name": "Serge E. Hallyn", "email": "serue@us.ibm.com", "time": "Tue Oct 16 23:31:36 2007 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org", "time": "Wed Oct 17 08:43:07 2007 -0700" }, "message": "Implement file posix capabilities\n\nImplement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a\nsubset of root\u0027s powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use\nsetuid and giving the binary all of root\u0027s powers.\n\nThis version works with Kaigai Kohei\u0027s userspace tools, found at\nhttp://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this\npatch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at\nhttp://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.\n\nChangelog:\n\tNov 27:\n\tIncorporate fixes from Andrew Morton\n\t(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and\n\tsecurity-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)\n\tFix Kconfig dependency.\n\tFix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.\n\n\tNov 13:\n\tIntegrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from\n\tcapability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.\n\n\tNov 13:\n\tFix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey\n\tDobriyan.\n\n\tNov 09:\n\tAddress warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security\n\twhen file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean\n\tup the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper\n\tfunction.\n\n\tNov 08:\n\tFor pointers to required userspace tools and how to use\n\tthem, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.\n\n\tNov 07:\n\tFix the calculation of the highest bit checked in\n\tcheck_cap_sanity().\n\n\tNov 07:\n\tAllow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since\n\tcapabilities are the default.\n\tHook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.\n\tMove capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce\n\taudit messages.\n\n\tNov 05:\n\tAdd secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and\n\ttask_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file\n\tcap support can be stacked.\n\n\tSep 05:\n\tAs Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place\n\tfor capability code.\n\n\tSep 01:\n\tDefine task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and\n\ttask_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which\n\tthey called a program with some fscaps.\n\n\tOne remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we\n\tok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a\n\tcpuset?\n\n\tIt is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn\u0027t\n\tallow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since\n\tit uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where\n\tCAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,\n\tfixing it might be tough.\n\n\t task_setscheduler\n\t\t note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with\n\t\t CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?\n\t task_setioprio\n\t task_setnice\n\t\t sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another\n\t\t process. Need same checks as setrlimit\n\n\tAug 21:\n\tUpdated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that\n\teuid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process\n\tmight still have elevated caps.\n\n\tAug 15:\n\tHandle endianness of xattrs.\n\tEnforce capability version match between kernel and disk.\n\tEnforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are\n\tset, else return -EPERM.\n\tWith this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering\n\tdoing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than\n\td_instantiate.\n\n\tAug 10:\n\tAlways call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than\n\tcaching it at d_instantiate.\n\n[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]\n[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]\nSigned-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nCc: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nCc: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nCc: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@sous-sol.org\u003e\nCc: Andrew Morgan \u003cmorgan@kernel.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morgan \u003cmorgan@kernel.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Adrian Bunk \u003cbunk@kernel.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "20510f2f4e2dabb0ff6c13901807627ec9452f98", "tree": "d64b9eeb90d577f7f9688a215c4c6c3c2405188a", "parents": [ "5c3b447457789374cdb7b03afe2540d48c649a36" ], "author": { "name": "James Morris", "email": "jmorris@namei.org", "time": "Tue Oct 16 23:31:32 2007 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org", "time": "Wed Oct 17 08:43:07 2007 -0700" }, "message": "security: Convert LSM into a static interface\n\nConvert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security\nmodule is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the\noverall security architecture.\n\nNeedlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API\nabuse.\n\nParameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified\nat boot.\n\nThe SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed.\n\nIn a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface\nis thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree\nmodules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and\ndangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux.\n\n[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups]\n[akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix]\n[randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc]\nSigned-off-by: James Morris \u003cjmorris@namei.org\u003e\nAcked-by: Chris Wright \u003cchrisw@sous-sol.org\u003e\nCc: Stephen Smalley \u003csds@tycho.nsa.gov\u003e\nCc: \"Serge E. Hallyn\" \u003cserue@us.ibm.com\u003e\nAcked-by: Arjan van de Ven \u003carjan@infradead.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Randy Dunlap \u003crandy.dunlap@oracle.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "e63340ae6b6205fef26b40a75673d1c9c0c8bb90", "tree": "8d3212705515edec73c3936bb9e23c71d34a7b41", "parents": [ "04c9167f91e309c9c4ea982992aa08e83b2eb42e" ], "author": { "name": "Randy Dunlap", "email": "randy.dunlap@oracle.com", "time": "Tue May 08 00:28:08 2007 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org", "time": "Tue May 08 11:15:07 2007 -0700" }, "message": "header cleaning: don\u0027t include smp_lock.h when not used\n\nRemove includes of \u003clinux/smp_lock.h\u003e where it is not used/needed.\nSuggested by Al Viro.\n\nBuilds cleanly on x86_64, i386, alpha, ia64, powerpc, sparc,\nsparc64, and arm (all 59 defconfigs).\n\nSigned-off-by: Randy Dunlap \u003crandy.dunlap@oracle.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton \u003cakpm@linux-foundation.org\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds \u003ctorvalds@linux-foundation.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "6ab3d5624e172c553004ecc862bfeac16d9d68b7", "tree": "6d98881fe91fd9583c109208d5c27131b93fa248", "parents": [ "e02169b682bc448ccdc819dc8639ed34a23cedd8" ], "author": { "name": "Jörn Engel", "email": "joern@wohnheim.fh-wedel.de", "time": "Fri Jun 30 19:25:36 2006 +0200" }, "committer": { "name": "Adrian Bunk", "email": "bunk@stusta.de", "time": "Fri Jun 30 19:25:36 2006 +0200" }, "message": "Remove obsolete #include \u003clinux/config.h\u003e\n\nSigned-off-by: Jörn Engel \u003cjoern@wohnheim.fh-wedel.de\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Adrian Bunk \u003cbunk@stusta.de\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "367cb704212cd0c9273ba2b1e62523139210563b", "tree": "cda6402ea19e2b706ad8ac9a186f1e391ab3c6ea", "parents": [ "20ede2741551d4a1d24313292beb0da915a55911" ], "author": { "name": "Sam Ravnborg", "email": "sam@mars.ravnborg.org", "time": "Fri Jan 06 21:17:50 2006 +0100" }, "committer": { "name": "Sam Ravnborg", "email": "sam@mars.ravnborg.org", "time": "Fri Jan 06 21:17:50 2006 +0100" }, "message": "kbuild: un-stringnify KBUILD_MODNAME\n\nNow when kbuild passes KBUILD_MODNAME with \"\" do not __stringify it when\nused. Remove __stringnify for all users.\nThis also fixes the output of:\n\n$ ls -l /sys/module/\ndrwxr-xr-x 4 root root 0 2006-01-05 14:24 pcmcia\ndrwxr-xr-x 4 root root 0 2006-01-05 14:24 pcmcia_core\ndrwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 2006-01-05 14:24 \"processor\"\ndrwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 2006-01-05 14:24 \"psmouse\"\n\nThe quoting of the module names will be gone again.\nThanks to GregKH + Kay Sievers for reproting this.\n\nSigned-off-by: Sam Ravnborg \u003csam@ravnborg.org\u003e\n" }, { "commit": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2", "tree": "0bba044c4ce775e45a88a51686b5d9f90697ea9d", "parents": [], "author": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org", "time": "Sat Apr 16 15:20:36 2005 -0700" }, "committer": { "name": "Linus Torvalds", "email": "torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org", "time": "Sat Apr 16 15:20:36 2005 -0700" }, "message": "Linux-2.6.12-rc2\n\nInitial git repository build. I\u0027m not bothering with the full history,\neven though we have it. We can create a separate \"historical\" git\narchive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it\u0027s about\n3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early\ngit days unnecessarily complicated, when we don\u0027t have a lot of good\ninfrastructure for it.\n\nLet it rip!\n" } ] }